Notes on Strategy
PART ONE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS
INTRODUCTORY
Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.
The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.
War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.
MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY
We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or primary.
Primary objects are the special objects of particular operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the campaign.
Consequently it must be remembered that every particular operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.
Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two kinds — Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.
Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.
Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war and includes:
(1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior [pg 327] object;
(2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces.
Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole resources of the nation for war.
It is a branch of statesmanship which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war.
But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem.
It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versâ. For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versâ. To decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only.
Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.
Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with—
(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation.
(2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.
Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—
(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only.
(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only.
(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together.
[pg 328]
It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.
Hey T - have banter, will travel ....
. Quite seriously, the banter does contain some nuggets that apply here - as from your Julian Stafford Corbett, Some principles of maritime strategy (1911; the same year as Mahan, but more overtly CvC and fairly arguably more modern) - from p.326-328 (emphasis added):
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