The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[slapout9]

pvebber, don't mean to be snarky but were you alive during the embargo? You do know that they physically stopped shipping oil at any price. It was not just a price embargo it was a physical embargo. I remember days when you could not get gas anyplace at any price and when you could there was usually a limit (rationing).

[Backwards Observer]

Ken, Fuchs, PVebber, I don't think you guys are confused, by the questions ask you are seem to be getting it.

Slap, not that it matters what I think, but you seem like a good guy and Warden comes across as sincere; however your admonition that others are slow to 'get' the Theory of Bloodless Airpower while dropped ordnance is still chopping up folks in SEAsia seems uncharitable.

The following articles may be considered controversial:

We heard a terrifying noise which shook the ground; it was as if the earth trembled, rose up and opened beneath our feet. Enormous explosions lit up the sky like huge bolts of lightning; it was the American B-52s.
— Cambodian bombing survivor

Recorded using a groundbreaking IBM-designed system, the database provided extensive information on sorties conducted over Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Clinton’s gift was intended to assist in the search for unexploded ordnance left behind during the carpet bombing of the region. Littering the countryside, often submerged under farmland, this ordnance remains a significant humanitarian concern. It has maimed and killed farmers, and rendered valuable land all but unusable. Development and demining organizations have put the Air Force data to good use over the past six years, but have done so without noting its full implications, which turn out to be staggering.

The still-incomplete database (it has several “dark” periods) reveals that from October 4, 1965, to August 15, 1973, the United States dropped far more ordnance on Cambodia than was previously believed: 2,756,941 tons’ worth, dropped in 230,516 sorties on 113,716 sites. Just over 10 percent of this bombing was indiscriminate, with 3,580 of the sites listed as having “unknown” targets and another 8,238 sites having no target listed at all.

Bombing Cambodia - The Walrus (Canada) - October 2006

Bombs Over Cambodia (pdf) - Yale - October 2006

Benedict F. Kiernan (born 1953 in Melbourne, Australia) is the Whitney Griswold Professor of History, Professor of International and Area Studies and Director of the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University. He is a prolific writer on the Cambodian genocide. Kiernan has also published prize-winning work on the global history of genocide.

Ben Kiernan - Wikipedia

Taylor Owen is Post Doctoral Fellow at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, UBC. His Doctorate is from the University of Oxford where he was Trudeau Scholar. He has been a lecturer at the Trudeau Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto, Research Fellow at the Center for Global Governance at the LSE, Fellow in the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University, was an Action Canada Fellow, has an MA from the University of British Columbia, and has worked as a researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and the International Development Research Center.

Taylor Owen Bio - taylorowen.com

***

The KR Tribunal is a national court, so I guess it makes sense that they are not allowed to put countries on trial. But that is not very satisfying to a lot of people in Cambodia. The folks about to be put on trial are already pointing fingers of responsibility at the US and China while the local farmers still can’t quite believe that one of their own could have killed so many.

From the Cambodia Daily, 25 September: The total weight of bombs that the US dropped on Cambodia during its war with Vietnam may have been five times greater than previously thought, according to a new academic study.

The bombing of Cambodia also began in 1965, more than three years earlier than is widely believed, according to historians Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan whose analysis of US Air Force data released in 2000 appear in the October issue of Canada's The Walrus magazine.

Air Force data indicates that 2,756,941 tons of bombs were dropped in 230,516 sorties over 113,716 sites between 1965 and 1973, the authors say.

This surpasses the bomb weight dropped by the allied forces on all combat theaters during the whole of World War II, which totaled 2 million tons, they write.

...Information Minister and government spokesman Khieu Kanharith said the bombing encouraged rural Cambodians to join the Khmer Rouge. But he said he was not concerned with the numbers of bombs dropped. "We are Buddhists...so we try to forgive and forget," he said.

US Embassy spokesman Jeff Daigle could not be reached for comment.

Uh, forgiving and forgetting is probably a wise choice under the circumstances...

Who Is To Blame? - Trials and Denials In Cambodia - 9/30/2006

Graphic: Sites Bombed by the US Air Force in Cambodia, 1965-73 - 113,716 Sites - 230,516 Sorties - 2,756,941 Tons of Ordnance

[pvebber]

pvebber, don't mean to be snarky but were you alive during the embargo? You do know that they physically stopped shipping oil at any price.

We can start another thead to discuss the embargo if you want. As it pertains to the argument, whether I was alive or not is immaterial. They tried the embargo in 1967 to deter us from supporting Isreal in the 67 war. It was uncoordinated and inconsistently applied so it accomplished little.

I was wrong in describing the 73 embargo as "revenge" with no objective. Knee-jerk on my part I apologize for. It was imposed in retaliation for our aid to Isreal, as a cost-imposing strategy to cause us to end our support to Isreal. It failed to do that. It achieved an effect that we both remember well, but 'causing an effect' is not 'achieving an objective'.

OPEC did not end production, it raised the price and cut production in a series of increments. Wikipedia says a total of 70% in price and 25% in cut production. Oil, being a fungible commodity, can't be "cut off" by the supplier, it just gets redistributed by other customers once they take delivery. Stopping "direct shipments" doesn't mean much, except adding a "pass through tax" as the customer base redistributes what they get at a modest profit. There was a shortage, but not a "stoppage of shippin goil at any price".

The response was not a give in to the OPEC demands, but an INCREASE in aid to Isreal. So from the point of view of achieving a desired outcome, the embargo backfired. Warden might argue it failed because it used a physical CoG to affect the moral domain, and by not being sufficiently cost-imposing, allowed us to adapt and overcome it. It didn't 'break' anything, it just casued an incovenience that we were able to weather. Hence the issue with "bloodless war". It works on that darned, complex, "moral" term in the equation.

Back to the topic, I'll reiterate the problem with a focus on physical destruction:

The fundamental non sequitor is still there. To the extent Warden's theory is about bloodless war (desired!) it is not about airpower. To the extent it is about airpower, it is not about bloodless war (not desired!). To the extent that it is bloodless, it is not about the physical, but the moral (too hard!) and to the extent it is about breaking things and killing people (simple), it must drive that factor quickly to zero. That leads to the resentment and bad peace one is trying to avoid.

This seems to be a fundamental inconsistency in Warden's theory?

[Backwards Observer]

Sorry for going off topic, but here's another useless thought. If US evangelical Christians, senators and congressman feel compelled to do the Jesus thing in foreign countries; maybe putting together a program with the USAF to help Cambodia dispose of some of that ordnance would be helpful. Perhaps this is already being done. If so, Praise the Lord!

Link to a New Zealand company doing UXO clearance in Cambodia and Laos among other places:

Phoenix Clearance Limited Website

Female Bomb Disposal Technicians - Phoenix Clearance

Pic: Laotian UXO Clearance Lady.

[slapout9]

We can start another thead to discuss the embargo if you want. As it pertains to the argument, whether I was alive or not is immaterial. They tried the embargo in 1967 to deter us from supporting Isreal in the 67 war. It was uncoordinated and inconsistently applied so it accomplished little.

The reason I asked is in the past I have found it hard to discuss just how effective it was unless they some personal experience about it(part of the 5 minute attention span America seems to have). OPEC was formed in or around 1960 I believe and in 1967 they had not really become a real threat but by 1973 they were extremely effective. It is also a very concrete example of an attack on a System. The target chosen did not just have a tactical target effect, it had a Strategic System Wide effect, it bypassed our Ring#5 miltary forces and went straight to the inner rings of our country as Warden talks about. It Affected our Leadership, our System Essentials and our Population, some which have lasted to this day.

I was wrong in describing the 73 embargo as "revenge" with no objective. Knee-jerk on my part I apologize for. It was imposed in retaliation for our aid to Isreal, as a cost-imposing strategy to cause us to end our support to Isreal. It failed to do that. It achieved an effect that we both remember well, but 'causing an effect' is not 'achieving an objective'.

No need to apologize, knee-jerk reactions are common to all mankind but I disagree with your conclusion. There was a very clear Arab objective and that was to stop the Israeli counter-attack by conducting a Strategic Systems Essential Ring #2 attack against their supporter(The US) and it worked exactly as you described (that type of strategy is listed in Warden's The Enemy as a System) and as they (OPEC) wanted it to.

OPEC did not end production, it raised the price and cut production in a series of increments. Wikipedia says a total of 70% in price and 25% in cut production. Oil, being a fungible commodity, can't be "cut off" by the supplier, it just gets redistributed by other customers once they take delivery. Stopping "direct shipments" doesn't mean much, except adding a "pass through tax" as the customer base redistributes what they get at a modest profit. There was a shortage, but not a "stoppage of shippin goil at any price".

Again that is exactly what they wanted to do and I disagree Oil is or at least was not fungible, the demand is/was basically inelastic as the economist say.

The response was not a give in to the OPEC demands, but an INCREASE in aid to Isreal. So from the point of view of achieving a desired outcome, the embargo backfired. Warden might argue it failed because it used a physical CoG to affect the moral domain, and by not being sufficiently cost-imposing, allowed us to adapt and overcome it. It didn't 'break' anything, it just casued an incovenience that we were able to weather. Hence the issue with "bloodless war". It works on that darned, complex, "moral" term in the equation.

We did give into OPEC demands. Israel was going to be overun until US Airpower resupplied them with one of the most massive Air Lifts ever accomplished(Israel owes it life to American Airpower) and then when Israel counter-attacked the embargo was placed against the US and in a matter of days we saw a cease fire. But the Arabs were not satisfied and when the embargo was lifted in 1974 OIL had tripled and shortly after the stock market would crash(50% loss in value due to OIL) and we would enter one of the worst recessions we have ever had until 2008.

Back to the topic, I'll reiterate the problem with a focus on physical destruction:

It is about very precise destrcution. Not carpet bombing (unless that is the political objective) more like a laser beam burning through a five dollar part of a million dollar machine.

The fundamental non sequitor is still there. To the extent Warden's theory is about bloodless war (desired!) it is not about airpower. To the extent it is about airpower, it is not about bloodless war (not desired!). To the extent that it is bloodless, it is not about the physical, but the moral (too hard!) and to the extent it is about breaking things and killing people (simple), it must drive that factor quickly to zero. That leads to the resentment and bad peace one is trying to avoid.

This seems to be a fundamental inconsistency in Warden's theory?

No, the article is in 2 parts first is Strategy which is independent of any service the second part is about the future of Airpower, about Precision of impact and Precision of Effect.

[pvebber]

It is also a very concrete example of an attack on a System. The target chosen did not just have a tactical target effect, it had a Strategic System Wide effect, it bypassed our Ring#5 miltary forces and went straight to the inner rings of our country as Warden talks about. It Affected our Leadership, our System Essentials and our Population, some which have lasted to this day

.

Or it was a case of "if you only have 1 card to play, you don't need systems analysis to play it". Just because in hindsight, you can look at the US as a system, and interpret things other people do in terms of system effects, doesn't mean that at the time, they were thinking in terms of system theory.

In any case it appears you have retreated from the notion that war is only about breaking PHYSICAL systems. I will agree to disagree on how good an example the oil embargo is and revel in my (moral) victory

It is about very precise destrcution.

Yes, but to reduce the PHYSICAL side of the outcome equation to ZERO you need to strike lots and lots of targets. That is lots of broken stuff, even if it only has little holes in it breaking it. IF you break an electrical system nationwide, yes you may have done it by breaking a 5$ part, but without power, people will die and bad things will happen, and they will still hold you responsible for shutting their country down and ruining their economy, despite how economically you destroyed it. A devastating effect is a DEVASTATING, regardless of its cause.

No, the article is in 2 parts first is Strategy which is independent of any service the second part is about the future of Airpower, about Precision of impact and Precision of Effect.

But the two parts have to hang together if it is to acheive Warden's intent:

Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can never realize its real capability so long as it remains bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary. On the contrary, if airpower is truly to come of
age, it must do so in the context of a mod#ern concept of war that associates the use of force as directly as possible with end# game strategic objectives, not with the act of fighting. If this is to happen, the opera#tors of airpower must understand, believe, and teach end#game strategy as the foundation of airpower. Failure to do so will con#demn airpower to suboptimization and de#prive its owners of using force in such a dramatically different way that will achieve national objectives quickly and at minimum cost.

The strategy provides the context for airpower's coming out party. Once again the strategy is valuable, the argument has not been made convincingly that it apply's universally to all military problems, or is necessarily better than other strategic methods. Airpower is useful, but not omnipotent and assuming that it is until proven otherwise is not a logical approach as it invites accepting great risk by being disproven only by tragic outcomes, or the expenditure of vast sums.

I don't feel you've satisfactorily addressed the criticisms made to this point. I'm not saying the strategy is "bad" or that airpower does not have value. I'm saying the strategy is but one of many ways to skin the proverbial cat, and that airpower is tool that does not have any more "potential" to be applied to "any problem until proven otherwise" than a hammer does. I will continue use my hammer to drive nails, but turn to a screwdriver to turn screws and a saw to turn one piece of wood into two pieces, despite the fact my hammer can also do those tasks, just not as effectively.

[slapout9]

.

Or it was a case of "if you only have 1 card to play, you don't need systems analysis to play it". Just because in hindsight, you can look at the US as a system, and interpret things other people do in terms of system effects, doesn't mean that at the time, they were thinking in terms of system theory.

Maybe, but it worked so good they did again in 1979 when Iran pulled bascially the same stunt.

In any case it appears you have retreated from the notion that war is only about breaking PHYSICAL systems. I will agree to disagree on how good an example the oil embargo is and revel in my (moral) victory

Retreat! Hell we just got here.(I think some Marine said that) War is about AFFECTING Physical systems, you get 2 points for my poor choice of words.

Yes, but to reduce the PHYSICAL side of the outcome equation to ZERO you need to strike lots and lots of targets. That is lots of broken stuff, even if it only has little holes in it breaking it. IF you break an electrical system nationwide, yes you may have done it by breaking a 5$ part, but without power, people will die and bad things will happen, and they will still hold you responsible for shutting their country down and ruining their economy, despite how economically you destroyed it. A devastating effect is a DEVASTATING, regardless of its cause.

Then those people should be very carfull about attacking my country in the first place.

But the two parts have to hang together if it is to acheive Warden's intent:

The strategy provides the context for airpower's coming out party. Once again the strategy is valuable, the argument has not been made convincingly that it apply's universally to all military problems, or is necessarily better than other strategic methods. Airpower is useful, but not omnipotent and assuming that it is until proven otherwise is not a logical approach as it invites accepting great risk by being disproven only by tragic outcomes, or the expenditure of vast sums.

I don't think he is saying that at all, it's more like we need to find out what all Airpower can truly do, because we have just "assumed" (often because of current technology limits) it has limits, instead of finding out what they actually are.

I don't feel you've satisfactorily addressed the criticisms made to this point. I'm not saying the strategy is "bad" or that airpower does not have value. I'm saying the strategy is but one of many ways to skin the proverbial cat, and that airpower is tool that does not have any more "potential" to be applied to "any problem until proven otherwise" than a hammer does. I will continue use my hammer to drive nails, but turn to a screwdriver to turn screws and a saw to turn one piece of wood into two pieces, despite the fact my hammer can also do those tasks, just not as effectively.

If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.

[Marc]

If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.

Slapout9,

that is indeed the sentence that closes Warden's circular reasoning. His exact phrasing is:

If we cannot or will not operate in the parallel domain, then we should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).

In summary: airpower is the best way to win a war and if it is not, we should not go to war. Allow me to present one concrete example of the implications of this type of circular reasoning. As Warden concedes himself:

Offhand, I can think of only one thing that airpower cannot do and that some other form of military power can: physically take people into custody.

This means that, if Warden had been President George W. Bush's strategist in 1989, Manuel A. Noriega would still be the dictator of Panama. To paraphrase Slapout9's statement: "when people say Airpower can not bring democracy to Panama what they really mean is that Military power can not bring democracy to Panama." Well, if you read a history book about Panama, I think you will have to admit that the facts contradict Warden's circular reasoning.

[Cliff]

Slap, not that it matters what I think, but you seem like a good guy and Warden comes across as sincere; however your admonition that others are slow to 'get' the Theory of Bloodless Airpower while dropped ordnance is still chopping up folks in SEAsia seems uncharitable.

I think Warden would agree with you B.O., and point out that maybe we could have bombed some targets in NVN (ala 1972) instead of Cambodia... Warden is not saying that warfare is bloodless now. He is saying that the potential is there and we should keep trying to get there.

The following articles may be considered controversial:

Why? We bombed the heck out of Cambodia, Laos, and S. Vietnam- more ordnance there than on NVN if I recall correctly. It wasn't pretty. Warden argues we should try and avoid repeating this in the future. I agree.

Cambodia could be a very depressing place based on its' history, but isn't because the people there are so happy and friendly. You have to admire their resilience.

V/R,

Cliff

[Backwards Observer]

Warden is not saying that warfare is bloodless now. He is saying that the potential is there and we should keep trying to get there.

Warden is a visionary, I'm just a random internet clod. My humble suggestion would be that a deeper understanding of how different cultures interact in their own regional contexts rather then attempting to template a system over them might help reduce the confusion and/or chopping. If not, then a better way of persuading/restraining folks than unloading millions 'o' tons of bombs on subsistence farmers would certainly be desirable. I know that's not how it's done no more, just sayin'.

Why?

To be honest, who knows what the f**k is or isn't controversial anymore. Not too long ago, there seemed to be a controversy over who was actually a human being and who wasn't. Wait...folks still ain't sure? Well, there ya go. Maybe we're all just systems. Does that mean some systems are more equal than others?

Cambodia could be a very depressing place based on its' history, but isn't because the people there are so happy and friendly. You have to admire their resilience.

If by 'happy and friendly', you mean 'made a virtue out of region-wide trauma', then sure. I think I know what you're trying to say, er, that is, I think I know what I'm trying to say..

Cliff, I appreciate your taking the time to reply. I gotta say, flying around in the heavens sure seems to make for an enviably upbeat outlook, I say this sincerely. Thanks again.