The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[pvebber]

It is also a very concrete example of an attack on a System. The target chosen did not just have a tactical target effect, it had a Strategic System Wide effect, it bypassed our Ring#5 miltary forces and went straight to the inner rings of our country as Warden talks about. It Affected our Leadership, our System Essentials and our Population, some which have lasted to this day

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Or it was a case of "if you only have 1 card to play, you don't need systems analysis to play it". Just because in hindsight, you can look at the US as a system, and interpret things other people do in terms of system effects, doesn't mean that at the time, they were thinking in terms of system theory.

In any case it appears you have retreated from the notion that war is only about breaking PHYSICAL systems. I will agree to disagree on how good an example the oil embargo is and revel in my (moral) victory

It is about very precise destrcution.

Yes, but to reduce the PHYSICAL side of the outcome equation to ZERO you need to strike lots and lots of targets. That is lots of broken stuff, even if it only has little holes in it breaking it. IF you break an electrical system nationwide, yes you may have done it by breaking a 5$ part, but without power, people will die and bad things will happen, and they will still hold you responsible for shutting their country down and ruining their economy, despite how economically you destroyed it. A devastating effect is a DEVASTATING, regardless of its cause.

No, the article is in 2 parts first is Strategy which is independent of any service the second part is about the future of Airpower, about Precision of impact and Precision of Effect.

But the two parts have to hang together if it is to acheive Warden's intent:

Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can never realize its real capability so long as it remains bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary. On the contrary, if airpower is truly to come of
age, it must do so in the context of a mod#ern concept of war that associates the use of force as directly as possible with end# game strategic objectives, not with the act of fighting. If this is to happen, the opera#tors of airpower must understand, believe, and teach end#game strategy as the foundation of airpower. Failure to do so will con#demn airpower to suboptimization and de#prive its owners of using force in such a dramatically different way that will achieve national objectives quickly and at minimum cost.

The strategy provides the context for airpower's coming out party. Once again the strategy is valuable, the argument has not been made convincingly that it apply's universally to all military problems, or is necessarily better than other strategic methods. Airpower is useful, but not omnipotent and assuming that it is until proven otherwise is not a logical approach as it invites accepting great risk by being disproven only by tragic outcomes, or the expenditure of vast sums.

I don't feel you've satisfactorily addressed the criticisms made to this point. I'm not saying the strategy is "bad" or that airpower does not have value. I'm saying the strategy is but one of many ways to skin the proverbial cat, and that airpower is tool that does not have any more "potential" to be applied to "any problem until proven otherwise" than a hammer does. I will continue use my hammer to drive nails, but turn to a screwdriver to turn screws and a saw to turn one piece of wood into two pieces, despite the fact my hammer can also do those tasks, just not as effectively.