Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
JMA - I'm beginning to understand where you're coming from.

The British follow 10 principles of war, closely related to the US's 9 but distinctly different. Your "selection and maintenance of the aim" is closely related to our "objective."

I think what you're saying is that by setting the aim or objective and following the principle of "mission command" methodology becomes less material than by dictating the methods used.

The mission command concept, being about trust in subordinates, intitiative, flexibility, and ingenuity, seems to be what you're really talking about.

I think mission command has a place in tactics, but less in national security strategy - I think there is still a necessity to get specific.
I see this on a few levels.

First when it was announced that NATO was to take over the command of Operation Odyssey Dawn I read something that made the hair on my neck stand up.

Coalition political committee to steer Libyan action, NATO to enforce no-fly zone

“The political committee will give broad directions for military action, keeping a close eye on avoiding any kind of excess use of force and also to streamline humanitarian aid that is of paramount importance as this whole operation is about humanitarian relief and saving lives from the sanguinary tactics of Gaddafi forces,” added the diplomat on condition of anonymity.
How any self respecting general can accept a command under those conditions I just don't know... maybe that's why they have two admirals

So lets start there with the need for a clear handshake between the politicians and the military. After that the chiefs should protect the force commander from political interference and any perceived need by the politicians to keep a close eye on anything.

As far as the commander is concerned the "best horse for the course" must be appointed. Not just pick the guy on top of the list or as the Brits do in Afghanistan rotate a brigadier through every six months to give all the chaps a chance.

The right guy will then make sure he gets all the intel he needs - even by flying in a bunch of old soldiers in retirement - so as to select the best operational method to achieve the mission (within any given limitations) in the current context, on the applicable terrain, against the specific enemy. Give him the tools and then let him get on with the job - with no oversight from some damn political committee.

Where the confusion seems to creep in seems to be in the hole in the US principles of war where the principle flexibility is missing.

Then the last US principle is Simple. KISS. Even the simple things can be difficult to carryout in a war. Do the politicians understand this?

Then we have what I see as the biggest problem today and that is it takes generals 30 years service and years of staff courses and the like to get into contention to command such an operation only to be tasked, overseen and second-guessed by a bunch of clowns whose only qualification is that their daddy contributed a few million to the President's campaign.

This Libya thing is really Mickey Mouse (or should have been) and was what the boys off that carrier could have wrapped up in an afternoon had the intention been there. The first 48 hours seemed to be bang on then it went all pear shaped.

Where was/is the problem? At the political/military handshake level or with the military or where?