Had to note the brief reference to a French request for US assistance to "resistance groups nor fighting the Japanese in Indo-China".
One of the best sources on Vietnam in this period is Archimedes Patti's Why Viet Nam. You can agree or disagree with his opinions, but there is a vast amount of data there, accurate timelines, detailed breakdowns of personalities and organization, and a wealt of other personal observation (Patti was the OSS officer handling liason with resistance groups.
Patti had a very low opinion of the French; concluded that they had no interest at all in fighting the Japanese and were only concerned with reasserting control after a Japanese defeat.
For some very odd reason I read "HST" as "Hunter S Thompson", producing a surreal moment.
Given what had already transpired, it's hard for me to believe that either party ever had any intention of actually following the agreed-upon course. Doubtless they had their own reasons for signing, but it's unlikely that the agreement was ever taken at face value. In any event, by November of that year the French were already shelling Haiphong.
Worth noting that without timely assistance from the British the French would not have been able to reassert control over Saigon.
I wish more people had listened to the War College Class 1951-1952.
This was a bit jarring:
Many of these conclusions seem completely without basis, unless one assumes that the rest of Southeast Asia would have fallen like dominoes. I doubt that the US "holding the line" had any impact at all on the fortunes of Communist movements in the Philippine and Indonesia, which emerged as a response to local conditions. Thailand also had considerable resilience, provided by the absence of a detested colonial power for Communist organizers to build around.Although in the end a political default, it is now clearly evident that there was an ironic strategic dividend to our presence in Vietnam; namely the impact of the American military "holding the line" for ten years against communist pressures on Southeast Asia thus provided for the Asian countries (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) a shield and hence a breathing spell toward development of greater political matrurity and self confidence as nations. It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world.
The comment "encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians" rather notably fails to mention the slaughter of roughly half a million people under the banner of suppressing the Commies.
I would attribute very little of what happened in SE Asia to FDRs influence... and still less in many other places. David's initial comments kind of sum it up:
FDR would have had to be quite a remarkable individual to play a significant role in events that occurred 10 years after his death.several posts have appeared of late on the role of FDR (President Roosevelt) and the demise post-1956 of the mainly European empires
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