Any discussion of potential "day after" involvement by India in Afghanistan would have to involve specific assessment of the following, all of which were markedly absent from the discussion linked to:

1. What would be the goal? What end state would India seek to achieve in Afghanistan, and by what means and with what probability of success?

2. What would be the costs and risks? Given that supply of forces in Afghanistan would require use of Pakistani airspace (yeah, right) or a very complex arrangement with the Iranians, whose goals may be quite different from India's, there's a lot of potential for trouble, up to and including the possibility of war with Pakistan.

3. What would be the benefits? Exactly what would India gain, and exactly what threat would be averted?
I think I have generally given the answer. But once again:

The goal would be to have a non fundamentalist Afghanistan that is allowed to function on their own compulsions and not forced to adopt a foreign model.

What one forget is how the British handled these difficult tribes not only in the NW but also the NE of India. They made them accept the British as overlords, but gave them total independence to run their areas the way they liked. In spite of the historical antecedent, people are re-inventing the wheel.

If India has to go into Afghanistan, it would be with the concurrence and active support of those who supported the Northern Alliance. It is also obvious that if India has to go into Afghanistan, then the US reservations over Iran would not come into play and there would be no complex arrangement with Iran. In fact, Iran and India have convergence of interests in Afghanistan.

If India was proactive, then it would cause innumerable headaches for Pakistan. The Afghans do not recognise the Durand Line. Even the pro Pakistan Taliban did not recognise the Durand Line. Thus, there is ample scope to for the Pashtunistan issue to be agitated. In will be recalled that Waziristan too is Pashtuns except the Saidgis.

Success is a relative term.

[quote]Also from the article you cited:



This also struck me, in the same piece:



That concern would of course also apply to TAPI... given the state of relations between India and Pakistan there would have to be significant risk to India in embracing any pipeline project that would have to pass through Pakistan, and given the instability and potential for security problems in both Iran and Afghanistan, neither would be a desirable source or conduit for energy supplies.
That is one of the issue regarding the IPI. India insists that it will pay only for the "landed" goods in India through the pipeline. I presume, such a clause could be cranked in to ensure that Indian interests are protected.

TAPI is not a life and death issue for India. If it works out, it will help. If it does not, then some of the shortages in the Indian requirement, India will have to learn to live with.

The article also has a good discussion of how Indian-Iranian relations are constrained not only by American dislike for Iran, but with India's rapidly evolving ties with the GCC, which are very real (as opposed to the rather hypothetical nature of discussions of projects involving Iran and Afghanistan) and involve very large energy and investment deals. he GCC and the Iranians are of course not the best of friends.
From the standpoint of development, the GCC is preferable.

Strategically, Iran is preferable.