I'm sorry, but that's less than obvious to me. The Taliban and the other jihadis already have bases and protection in Pakistan, right on India's border. How would they become more dangerous to India by moving to Afghanistan? They'd still have to go through Pakistan to get to India. What "non-traditional routes to India" exist from Afghanistan, a landlocked nation not bordering India and possessing very limited links to other countries?
I'm sure one could come up with a scenario, but again the question is one of scale. Is that threat severe and imminent enough to justify the enormous risks and costs of going to war in Afghanistan? Isn't there a real possibility that Pakistan-based jihadis would step up attacks on India to try and break India's will to persist in Afghanistan?
Again, such a proposition would, one hopes, be accompanied by a clear assessment of costs and benefits. What, exactly and specifically, is the threat to be averted? How sever is it? Is it severe enough to justify the costs and risks of war, which is an expensive and risky enterprise?
Is that calculation being discussed in public, anywhere? I figure if anyone would have a link, it would be you
Managing your own insurgencies and managing someone else's are very different kettles of fisdh.
Karzai may be fine for India, but what if he isn't so fine for Afghanistan? And what if the Afghans decide something that isn't so fine for India, as is quite likely to be the case?
Absolutely. From the US perspective a "functioning state" in Afghanistan would be a state that does not require US occupation and does not pose any threat to the US. The rest of it doesn't matter. It sounds like India's perspective is much the same.
Do they really? Have they ever, except among a few individuals? If so, where?
US companies undertaking the projects themselves is an excellent way for the US government to give US tax money to US companies. It was done that way for a long time, but it didn't work very well. The point of the exercise, remember, is not to get Afghans to like the US, it's to try to get them to like a government that the US can live with.
Aid is a two-edged sword, it can help and harm. It is no panacea, and its use as a counterinsurgency tool, despite a long history of effort, is spotty at best. Has India discovered some magic bullet that will change all that?
.Southeast Asia has Muslims too, remember?
Yes, lots of people would be worried. Again, though, these powers would be assessing costs and benefits themselves. Is a Taliban Afghanistan a great enough threat to them to make them want to stick their faces into the graveyard of empires? I suspect you'd get much encouragement and little help.
Certainly not. The question is whether fructification can be prevented by engagement in Afghanistan, which is arguably as likely to encourage another 9/11 as to avert one. Let's not forget that the whole point of 9/11 was to force the US to invade and occupy Muslim lands, a situation that AQ is ready and able to exploit.
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