The Indian role in Afghanistan (new title)

[Dayuhan]

What is the bold step that Indian has to take to stay relevant in Afghanistan?

Is the present Indian Govt up to it?

Possibly the Indian Government believes that the risks and costs of "staying relevant in Afghanistan" exceed the benefits? Is that timidity or common sense?

Mindanao, Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago are where the Moros are active. How frequent are their bombings/ suicide attacks elsewhere?

Actually there's very little activity on Palawan, and bombings/suicide attacks aren't the tactics of choice for the primary insurgent groups.

That the Afghan insurgency would not be a totally new experience for Indians is what I was stating. It sure will be a new experience for any Westerner. The psyche and ethos is totally different. It is not so for the Indian, even the insurgency modes, since we have seen it applied in Kashmir for many years.

Does India's logistic support for its forces in Kashmir have to pass through Iran? Just one difference among many. You may of course do as you will, but I would hesitate to assume that the two cases will be similar.

As for the type of help, it will depend on the situation prevailing prior to any change of responsibility. From whom? Those that supported the Northern Alliance and it cannot be that it will be an Indian show alone.

What you expect and what you get can be very different. Unwise to assume that you will have substantial assistance from others. If it comes, wonderful, but if you're going to take on that role the basis of planning should be that you will act alone. The world being what it is, the contributions of others are likely to be token and ephemeral.

I thought I was explaining that all along.

In short. approach the issue in a low tech way, allow them to govern themselves the way they have been doing through centuries and have projects that have small gestation time. Once, the confidence has been built, then go in for high end projects.

You are describing method; my statement referred to purpose. The purpose of the intervention you describe is identical to the American purpose: install or maintain a government that suits the interests of the intervening power. Many of the subsequent issues derive not from method, but from that purpose.

If we'll discuss method, I suspect that you place far too much faith in the capacity of aid projects to resolve insurgency, but I've said that before.

If Pakistan were to be delighted to have India in Afghanistan and do another 1000 cuts, then why are they hell bent that India does not even undertake non military tasks such as re-construction?

Of course the Pakistanis will vocally and vehemently object to any Indian presence in Afghanistan. That's part of the charade, and it doesn't mean that Pak GHQ wouldn't be quite happy to have the ability to target Indian forces by proxy, in a position where the Indians are out on a limb with a shaky supply route and occupying a largely hostile territory. It's the sort of place one like to see one's antagonist. The US objected strenuously to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, but in the long run they were able to use that situation to weaken their adversary fatally. Why wouldn't Pakistan secretly welcome the opportunity to do the same to India?

I don't think Pakistan has any chance of defeating India or India defeating Pakistan. I have explained the rationale earlier.

Certainly there is a possibility that Pakistan could force India to withdraw from Afghanistan without achieving their objectives, if India were to take over the effort to "stabilize" Afghanistan. That would constitute a defeat, not defeat on an absolute scale, but a defeat nonetheless.

The question is whether the benefit to India of trying to stabilize Afghanistan justifies taking that risk.

Have you any evidence to suggest it otherwise?

The evidence would lie in the experience of everyone who has ever tried to occupy and pacify Afghanistan. Sure, maybe they were all just doing it wrong, and if you do it right it will be a cakewalk... but are you prepared to go in with that assumption?

Confidence is the first step to success. Approaching any problem with a half hearted resolve can never help.

A blunt and realistic assessment of the challenge is also critical to success. It is easy for will to evaporate when a task proves harder than expected. Better to assume the worst... political will never becomes a problem when a task proves easier than expected.

No insurgency is congenial. It is not through theory I speak but having been for about 37 years in various forms of insurgency and in various states of intensity.

That is why you shouldn't fight insurgencies unless you have to. Do you have to? Why repeat the US mistake and enter a war of choice against a notoriously intractable insurgency?

However, do explain that if Afghanistan was for revenge, did the US achieve it? If they did not, then why did they swing to Iraq without feeding their revenge? This issue you have failed to answer.

I am not aware that Saddam also was a kingpin in the 9/11 carnage.

Iraq, as I said, involved a whole different set of reasons and decisions, one with no direct relevance to this thread... and if anything this discussion needs more focus, not less.