The Indian role in Afghanistan (new title)

[Dayuhan]

What is the bold step that Indian has to take to stay relevant in Afghanistan?

Is the present Indian Govt up to it?

Possibly the Indian Government believes that the risks and costs of "staying relevant in Afghanistan" exceed the benefits? Is that timidity or common sense?

Mindanao, Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago are where the Moros are active. How frequent are their bombings/ suicide attacks elsewhere?

Actually there's very little activity on Palawan, and bombings/suicide attacks aren't the tactics of choice for the primary insurgent groups.

That the Afghan insurgency would not be a totally new experience for Indians is what I was stating. It sure will be a new experience for any Westerner. The psyche and ethos is totally different. It is not so for the Indian, even the insurgency modes, since we have seen it applied in Kashmir for many years.

Does India's logistic support for its forces in Kashmir have to pass through Iran? Just one difference among many. You may of course do as you will, but I would hesitate to assume that the two cases will be similar.

As for the type of help, it will depend on the situation prevailing prior to any change of responsibility. From whom? Those that supported the Northern Alliance and it cannot be that it will be an Indian show alone.

What you expect and what you get can be very different. Unwise to assume that you will have substantial assistance from others. If it comes, wonderful, but if you're going to take on that role the basis of planning should be that you will act alone. The world being what it is, the contributions of others are likely to be token and ephemeral.

I thought I was explaining that all along.

In short. approach the issue in a low tech way, allow them to govern themselves the way they have been doing through centuries and have projects that have small gestation time. Once, the confidence has been built, then go in for high end projects.

You are describing method; my statement referred to purpose. The purpose of the intervention you describe is identical to the American purpose: install or maintain a government that suits the interests of the intervening power. Many of the subsequent issues derive not from method, but from that purpose.

If we'll discuss method, I suspect that you place far too much faith in the capacity of aid projects to resolve insurgency, but I've said that before.

If Pakistan were to be delighted to have India in Afghanistan and do another 1000 cuts, then why are they hell bent that India does not even undertake non military tasks such as re-construction?

Of course the Pakistanis will vocally and vehemently object to any Indian presence in Afghanistan. That's part of the charade, and it doesn't mean that Pak GHQ wouldn't be quite happy to have the ability to target Indian forces by proxy, in a position where the Indians are out on a limb with a shaky supply route and occupying a largely hostile territory. It's the sort of place one like to see one's antagonist. The US objected strenuously to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, but in the long run they were able to use that situation to weaken their adversary fatally. Why wouldn't Pakistan secretly welcome the opportunity to do the same to India?

I don't think Pakistan has any chance of defeating India or India defeating Pakistan. I have explained the rationale earlier.

Certainly there is a possibility that Pakistan could force India to withdraw from Afghanistan without achieving their objectives, if India were to take over the effort to "stabilize" Afghanistan. That would constitute a defeat, not defeat on an absolute scale, but a defeat nonetheless.

The question is whether the benefit to India of trying to stabilize Afghanistan justifies taking that risk.

Have you any evidence to suggest it otherwise?

The evidence would lie in the experience of everyone who has ever tried to occupy and pacify Afghanistan. Sure, maybe they were all just doing it wrong, and if you do it right it will be a cakewalk... but are you prepared to go in with that assumption?

Confidence is the first step to success. Approaching any problem with a half hearted resolve can never help.

A blunt and realistic assessment of the challenge is also critical to success. It is easy for will to evaporate when a task proves harder than expected. Better to assume the worst... political will never becomes a problem when a task proves easier than expected.

No insurgency is congenial. It is not through theory I speak but having been for about 37 years in various forms of insurgency and in various states of intensity.

That is why you shouldn't fight insurgencies unless you have to. Do you have to? Why repeat the US mistake and enter a war of choice against a notoriously intractable insurgency?

However, do explain that if Afghanistan was for revenge, did the US achieve it? If they did not, then why did they swing to Iraq without feeding their revenge? This issue you have failed to answer.

I am not aware that Saddam also was a kingpin in the 9/11 carnage.

Iraq, as I said, involved a whole different set of reasons and decisions, one with no direct relevance to this thread... and if anything this discussion needs more focus, not less.

[Ray]

Possibly the Indian Government believes that the risks and costs of "staying relevant in Afghanistan" exceed the benefits? Is that timidity or common sense?

I believe Einstein had said 'Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen'.

The Indian Government has had no Minister (except one Major of post independence vintage and one Prince who was a TA officer) with military service and hence find petrified at the thought of armed conflicts.

The economist in the PM can only calculate the Rupees and Paisas and yet he still comes a cropper!

Therefore, is it common sense or sheer timidity?

The manner in which India is being bled by Pakistan and Indian Govt remains a docile spectator spewing pious platitudes is a sign of common sense or sheer timidity and paralysis to face the reality?

It requires the US courts and enforcement agencies to ferret out the ISI connection to the Mumbai blast instead of getting its act together on its own, is that common sense or timidity?

Given the way this Govt is performing, maybe they will follow your line of thought of staying out of 'harm's way' and tomtom it as 'common sense' and let Indian strategic and economic interests be sold out!!

Take the occupation of Tibet. In 1950s, China was preoccupied with the US in Korea and yet our pacifist Prime Minister, the world acclaimed leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, sold out the Tibetans to the Chinese and a part of India too!!

Some may call it 'common sense' and some would contest that it is not timidity as was stated in another thread.

I, for one, would construe this pacifism that yields no result but sells off Indian interests as timidity (I could have used stronger terms, but for the sake of decency, am giving it the go by).

It is time to take stock and not merely go by the Biblical injunction - And unto him that smiteth thee on the [one] cheek offer also the other; and him that taketh away thy cloke forbid not [to take thy] coat also. (Luke 6:29 )

Actually there's very little activity on Palawan, and bombings/suicide attacks aren't the tactics of choice for the primary insurgent groups.

From open sources, it appear that the United States has provided the Philippines with military "advisers" to support its campaign against al Qaeda linked Abu Sayyaf.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ilippines.html

I take it that AQ tactics depends heavily on suicide bombers and their like.

However, you would be the best judge.

Does India's logistic support for its forces in Kashmir have to pass through Iran? Just one difference among many. You may of course do as you will, but I would hesitate to assume that the two cases will be similar.

The issue to which you have answered was the psyche and ethos, where I had stated that Indians were conversant with the Afghan psyche and ethos, unlike the Westerner.

Therefore, the logistic support issue is not understood.

Notwithstanding, it is obvious that the logistic support to Kashmir does not cross Iran.

However, to assume that going through Iran is something insurmountable and dangerous would not be a correct analysis.

What exactly would be the problems of the Iran logistic route that would deter the use?

The logistic support was not safe in the formative days, but now that there is no disturbance to the logistic support, does speaks volumes as to the success of the Indian Army and the Govt in controlling foreign supported insurgency to a real low intensity.

In fact, it is only today, the Hurriyat (the Pak supported pressure group and pro terrorist organisation) has called for the Hurriyat themselves to parley with the Govt of India rather than the Govt always asking them to come for talks!!

Hurriyat leader prod for talks

Srinagar, May 23: A senior leader of the moderate Hurriyat faction has asked the group to offer talks to New Delhi and not wait for an invite, a proposal that amounts to an about-turn from the separatists’ traditional stand.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/111052...y_14022345.jsp

What you expect and what you get can be very different. Unwise to assume that you will have substantial assistance from others. If it comes, wonderful, but if you're going to take on that role the basis of planning should be that you will act alone. The world being what it is, the contributions of others are likely to be token and ephemeral.

One makes assumptions.

Then closer to time, the assumptions are tested for its credibility based on the interaction and the environment.

Plans are based on assumptions since one cannot predict the outcome in minute details. Therefore, one has contingencies also cranked in

For instance, in a battle one may have a brilliant plan, but once it is launched, there has to be flexibility to cater for the situations arising. The one who has the contingency catered for, wins.

While it is correct that contributions are likely to be token and ephemeral, one would not embark on a dangerous mission merely on promises.

[Ray]

You are describing method; my statement referred to purpose. The purpose of the intervention you describe is identical to the American purpose: install or maintain a government that suits the interests of the intervening power. Many of the subsequent issues derive not from method, but from that purpose.

Out of the Purpose evolves the Method.

I believe the United States’ “goal in Afghanistan is to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.”
http://www.lanaturnerjournal.com/onl...973caebf11ebe2

I think that would be the purpose of anyone operating in Afghanistan.

My comments were in reply to your contention of it being cost prohibitive for India.

Afghanistan is costly because the win ability is based on a high tech and so high cost method. Terrorists are like protoplasm. They recreate themselves out of the debris of collateral damage caused by air attacks and artillery and other area weapons (all of which is costly in terms of finance). They also believe in Revenge.

Afghans have the warrior instinct. But it would be wrong to assume that they are dolts and blood thirsty beyond reason. Limit their justification for 'Revenge' and the it becomes a better win-able situation.

A low cost approach along with the projection of 'soft power' will not be that expensive, except maybe in terms of casualties.

Merely to state a purpose and not have a compatible method that suits the environment would possibly not give the correct and desirable result.

If we'll discuss method, I suspect that you place far too much faith in the capacity of aid projects to resolve insurgency, but I've said that before.

Maybe I do place faith in aid projects. If one has aid projects that are visible (in a short span of time) in giving results to the common man, I presume it will have its affect. It has worked in our insurgencies. It will not resolve the insurgencies as such, but would work to wean away the recruiting base to a great degree.

For instance, if I may give an example. In Kashmir, the Indian Army would build projects for local use. They would use them but not really care for them since they knew that if the item fell apart from disuse or terrorist action, because of their 'blackmail' power, it would be rebuilt by the army. When we told them that we would give the material but they would have to build it themselves, there was immense dissatisfaction from not only their ranks, but also from our superior HQs.

Notwithstanding, we made them build their own (it was a mosque). They ensured that it stood, come hail or high water or terrorist. Possibly because it was their labour of love and possibly because if it was destroyed, they themselves would have to build it again!! Bottom line learnt from the Americans - there is no such thing as a Free Lunch!!

It worked.

Of course the Pakistanis will vocally and vehemently object to any Indian presence in Afghanistan. That's part of the charade, and it doesn't mean that Pak GHQ wouldn't be quite happy to have the ability to target Indian forces by proxy, in a position where the Indians are out on a limb with a shaky supply route and occupying a largely hostile territory. It's the sort of place one like to see one's antagonist. The US objected strenuously to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, but in the long run they were able to use that situation to weaken their adversary fatally. Why wouldn't Pakistan secretly welcome the opportunity to do the same to India?

You base your assumptions on (a) a shaky supply route and (b) largely hostile territory.

Now, what makes one conclude the supply route to be shaky? I see that it is fraught with the same dangers as it would be in any insurgency and not something extraordinarily different. However, if you could point out the dangers that I have not seen, it would help.

It is wrong to assume that Indians face a hostile Afghan environment. It does not. In fact, Indians are not taken as interlopers.

The casualties Indians have faced in their various projects should be an indicator. The casualties that have occurred are based on Pakistan guided activities since the Indian presence to make a positive contribution, while Pakistan embarked on destruction, has Pakistan worried.

A very marginal ITBF (paramilitary) presence protect the workers from attacks.

It is worth noting if Pakistan has made any effort to reconstruct the war torn Afghanistan.

Afghans can be labelled to be anything, but they are not blind!

Certainly there is a possibility that Pakistan could force India to withdraw from Afghanistan without achieving their objectives, if India were to take over the effort to "stabilize" Afghanistan. That would constitute a defeat, not defeat on an absolute scale, but a defeat nonetheless.

The question is whether the benefit to India of trying to stabilize Afghanistan justifies taking that risk.

If India is in Afghanistan,(Big IF) then I wonder if Pakistan can make India withdraw.

Let us look at it another way on the issue of 'stabilisation'.

How many Western troops are involved in UN military missions? Where are the troops coming from?

Would the UN military missions be successful without the backing (moral and financial) of those powers who are interested in bringing peace through these UN Mission?

Who finally benefits when peace (or quasi peace) is brought through these UN Missions? Obviously those nations which can invest in the nations where peace or quasi peace is obtained.

There lies the 'usefulness' of India!

As they say, there is no Free Lunches. It is a Quid Pro Quo and there is enough interest to hand over the body bags problem to those who take it as a matter of course in a day's work.

The evidence would lie in the experience of everyone who has ever tried to occupy and pacify Afghanistan. Sure, maybe they were all just doing it wrong, and if you do it right it will be a cakewalk... but are you prepared to go in with that assumption?

Nothing in life is a cakewalk. To assume so, is the first step to disaster.

Nobody is doing it wrong. Everybody in Afghanistan is doing it as suggested by their psyche and approach to issues.

None should even attempt to 'occupy' or 'pacify'. That would be imposing one's own interpretation to solving an issue. It is where those who have the 'missionary's zeal' of bringing 'civilisation to the savages' go wrong. It is better to do it the British way - let the savages be savages, so long it works in our favour! Never forget, a handful of British ruled a whole Empire of 'savages'!!

It is my experience that one should give the broad outline and the tools (that they desire and not what one think they should have) and let the people involved solve it their way. My experience shows that if one allows those involved in a task the liberty to do it their way, most of the times they will pleasantly surprise you with their solutions.

A blunt and realistic assessment of the challenge is also critical to success. It is easy for will to evaporate when a task proves harder than expected. Better to assume the worst... political will never becomes a problem when a task proves easier than expected.

Indeed a blunt and realistic assessment is the answer. And, believe it or not, one prepares for the worst case scenario.

No task in an insurgency will ever be easy. A war is easier to conclude, but not an insurgency. Insurgency follows no rules or mode of tactics. It is mostly personality driven.

The first casualty to any success in an insurgency is the political will.

If there was not the issue of a second election for the US President, maybe things would have been different. Notwithstanding, the US has so far held its own; inspite of domestic compulsions and a fluid insurgency that is operating from safe havens which for good reasons cannot be addressed in the classical manner.

That is why you shouldn't fight insurgencies unless you have to. Do you have to? Why repeat the US mistake and enter a war of choice against a notoriously intractable insurgency?

No country goes willingly to fight an insurgency. They do so to protect their national interests.

India obviously has interests or else they would not be squandering money for reconstruction work in Afghanistan. Indian interest in Afghanistan is known and maybe I have mentioned it too.

[Ray]

Iraq, as I said, involved a whole different set of reasons and decisions, one with no direct relevance to this thread... and if anything this discussion needs more focus, not less.

Of course, Iraq has relevance to the thread.

By stating that nd if anything this discussion needs more focus, not less won't wish away the issue.

It was said that the Oriental people do not understand the psyche of the Americans and hence do not understand that Revenge is a reason to go to war. I concede that.

If Revenge was the raison d'etre for going into Afghanistan, then the rational to leave it simmering and take on Iraq is indeed confounding.

Let us even concede that Revenge was the reason to go into Iraq, but militarily, one does not spilt the Selection and Maintenance of Aim or squander on the Principle of Concentration of Force or fail to adhere to the principle of Economy of Effort. I daresay that the US Army is one of the finest led Armies of the World. Much of the contemporary military thinking is from US Doctrines!! Therefore, would it be too much to believe that the US Army knows what they do? While the political head honchos have their own compulsions that are not so easily understood?

The thread is on Afghanistan and the ending of the insurgency and bringing stability to Afghanistan.

Therefore, it is very much relevant to wonder if it was the aim to take Revenge and in the process smash the AQ and bring stability to Afghanistan, then what prompted in the wavering of the Aim and moving the bulk from the US to Iraq?

[Dayuhan]

Revenge is a reason to go to war. It's not the only reason. Different wars, different reasons.

[carl]

Dayuhan:

If the Indians, or maybe when the Indians, take over in Afghanistan, they are likely to have a very great advantage over us. They will recognize from the beginning who their primary enemy is, the Pak Army/ISI. They won't feed the cat that is clawing at their leg.

The evidence would lie in the experience of everyone who has ever tried to occupy and pacify Afghanistan. Sure, maybe they were all just doing it wrong, and if you do it right it will be a cakewalk... but are you prepared to go in with that assumption?

I never understand this contention. Lots of people have beaten up an occupied Afghanistan. The famously truculent Nuristanis were forcebly (sic) converted to Islam. The Brits never really wanted the place as more than a buffer that they could manipulate and they mostly achieved that. The Russkis got kicked out by American and Saudi money. The Afghans never could have done it on their own. Where does this idea that the Afghans are ten feet tall come from.

[ganulv]

The Afghans never could have done it on their own. Where does this idea that the Afghans are ten feet tall come from.

I think you answer your own question. Afghanistan sits astride historic trade routes and borders contemporary nations who are mistrustful of one another so the chances of finding an outside investor, as it were, have been and continue to be pretty good.

[JMA]

I never understand this contention. Lots of people have beaten up an occupied Afghanistan. The famously truculent Nuristanis were forcebly (sic) converted to Islam. The Brits never really wanted the place as more than a buffer that they could manipulate and they mostly achieved that. The Russkis got kicked out by American and Saudi money. The Afghans never could have done it on their own. Where does this idea that the Afghans are ten feet tall come from.

Good observation. As the operation is being conducted currently by the time the ISAF forces start to scale down in a year or so they will have risen to twelve feet tall. The incompetence of your enemy (strategy and/or troops) increases your stature.