Crowdsourcing on AQ and Analysis (new title)

[CWOT]

Bin Laden's death has many implications for al Qaeda terrorism and Western counterterrorism operations. I think the greatest impact of Bin Laden's death will be a sharp decrease in Gulf donor support to AQ Central. The media’s portrayal of AQ terrorism as an inexpensive undertaking are greatly exaggerated. While individual attacks, like AQAP’s “Printer Cartridge” plot, may only cost a few thousand dollars in supplies, annual AQ operational costs require millions of dollars. For AQ Central hiding in Pakistan, there are significant expenses in paying group members and supporting their families, arming and outfitting terrorists, securing communications and safe havens and then conducting operations.

Here’s my logic for why I think a ‘decrease in AQ fundraising’ will be the chief consequence of Bin Laden's death:

* AQ’s financial support arrives in three forms: donor support from the Gulf, illicit revenue from criminal enterprises, and sometimes earnings from legal businesses.

* UBL’s ability to secure donor revenue, more than any other reason, allowed him to initiate, propel and sustain AQ. Many other terrorist leaders have professed an extremist ideology and planned attacks on the U.S. However, no other terrorist brought in resources like UBL.

* AQ Central led by UBL relied heavily on donor support from the Gulf to sustain a Pakistani safe haven. While a common ideology helped bind AQ and certain tribes, money was critical to cementing a comprehensive alliance with the Taliban. Without Gulf donations being passed on to Taliban protectors, I believe the ideological bounds between AQ and the Taliban will erode.

* Donor support is infinitely better for terrorist groups than illicit financing. Illicit financing is time consuming; requiring terrorist groups to divide their efforts between securing resources and terror plot planning/recruiting/training. Additionally, the bartering and bickering involved with illicit financing usually results in ideological compromises that undermine AQ’s foundation. (AQIM is a good example.) Lastly, pursuit of illicit funding streams weakens AQ’s operational security creating vulnerabilities more easily exploited by Western CT efforts.

* Securing future donor support for AQ Central will require a capable AQ leader with roots in the Arabian peninsula. I’m uncertain Zawahiri and the North African AQ members will receive equal donor commitment. Thus, AQ Central in Pakistan will either 1) move to a more junior Saudi/Yemeni leader that can secure Gulf donor support, 2) fracture into an AQ affiliate led by a Pakistani/Afghan leader more able to secure resources via Taliban groups & illicit financing (this will likely lead to AQ Central shifting focus to guerrilla warfare in South & Central Asia) or 3) remain in the hands of AQ’s old guard (Zawahiri) and eventually be starved into irrelevance.

* In the future, Gulf donors supporting Islamist/Salafist causes will have to decide where best to invest their money.

1. Continue supporting AQ Central in Pakistan- Donors must wonder if AQ Central is worth the investment. With UBL dead, the Pakistani government under pressure to produce, and AQ on the run, what can a donation ultimately achieve?

2. Shift their donation to AQAP in Yemen- AQAP has steadily increased its recruitment, capability and attacks on the West. Led by Saudis and Yemenis, embedded in a Yemeni safe haven and close to the Gulf, why would a donor continue supporting an AQ Central on the decline rather than an AQAP on the rise?

3. Move their donations to Islamist groups competing for political power amongst current uprisings- One of AQ’s long time ideological goals was the overthrow of apostate regimes (near enemy). AQ never achieved this, but many other Islamist groups currently compete for national power in the wake of Middle Eastern and North African uprisings. Why donate to an AQ affiliate on the run, when a dollar donated to an Islamist group might result in an Arab regime more in line with Islamist principles?

What are some other dynamics to AQ donor support that I have overlooked?

[davidbfpo]

A detailed summary CWOT and finally you asked

What are some other dynamics to AQ donor support that I have overlooked?

At times you infer Gulf donors act as investors in the Global Jihad cause, via AQ Central. That is a good model to follow in part.

The AQ Central prospectus is quite clear: we are engaged in a relentless struggle, attempting to mount "spectacular" attacks - with allies / partners and have a long term strategy of antagonising our enemies into action.

Revenge IMHO is a particularly strong factor for those whose participation is only as an investor. All too often we forget terrorism is armed propaganda. AQ Central appear to have a more effective global PR appeal and infrastructure than the others.

AQAP gain much from the US focus and fear of them (that is another matter).

Donors appear to trust AQ Central, after all the relationship is far older and may date back to the 1980's. Once committed as donor how do you stop? Plus I would expect AQ Central has to endorse other groups before investments are made.

The scale of the donations is quite small and somewhere I recall reading a few years ago US$30m was the annual estimated amount AQ Central needed.

Finally fear of discovery for the donors by their own governments, who take action, not issue "coded warnings" and publicity. Given the apparent ease of making donations for many years without discovery and publicity I have a low expectation that donors are concerned with Western attention.

[CWOT]

I should probably parse out what donor support would consist of. I think there are a few different categories.

1- Money donated directly to AQ- this would, I imagine move through a hawala route directly to AQ financing POC. There's a fairly good discussion of this in the Ron Suskind book "The Way of the World" (I think, it could be the "one Percent Doctrine" can't remember)

2- Money given directly to Taliban tribes- Some of the donations go directly to Taliban tribes that provide protection for AQ and sustain the insurgency in Afghanistan. This has been going on since the 1980's and continues today. I'm trying to find the article but can't track it down. But there's a great quote where a Taliban leader in Pakistan says to the troops and some fellow commanders something to the sort of "Everyone needs to relax, things aren't that bad, you're still taking trips to Dubai"

3- Money pushed through the Madrassa system- Another route for donations is through the madrassa system; some of the money goes in through this route and gets spun off in different directions.

I think each one of these layers is essential to keeping AQ covered in Pakistan.

The scale of the donations is quite small and somewhere I recall reading a few years ago US$30m was the annual estimated amount AQ Central needed.

I don't know that I agree that $30M is small. And I think that is probably a decent estimate for that which AQ Central receives directly. But I think there is another large sum transferred to the TTP in Pakistan. I've seen estimates well into the $100's Millions to keep Taliban operations going. Only a portion of this would be from donors, but there is still several million.

Given the apparent ease of making donations for many years without discovery and publicity I have a low expectation that donors are concerned with Western attention.

You are right, I don't think they are worried about discovery either. I think their issue is more about 'Return on Investment', I imagine they'll keep donating, the question I'm more interested in is where will they donate, now that they have other options available?

[CWOT]

For those interested in this thread, here are some results from the poll I ran that are particularly relevant to AQ financing.

"
While poll results #1, #2, and #3 were all interesting in their own way, I believe the results of the AQ donor support question are the most interesting so far. Due to the fortunate timing of UBL's demise, I was able to run the same poll question the week prior and the week after UBL's death.

The first poll, AQ Strategy 2011-2012, initiated the crowdsourcing experiment on 27 April and 272 respondents tallied their votes for the following question:

Over the next two years, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)

The second poll, Post UBL Poll, began on the morning of May 2nd and 132 respondents cast their votes to roughly the same question with the same response choices. (Many voters from the first poll also voted in the second poll)

After UBL's death, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)

The before and after results from this question, I believe, illustrate Bin Laden's significance to AQ Central operations. It also suggests that UBL's death may significantly help AQAP's rise in Yemen.

Interesting results across the board. Here are a few that I picked out.

-Votes for "Shift to AQAP" increased dramatically after UBL's death.
-Votes for "Remain supporting AQ & Taliban in AFPAK" decreased sharply after UBL's death.
-10% of 'Academia' and 'Private Sector' voters moved away from "Shift to Islamist groups in North African uprisings".

In terms of volatility, 'Academia' had the highest volatility in their opinion before and after UBL's death. I found this particularly interesting as the 'Academia' crowd was the group most likely to select "Status Quo - No Significant Change" as the "Chief Consequence of UBL's death" in Poll Results #2. Based on their voting shift after UBL's death, I would have expected the 'Academia' group to have selected "AQ fundraising decreases" or "AQAP becomes new AQ Central".

For graphs, tables and additional analysis to what has been the most interesting poll result thus far, see

http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=290"

[CWOT]

While poll results #1, #2, and #3 were all interesting in their own way, I believe the results of the AQ donor support question are the most interesting so far. Due to the fortunate timing of UBL's demise, I was able to run the same poll question the week prior and the week after UBL's death.

The first poll, AQ Strategy 2011-2012, initiated the crowdsourcing experiment on 27 April and 272 respondents tallied their votes for the following question:

Over the next two years, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)

The second poll, Post UBL Poll, began on the morning of May 2nd and 132 respondents cast their votes to roughly the same question with the same response choices. (Many voters from the first poll also voted in the second poll)

After UBL's death, the largest portion of Gulf donor contributions to extremism will: (You can choose only one)

The before and after results from this question, I believe, illustrate Bin Laden's significance to AQ Central operations. It also suggests that UBL's death may significantly help AQAP's rise in Yemen.

Interesting results across the board. Here are a few that I picked out.

-Votes for "Shift to AQAP" increased dramatically after UBL's death.
-Votes for "Remain supporting AQ & Taliban in AFPAK" decreased sharply after UBL's death.
-10% of 'Academia' and 'Private Sector' voters moved away from "Shift to Islamist groups in North African uprisings".

In terms of volatility, 'Academia' had the highest volatility in their opinion before and after UBL's death. I found this particularly interesting as the 'Academia' crowd was the group most likely to select "Status Quo - No Significant Change" as the "Chief Consequence of UBL's death" in Poll Results #2. Based on their voting shift after UBL's death, I would have expected the 'Academia' group to have selected "AQ fundraising decreases" or "AQAP becomes new AQ Central".

For graphs, tables and additional analysis to what has been the most interesting poll result thus far, see

http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=290

[CWOT]

Here is a related news story at al Jazeera english that I thought was particularly relevant.

Leaked cable: Gulf states 'funded extremism'
Leaked US diplomatic cable alleges Saudi Arabia and UAE sent $100m annually to radical Islamic schools in Pakistan.

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/mi...717683995.html

Here's a key quote:

Donors in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are estimated to have been sending up to $100 million annually to radical Islamic schools in Pakistan that back extremist groups, according to a leaked US diplomatic cable.

The cable alleged that financial aid for a "sophisticated jihadi recruitment network" was coming from "missionary" and "Islamic charitable" organisations in the Gulf, ostensibly with the direct support of the Saudi and UAE governments.

[CWOT]

The Post UBL Poll asked the following question during the week immediately following UBL’s death:

What will be the chief consequence of UBL’s death for the U.S. and its Western allies?

140 respondents answered this question with surprisingly uniform distribution of votes across all professional categories and question responses.

-Most voters (44%) thought UBL’s death would result in no significant change in U.S. & NATO operations

-Many (36%) thought public pressure would force the withdrawal of Western partners from Afghanistan

-Few (20%) thought UBL’s death would shift the strategy from counterinsurgency (COIN) focus in Afghanistan to a regional counterterrorism (CT) focus in AFPAK.

Military voters were the only sub-group that thought somewhat differently than the overall crowd. Most military voters believe UBL’s death will lead to the exit of their NATO partners. (47% for Military compared to 37% for the crowd as a whole)

For graphs and additional analysis, see this link: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=303

[CWOT]

This week’s poll results focus on AQ affiliates. Specifically, which AQ affiliate will lead AQ’s next chapter. I asked several questions in the AQ Strategy Poll and the Post UBL Poll addressing this issue. This week, I’ll release several results from the AQ Strategy Poll but will begin today with the results of the Post UBL Poll question:

With respect to UBL’s death, which AQ affiliate will be the primary node of AQ over the next 2 years?

133 respondents answered this question the week after UBL’s death revealing some interesting insights:

-More than half (50%) of all voters identified AQAP in Yemen as the key affiliate for AQ globally.

-‘Academia’ respondents selected “AQAP in Yemen” at a far higher rate than other professional groups and “AQ Central in AFPAK” at a far lower rate than other professional groups.

-‘Academia’ and ‘Government’ voters were less concerned by an emerging “AQ affiliate amongst North African uprisings” than ‘Students’ and ‘Private Sector’ voters.

For more analysis and charts, see the following link: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=300

[CWOT]

Following up on Monday's Post UBL Poll results on AQ's affiliates after UBL, I returned to the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 poll conducted the week prior to UBL's death.

The first question asked pertaining to AQ affiliates was:

Which AQ affiliate has the greatest technological and operational ability to conduct a terror attack against the West?

Out of 295 respondents, I found the following to be of particular interest:

-The majority of all voters identified 'AQAP in Yemen' as having the greatest capability prior to UBL's death with 'AQ Central in AFPAK' coming in second.

-After AQAP & AQ Central, an 'Emerging AQ Affiliate amongst North African uprisings' received the third largest set of votes despite there being no clear picture of what that organization might be.

-The fourth highest vote getter was 'Other'. Amongst those 22 responses selecting 'Other', 10 voters cited AQ cells in Europe as the most capable and 6 cited homegrown recruits in the U.S. or the West as most capable.

-Prior to UBL's death, 'Academia' and 'Students' were the most bullish on AQAP while "Private Sector' voters were the most likely to select AQ Central.

-For charts on this question, see http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=310

[CWOT]

During the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 poll, voters were asked the following question:

Which AQ affiliate is most dedicated to attacking the ‘far enemy’ and least distracted with ‘near enemy’ battles?

296 respondents answered this survey question. Here are the results I found particularly interesting:

- The majority of voters found ‘AQ Central in AFPAK’ the most dedicated to attacking the U.S. and least distracted by ‘near enemy’ battles. I found this surprising considering the persistent drone attacks and other pressures present in AFPAK.

- ‘Media’ respondents (a small group of voters) selected AQAP in Yemen more than any other group. I was not surprised by this since the media appears obsessed with Awlaki.

-‘AQ in East Africa’ received the third highest vote count overall.

For charts and graphs breaking down voting groups, visit:
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=314

As always, thanks to those that voted!

[CWOT]

The first question of the AQ Strategy Poll 2011-2012 asked 268 respondents the following question the week prior to Bin Laden’s death

Assuming 1) AQ’s Senior Leaders (UBL and Zawahiri) still have some directional authority over AQ affiliates and, 2) AQ is designing a strategy to survive and flourish based on recent events, what will be the primary focus of AQ’s strategy from the summer of 2011 through the end of 2012? (You can only pick one)

This goal of this question was to anticipate what al Qa’ida’s main effort would be through 2012. Reminder, respondents voted on this question the week prior to Bin Laden’s death.

Here are the findings I found most interesting:

-‘Attacks in Pakistan’ received the most votes followed closely behind by ‘Multiple attacks in the West’, ‘Strengthen AQAP in Yemen’ and ‘Repaint AQ’s role in the Arab Spring’. Overall, there was no strong preference for any one option.

-All professional groups voted in remarkably similar distributions across all responses. This is one of the only questions where groups did not significantly diverge in preference.

-‘Academic’ and ‘Government’ voters diverged in their preferences on almost all of the survey questions analyzed up to this point. However, in this question, ‘Academic’ and ‘Government’ voters were normally within 5% of each other for every response.

-‘Government’ respondents were the most likely group to pick ‘Strengthen AQAP in Yemen’. I wonder if all groups would pick this choice in larger numbers had the question been asked the week after Bin Laden’s death.

For Charts and Graphs see this link:
http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=391

[CWOT]

The tenth anniversary of 9/11 initiated many interesting articles on al Qaeda. The Wall Street Journal published "Shadowy Figure: al Qaeda's size is hard to measure". Following this lead, I launched a crowdsourcing effort a month ago to determine al Qaeda's size based on the estimates provided by those visiting this blog. This question, unlike my past surveys, should have been well suited for crowdsourcing (I'll explain why I believe this in a separate post in the coming weeks.)

In total 54 respondents answered the question "How many people in the entire world are members of al Qaeda?" and collectively arrived at the following estimates for the number of al Qaeda members globally.

--3,448 people are in al Qaeda - according to the average of all responses.

or

--1,300 people are in al Qaeda - according to the median response of all responses.

and

--5,000 people are in al Qaeda - was the most common response - the mode.

Personally, I thought some outlying responses made the average too high and the median (middle response of all responses) a bit more realistic. The mode response of 5,000 didn't surprise me as I've commonly heard the numbers 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000 thrown out in news stories related to al Qaeda.

Overall, the highest estimate was 100,000,000 (an outlier I removed since it skewed all the results). The second highest estimate was 25,000 and cast by a 'Private Sector' voter. The lowest estimate was 100 and cast by a 'Other' category voter. Here is the breakdown for each professional group's average estimate of the size of al Qaeda.

Military (including defense contractors) = 5,306
Government (Non-military) = 912
Private Sector = 6738
Academia = 2830
Other Voters = 1413

While I don't know this, I wonder if 'Private Sector' voters estimate higher because they watch more television news on al Qaeda? I've always felt news coverage made al Qaeda feel bigger than they are in reality.

I'm most interested in the 'Government - Non Military' voters. The estimate of the nine voters selecting this professional category is substantially lower than the other groups.

For more analysis see here.
And for related surveys see here.

[CWOT]

All.

Again, thank you for the support last year with the al Qaeda Strategy 2011-2012 survey and the Post-Bin Laden Survey. Prompted by the recent announcement of al Qaeda and al Shabaab, I finally compiled and analyzed the survey responses to the last question of the AQ Strategy Survey.

The last question analyzed from the survey asked 268 people the following question with regards to al Qaeda.

In two years, will regional insurgent groups and local, upstart terror groups continue to brand themselves as AQ affiliates?

(Example: GSPC changing its name to AQ in the Islamic Maghreb or al Shabaab calling itself AQ in the Horn of Africa.)

Here were the answer choices.

-No, AQ Senior Leadership will deny independent extremist groups branding as AQ affiliates because this weakens AQ's operational control and undermines AQ's global credibility.

-No, groups will not brand as an AQ affiliate as AQ's image has tarnished due to inactivity and internal fracturing.

-Yes, groups will continue to brand as an AQ affiliate in order to receive ideological guidance, operational direction, and financial/technological resources.

-Yes, groups will still consider AQ a powerful symbol and will brand as AQ affiliates. However, new groups will not have direct ties to AQ's senior leadership or resources.

I'll first discuss the results from April 2011 and then compare it to what has happened over the past 10 months with regards to name changes.

Below are two charts. (Click this link for the charts) The first shows the raw vote totals for the four answer choices by combining the votes of all five major professional categories. The second chart shows the percentage of people in each professional category choosing each of the four options. Note, there were only 12 'Media' voters in total so their voting in chart 2 appears more extreme than it actually is. Here are the findings I found particularly interesting.

-Votes overwhelming selected "Yes, groups will re-brand but have no direct connection with AQ".

-The notion that groups would re-brand to receive additional resources and guidance finished third out of four choices, but many analysts are currently citing this as the reason behind Shabaab's recent merger. Only the smallest voting group, 'Media', selected this more than other groups.

-The lowest vote getter was "No, AQ will deny new groups from branding as AQ." 'Academia' selected it the most, but even then, only a little over 10% selected it. I also find this surprising as it appears Bin Laden and Fazul both denied Shabaab the title of an AQ affiliate prior to their deaths.

For additional analysis on this question, you can visit this post at this link: Al Qaeda's Name: Stronger or Weaker?

Also, thanks to your contributions to the survey, I've been able to compare the results of the survey with current events with regards to al Qaeda's ups and downs. For those interested in how your survey results can be used, here is a link to some recent news regarding al Qaeda's financing and foreign fighters. Al Qaeda Where's the Money? Not Dead, but Dying, Part 2.

Again, thanks for your support answering the survey!

[CWOT]

SWJ members:

Good morning,

One year ago, U.S. forces killed Usama Bin Laden in Pakistan. On the morning of May 2, 2011, I posted a survey, which asked your opinions on what would happen to al Qaeda and terrorism after the death of Bin Laden. Your votes created more than 500 responses generating a dozen or more collective forecasts about what will happen to al Qaeda after Bin Laden's death - forecasts which I now ask you to assess one year later.

If you have the time and interest, I ask you to take a short follow up survey that seeks to identify what has changed with regards to al Qaeda and terrorism since Bin Laden's death.
Here is the link:

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/UBLayearlater

This survey asks respondents what has changed in the world of terrorism since the demise of al Qaeda's founder. Unlike last year's survey which attempted to gain a collective judgment on the future of al Qaeda, this survey now seeks to assess the results of the survey conducted last year.

With that purpose, this survey is much quicker to answer and is designed to take about 3-5 minutes. The questions are directly tied to last year's questions. Like last year, all are welcome to participate - no base level of experience, knowledge or skill is required. There is no requirement to have participated in last year's survey either. The more responses - the better so please feel free to forward this link to anyone that you think might be interested in the topic.

Starting in approximately two weeks, I'll take the results of this assessment survey and compare it to the results of our forecasting survey from last year. As with last year's survey results, I'll post this survey's results and comparisons to last year's results at www.selectedwisdom.com and here at this thread on the SWJ discussion board.

Thanks again for participating in last year's Post Bin Laden survey and thanks in advance for your contributions to this year's survey.

Clint

Here's a sample question:
"Since Usama Bin Laden's death, is al Qaeda 'stronger' or 'weaker'?"

(Use an definition of 'stronger' or 'weaker' that you prefer)

[CWOT]

Thanks to all those that have voted thus far!

The survey is still open and available at this link:


https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/UBLayearlater

[davidbfpo]

I struggled with a title; the author IMO is a 'disruptive thinker', a theme that appears on SWJ in particular and using his own, long title would be wrong.

CWOT's interesting short article on this difficult topic, which often appears here and more widely in intelligence studies. It starts with a German (Prussian IIRC) quote pre-WW1:

In war you will generally find that the enemy has at any time three courses of action open to him. Of those three, he will invariably choose the fourth.

—Helmuth Von Moltke

With that quip, Von Moltke may have launched a spirited debate within his intelligence staff. The modern version of the debate can be said to exist in
the cottage industry that has been built on the examination and explanation of intelligence failures, surprises, omissions, and shortcomings.

The contributions of notable scholars to the discussion span multiple analytic generations, and each expresses points with equal measures of regret, fervor, and hope. Their diagnoses and their prescriptions are sadly similar, however, suggesting that the lessons of the past are lost on each succeeding generation of analysts and managers or that the processes and culture of intelligence analysis are incapable of evolution. It is with the same regret, fervor, and hope that we offer our own observations on avoiding intelligence omissions and surprise. Our intent is to explore the ingrained bias against outliers, the potential utility of outliers, and strategies for deliberately
considering them.

Link:https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...iers-13Jan.pdf

CWOT cites several crowd sourcing surveys, which have appeared here and draws on those.

[davidbfpo]

I have merged into this thread eight of CWOT's crowd sourcing threads. They were: Does Bin Laden Matter?, Crowdsourcing AQ's Strategy 2011-2012, Vote Now - 1 Year After Bin Laden: What has happened?, Results of the Post Bin Laden & AQ Strategy Poll, Results "How big is al Qaeda?", Vote: What will terrorism be post Bin Laden? and Financial Implications of Bin Laden's death.

I have also renamed the thread's title, it was How Bin Laden Narratives Hindered Analysis.

[CWOT]

David,

thanks for consolidating.

And for those interested in my latest crowdsourcing experiment, here's a 1-question survey I'm running.

Should the U.S. and Europe openly support the resistance in Syria?

Vote at this link if interested:

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/ZRS5JDG

I'll post the results here at the end of the week.