in the case of Vietnam:
That generic assertion
can be true; that is, "not worth the effort and the sacrifice and the cost"
can be a "makeweight" - a late in the game dodge - to "justify" a "cut and run". On the other hand, it
can be a consistent argument for not intervening in the first place - which argument continues throughout the intervention and may prevail to result in a termination of the intervention.
In the case of Vietnam, the "Vietnam ain't worth much" thesis goes back to whether or not the US should provide materiel assistence in May 1950, or whether more direct measures should be taken. The 1950-1951 War College conclusions (
my post #13) presented a 5-point argument:
which was reiterated by other military leaders throughout the course of the conflict (e.g., the JCS in 1954 and Ridgway from 1954 into 1970).
Attachment 1470
Attachment 1471
Attachment 1472
(all three snips from Dave Petraeus' thesis)
Those "Never Again, but-ers" were neither pacifists nor "cutters and runners". They simply recognized from the outset that Vietnam would be a very hard slog (if not impossible after Pres. Kennedy decided to "neutralize" Laos and Cambodia) - requiring a huge investment if a ground war were pursued.
The LBJ administration (largely a continuation of Kennedy administration personnel) and LBJ himself marginalized the JCS - McMaster's
Dereliction of Duty lays out the case (and the lies) in detail (
68 Customer Reviews). He reaches much the same conclusions as I did (back in the 1960s) and hold now (pp.333-334):
I'd add that many of the failings lay in excessive idealism (in both domestic and foreign affairs - e.g., the Great Society and Third World Modernization); and, in the related ideology that everything can be managed and controlled, including warfare.
I'd also add that, whatever one concludes as to Vietnam, the end result in Southeast Asia was not a disaster for the US. Dayuhan doesn't believe the US had much (if anything) to do with that; I differ. There is no point in arguing different beliefs.
My conclusion: each case, and its arguments pro and con, for US intervention, past and present, must be examined separately. An assertion attibuting motives and stereotypes - based on a generic proposition (true only in some cases) - is frankly as dumb as saying: "If you ain't for me (my beliefs), you are against me."
Regards
Mike
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