Your Brain In Combat

[slapout9]

Just read this article from the current Military Review on your Brain in combat. Thoughts on this?


http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...630_art010.pdf

[Ken White]

Not a bad article. I can provide a short version of an element he cites that has long been known and that we used to practice but seldom do today. From the article :

Decades of neuroscience research have firmly shown that the brain is highly adaptable and that repeated activities designed to create specific behaviors—like combat training—literally “change cellular structure and strength of connections between neurons.”50 (emphasis added / kw)

Exactly.

I do not rabidly disagree with his recommendations but suggest that it is far less important they be implemented than it is that more and better combat training be conducted. Not necessarily at a CTC. Perhaps ideally not at a CTC...

[JMA]

Just read this article from the current Military Review on your Brain in combat. Thoughts on this?


http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...630_art010.pdf

Initially I thought this article would relate to combat leadership meaning the commander being "under fire" himself rather than merely commanding troops who themselves are "under fire" (or in contact). However, I quote from the article:

In this article, the term “leader” refers to any individual who is responsible for leading several groups of soldiers in maneuver against the enemy and must manage multiple battlefield systems. This leader spends most of his battlefield time outside of his weapon’s sights.

If this is the case then I can hardly think what would distract the "leader" (as defined) from the cognitive processes command in battle requires. Those given to emotional responses and propensity for cognitive distraction would surely be weeded out early in the officer selection and training process?

[bumperplate]

Outside of the weapon sites has a lot of different meanings. Could mean you're in the TOC, could just mean you're in the thick of it with a rifle in one hand, and the handset up to your ear with the other hand - in both cases you're outside of the weapon sites. Kind of vague in the description.

Selecting officers based on their responses in realistic training....sounds great. How do we get started? We still have commanders that take their LTs out for a run in order to determine who the new Scout PL is going to be; and base moves of company commanders on year group, time of CCC, staff time, and other measures that generic nothing in the way of a leadership metric.

Maybe my experiences are out of the norm, but I've never had to run in PTs and running shoes over to establish an LP/OP, or conduct reconnaissance on an NAI, and the last I checked my PT card didn't cover my ability to adjust fire, call in a MEDEVAC, or conduct a KLE.

I think Ken White is hinting at some very salient and noteworthy points. However, as we rush to close theaters and begin an age of austerity, we are likely to see the dime & washer drill replace reflexive fire; see Table XII (using SLAP-T rounds of course, $15 as opposed to about $1200 avg cost for training rounds for a main gun, IIRC) replace force-on-force maneuvers; and then to see CCTT replace Table XII, Table VIII; and thought experiments will likely replace battle drill training for our infantry. It's just too expensive to buy ammo, pay for fuel, and replace uniforms and equipment that get destroyed in a typical field exercise. That said, I think we need to suck it and find a way to sustain (assuming it's already done) good training.

[The Cuyahoga Kid]

If this is the case then I can hardly think what would distract the "leader" (as defined) from the cognitive processes command in battle requires. Those given to emotional responses and propensity for cognitive distraction would surely be weeded out early in the officer selection and training process?

From where I'm sitting (on my lofty perch as an 18 y.o. highschool student) I think that officer selection and training weeds out the canidates who can't operate effectively because of the severity of their emotional responses and/or cognitive distractions, however, I also believe that these two reactions are something that every combat leader undergoes to one degree or another, and that teaching techniques to suppress or eliminate these responses would allow leaders to focus more on the nessecary cognitive task at hand, making them more effective at their positions.

[Ken White]

Selecting officers based on their responses in realistic training...other measures that generic nothing in the way of a leadership metric.

Unfortunately, the incompetent will always be with us -- at all ranks and grades. The system catches many but can never catch all and the number of shoddy leaders that slip through varies, it's cyclical. A good CofSA has his effect 15-20 years down the road. Conversely, a bad one does the same thing. The Personnel system rewards conformity and mediocrity so that has been true since WW I and the Army thus waxes and wanes.

It also reflects civilian society...

However, as we rush to close theaters and begin an age of austerity...That said, I think we need to suck it and find a way to sustain (assuming it's already done) good training.

That's the been there, done that. All you mention and more has occurred before and the Army survived. There were times in the late 50s-early 60s and again in the late 70s and the 90s when all those things were problematic -- even to the extent of inadequate funding for fuel causing vehicles to stay in the motor pool for entire fiscal quarters.

Good news is there is an unintended benefit. In austere times, people learn literally to do more with less and one has to innovate and use initiative. Those latter two things get stifled all too often in periods of excessive money being available.

There's also the benefit that less funding is available for the micro-managers to stick their nose into things.

Consider that the 'broke' Army of the 1930s did okay when committed after a few minor bubbles and the almost equally relatively poorly funded Army of the early 60s did okay in Viet Nam -- until the money kicked in, the second team got hired and the politics got overly intrusive. The American solution of throwing money at things that do not work rarely really succeeds in fixing the problems. Making do has its merits...

At the risk of being a heretic, I think the CTCs are also inimical to good training and they are ungodly expensive in all aspects including travel and equipment. They have some merit but having seen Army units before their inception and after, I'm not convinced the results justify the significant expense. Just the opposite, in fact. Aside from the CTCs, the Task, Condition and Standard solution of BTMS severely and adversely affected Army Training.

Dump both those and the picture ahead may not be nearly as bleak as one might think.

Got so busy being philosophical I lost the thread -- in austere times, you can't just buy stuff and do things by rote or even afford running shoes, you have to THINK and not waste money on inessentials. That in itself is what they call "good trainin'." Great exercise for the brain...

[ganulv]

I understand one of the claims the author is making is that one part of the brain (the limbic system) does what most of us would call reaction and a different part of the brain (the prefrontal cortex) does what most of us would call thinking. What I have a harder time understanding is where exactly the concept of “reflexive” fits into his model. On the one hand there are responses to immediate stimuli that are neither written nor spoken (hearing a rattlesnake or seeing a shark’s fin sorts of things) that I think most everyone would agree are reflexes. But if you have ever seen an excellent poker player or offensive coordinator you can get the sense that they are working with No Mind. I don’t understand whether or not the author is claiming that the limbic system is involved with reflexive actions.

Am I correct in assuming that there is an HR problem for the U.S. Army insomuch as any junior officer who shows a knack for the sort of leadership described in the paper is soon enough promoted to a rank where it is no longer part of his job?

[Kiwigrunt]

Am I correct in assuming that there is an HR problem for the U.S. Army insomuch as any junior officer who shows a knack for the sort of leadership described in the paper is soon enough promoted to a rank where it is no longer part of his job?

The Peter Principle is not limited to the military, but it is perhaps the most profound in bureaucracies like the military. That said, poorly designed ticket punching structures / systems do a lot to exacerbate the Peter Principle.

[ganulv]

The priest who was my French instructor once told us that “[w]e have a saying in the Church—‘You will be promoted to your level of incompetence.’”

As someone with no military experience I just had the impression that up or out might be counterproductive if your institution restricts combat leadership responsibility to a group made up of individuals who by definition can only have so much experience.

Am I correct in my understanding that NCOs in the USMC are entrusted with some of the combat leadership responsibilities that fall upon junior officers in the U.S. Army? If so, is this done (at least partly) with an eye towards enabling proven combat leaders to remain in a place where that matters for a longer period of time? Or is it more about the tendency to pay Marines less for doing more?

[bumperplate]

Good stuff in this thread. I'm not quite as optimistic about the possible benefits of austerity. I think we'll go into a massive dog & pony show. I hope not, but that's my hunch.

If that happens, "your brain in combat" will be something we can only take wild guesses about. But, perhaps the fact that this subject is getting discussed now will preclude or at least mitigate these potential problems later.

[JMA]

Am I correct in assuming that there is an HR problem for the U.S. Army insomuch as any junior officer who shows a knack for the sort of leadership described in the paper is soon enough promoted to a rank where it is no longer part of his job?

No, while I can't speak for the US Army, I think you are going in the wrong direction with this.

Officers become valuable to the military when the reach field officer (major) and beyond. Their time as junior officers is merely to prepare them for real command say from battalion level upwards.

Platoon commanding (while considered by many to be the happiest and most personally rewarding command experience due to the intimacy of the personal combat leadership experience) is merely an apprenticeship. In this a bright eyed and bushy tailed lieutenant will find an old and bold and hairy ass'd platoon sergeant a few steps behind him to support/guide/assist/advise and when necessary press him in his first command experience. Note platoon sergeant is not a command position as they go from section/squad to platoon to company and so on. The platoon sergeant should be tactically qualified to company level and be able to take over command should casualties demand. So why not give command of a platoon to the most experienced and capable? Because this officer apprenticeship is most often the career make or break for a young officer and an important testing/proving ground. Yes, there are a few late bloomers but that's another story.

Where I come from it is the time as platoon commander (30 months for rifle platoons) which sets him in a career stream. The first thing that happens is that the course order these youngsters passed out with gets "adjusted" career wise over the next 30 months and then thereafter every year with the annual assessment until the pecking order is resolved. So in the simplest terms out of every 12 platoon commanders you get 4 company commanders and then of the 4 one Lt Col battalion commander. Now out of this process you will still get a number of company commanders who don't shape up and then even a number of battalion commanders the same. There is a continual selection and weeding out process... which is not fool proof.

I say fool proof specifically because politics play a more and more important role the higher the rank level. This would be internal politics and then from the idiots in the government departments or congress/parliament/whatever. Then of course should a general mobilization take place then due to war-time escalation everyone gets over promoted by a few levels and quality flies out the window.

After all that it is probably only for a few years in a thirty odd year career where an individuals performance in the closeness of the "look into his eyes then kill him" type combat counts. However this performance (positive or negative) will live with him for the rest of his career.

You need to credit the military with the knowledge that comes through experience that it appreciates that there are certain young officers who may prove to be outstanding combat officers but may not be suitable for higher command and then there will be those (as stated) who will be "carried" by their platoon sergeant but grow into capable, possibly even outstanding, senior officers as they would be late bloomers.

You will find many complain about "check the box" personnel management in the larger militaries. This takes the personal out of career management so it is unlikely that truly meritorious officers will rise (as the should) above the rest as they too are trapped in a system where everyone gets a chance regardless of how unsuitable.

So don't hold your breath that some fire-ball of a young officer will have an accelerated career due to his prowess in combat.

...then one must have a war when one is a platoon commander to prove this matter as much to oneself as to the military. A quick 6 month tour is not really enough but is better than nothing.

[JMA]

The Peter Principle is not limited to the military, but it is perhaps the most profound in bureaucracies like the military. That said, poorly designed ticket punching structures / systems do a lot to exacerbate the Peter Principle.

In a steep pyramid hierarchy like the army it should not happen as there are fewer posts into which place people. But yes this has been countered by the exploding number of senior staff officer posts created to accommodate B-and C-stream officers. But these staff officers are seldom incompetent as they prove to be lethally effective in screwing up the military.

Make half the senior staff officers redundant tomorrow and it will probably improve the functioning of most militaries.

[motorfirebox]

I understand one of the claims the author is making is that one part of the brain (the limbic system) does what most of us would call reaction and a different part of the brain (the prefrontal cortex) does what most of us would call thinking. What I have a harder time understanding is where exactly the concept of “reflexive” fits into his model. On the one hand there are responses to immediate stimuli that are neither written nor spoken (hearing a rattlesnake or seeing a shark’s fin sorts of things) that I think most everyone would agree are reflexes. But if you have ever seen an excellent poker player or offensive coordinator you can get the sense that they are working with No Mind. I don’t understand whether or not the author is claiming that the limbic system is involved with reflexive actions.

Well, to somewhat more clearly define the terms, the author is laying out the idea that the limbic system handles decison-making and information processing when one is in a fight-or-flight state. So, yes, according to him, the limbic system is involved with what you're calling reflexive actions.

[Ken White]

Make half the senior staff officers redundant tomorrow and it will probably improve the functioning of most militaries.

...Yes.

Two thirds might be even better as most staffs are wildly overlarge...

[Stan]

Am I correct in my understanding that NCOs in the USMC are entrusted with some of the combat leadership responsibilities that fall upon junior officers in the U.S. Army? If so, is this done (at least partly) with an eye towards enabling proven combat leaders to remain in a place where that matters for a longer period of time? Or is it more about the tendency to pay Marines less for doing more?

Actually, both Army and USMC NCOs are responsible for junior officer combat development and the pay grades for both NCOs are in fact exactly the same regardless of the level of efforts . However, by regulation, only Navy Chiefs (E-7s) are tasked with junior officer development.

[Raymond Farrell]

Am I correct in assuming that there is an HR problem for the U.S. Army insomuch as any junior officer who shows a knack for the sort of leadership described in the paper is soon enough promoted to a rank where it is no longer part of his job?

Well, yes and no. Sr NCOs are leaders who remain with troops more or less throughout their careers. As has been noted, Jr offrs are really apprenticing for Sr command, so there is a slightly different basket of traits being sought or developed.

Which is the other point we need to recall - you dont select good leaders, you make them. Not everyone has the potential to become a good leader, so you select those that do. But then you train them to lead. Even instinctive leaders still need training and study to be their best.

Thats what the article is about - some suggestions on training leaders to remain more calm and more effective in battle.

[JMA]

Well, yes and no. Sr NCOs are leaders who remain with troops more or less throughout their careers. As has been noted, Jr offrs are really apprenticing for Sr command, so there is a slightly different basket of traits being sought or developed.

Which is the other point we need to recall - you dont select good leaders, you make them. Not everyone has the potential to become a good leader, so you select those that do. But then you train them to lead. Even instinctive leaders still need training and study to be their best.

Thats what the article is about - some suggestions on training leaders to remain more calm and more effective in battle.

I suspect we are in agreement that the raw material selected for officer training must have displayed prior leadership ability at school in the playground, on the sports field and in any other group activity. Once the raw material is there it can be honed and polished but it must be there already. Courage in battle is a more difficult animal to predict.

From the Falklands War (2nd Battalion Scots Guards) comes this on how outstanding natural leadership in difficult circumstances when shown still surprises as it is not a norm that can be anticipated or taken for granted.

Major John Kiszely on Mount Tumbledown 13/14 June 1982

The youngsters were very brave. For example, this young Platoon Commander, Second Lieutenant James Stuart, who was only nineteen, had arrived in my company straight from Sandhurst in April. There he was a month later in the Falklands. He was aged nineteen, green behind the gills, and within the first five minutes of coming under fire he’d had his Platoon Sergeant killed - Platoon Sergeant dead in his arms - this other man killed, two other people wounded and his Company Sergeant-Major shot in the hand. But he did extremely well, this young boy. In many ways it was proof of the system. You think, how could someone like that possibly cope? You know he’s way out of his depth, obviously very frightened, but knew what he had to do and got on with it.

Right the way through the night he commanded his platoon, really under fire all the time, clearing right the way through Tumbledown. But you know, a young boy like that, I just wonder when I was nineteen whether I could have done that. You think, could I have done it? An adult experience for a teenager. And yet he commanded his platoon right the way through it, with all these disasters. Just imagine having your Platoon Sergeant being shot right beside you! When you come to a platoon, the Platoon Sergeant’s a pretty key guy, keeps you straight, says, ‘Look, Sir, don’t do that, best do it this way’. When that is taken out of your life and disaster is all around you, you think – why me? I think he related quite closely to the casualties at the time too. It hit him. He came up on the air to me and said, ‘What do I do?’ So I just talked in a very calm matter-of-fact voice and said, ‘Well done, one or two things are going wrong, but it’s not a disaster. You’re doing well; keep plugging on with it and we’ll be up alongside you again. You’re winning through, well done, keep going’.

He probably thought I was mad, but he went on doing it, and did a bloody good job. He soon steadied them down.

He got a Mention in Dispatches.

Max Arthur (ed) Above All Courage (1985).

Note: Kiszely himself led a bayonet charge during Tumbledown shooting two and breaking his bayonet on a third while taking a bullet through his compass in a pouch on his belt. He was awared the MC.

Both men were tested on Tumbledown and proved their worth as officers.

[ganulv]

Thanks to all who have been in on this informative post. One of my personal favorite blogs—Neuroanthropology—deals exclusively with just the sort of neurological/endocrinological/psychological/social overlap discussed by Steadman in his article; links to the archived threads from their original site as well as to their current site at PLoS for anyone who might be interested.

[bumperplate]

Don't want to create an argument but above it was stated that the NCOs are responsible for the combat development of young officers. I would add that the officers' superiors are also responsible for that. Having been enlisted and officer, I tell you they are different worlds. We need officers heavily involved in the development of other officers. NCOs are great leaders and essential warehouses of advice and wisdom. But, we absolutely must have officers involved in the development of other officers.

Also, I vehemently disagree with the notion that junior officers "really don't count", and that officers should only be trained for eventual life as a senior leader/commander. This is part of what's wrong with our system. It's lazy, it's incompetent, and it stinks for lack of a professional approach to the commissioning of our officers.

We provide our junior officers with about 50% of the training minimum to step in front of a platoon, and that's being generous. We then throw them out to the Force and expect the NCOs to do the rest, and expect their superior officers to chip in a bit. Wrong, wrong, wrong. We should expect and train our officers to step in front of a platoon from day one. Otherwise, why have PLs? Why have junior officers at all? If we're going to sell the nobility of leadership, and speak about our officers as being leaders, then they need to be leaders from the start. There are learning curves - we all know that. But, the mentality where we exercise the "care and feeding of lieutenants" is 100%wrong. They wear the rank, they are paid the salary,they should be acting accordingly from the start. Will our NCOs still advise them and assist them - of course. Will their superiors mentor, correct, and train them additionally - of course. But to accept less than true leadership is wrong. To train for less is wrong as well.

Right now we have a completely hypocritical system, full of double speak and we hang our junior officers out to dry. We set them up for failure continuously. Our BN and BCT commanders will stand up at a promotion for 2LT going to 1LT and tell the troops that the LTs are just overpaid SPCs, then turn around and dismiss the formation and expect the LTs to go "lead" those platoons, after the big commander told his troops the LT is effectively a SPC. Then, when a situation like Wanat takes place, the Army will come in and write the history books and effectively place the blame on a LT for not doing x,y,z. Wrong answer.

Working on "your brain in combat" needs further study. It's a fascinating topic. But, when it comes to officers and their brains in combat, the Army needs to invest more time and energy into commissioning programs and branch basic schools.

[JMA]

Don't want to create an argument but above it was stated that the NCOs are responsible for the combat development of young officers. I would add that the officers' superiors are also responsible for that. Having been enlisted and officer, I tell you they are different worlds. We need officers heavily involved in the development of other officers. NCOs are great leaders and essential warehouses of advice and wisdom. But, we absolutely must have officers involved in the development of other officers.

I'm game for a discussion on this matter. Oh yes the officers are responsible for the career development of their subordinate officers. With platoon commanders who spend most of their time with their platoons the platoon sergeants have a special role to play in this regard as well.

Also, I vehemently disagree with the notion that junior officers "really don't count", and that officers should only be trained for eventual life as a senior leader/commander. This is part of what's wrong with our system. It's lazy, it's incompetent, and it stinks for lack of a professional approach to the commissioning of our officers.

I think you may misunderstand the system. Junior officers are indeed important because every colonel and general will start his career as a junior officer. Therefore it is important that they are nurtured and exposed to the necessary experiences that will provide them with the fundamental understanding of what impact their orders later from on high will have on the soldiers at the sharp end. This together with the understanding of the ability and means of units and subunits to operate in different tactical situations and terrain and climatic conditions is essential knowledge senior officers must have under their belts.

It is critical for the success of the company, the platoon in question and the junior officer himself that he succeeds and for that to happen it needs a combined effort of all the company officers and the applicable senior NCOs. Yes I agree it is primarily the company commanders duty to take the junior officer under his wing and mentor him, guide him, show him leadership and makes sure that he learns all he needs to know about tactics and skill at arms at platoon and company level. As it is the duty of the other "older" platoon commanders to help/protect/assist him. Sometimes if the company commander is weak the other platoon commanders may ignore him and even in the worst circumstances bully him. The duty of the company sergeant major is to make sure that the platoon sergeant keeps a grip on the platoon and provides subtle guidance to the junior officer without ever undermining his authority. It is a complex process and only necessary because platoon commanding is an essential and vital part of an officers career development.

We provide our junior officers with about 50% of the training minimum to step in front of a platoon, and that's being generous. We then throw them out to the Force and expect the NCOs to do the rest, and expect their superior officers to chip in a bit. Wrong, wrong, wrong. We should expect and train our officers to step in front of a platoon from day one. Otherwise, why have PLs? Why have junior officers at all? If we're going to sell the nobility of leadership, and speak about our officers as being leaders, then they need to be leaders from the start. There are learning curves - we all know that. But, the mentality where we exercise the "care and feeding of lieutenants" is 100%wrong. They wear the rank, they are paid the salary,they should be acting accordingly from the start. Will our NCOs still advise them and assist them - of course. Will their superiors mentor, correct, and train them additionally - of course. But to accept less than true leadership is wrong. To train for less is wrong as well.

If you "rose through the ranks" (as we call it) I can appreciate your sensitivity in this regard. Under normal circumstances - meaning in peacetime - the training of officers and recruits is probably fine given that soldiering in peacetime can be used to round off the training of both officers and soldiers. In wartime however it is a different kettle of fish. I agree you can' just throw these raw (maybe half trained) kids into platoons at war just as you can'y throw in half trained troopies either... but they do.

The problem I suggest may lie with the training in that the training needs to produce an officer trained to a tactical level of competence and troopies at the required skill at arms level. And in war don't hold your breath for all these legendary platoon sergeants of myth to be there to take the new comers under his wing... quite often due to the war time expansion you don't have the 7-10 year service sergeants there anymore and the junior officers are lierally thrown in the deep end and must either sink or swim. The only saving grace in all this is that the situation is probably worse on the enemy's side. Remember in war it is the least incompetent side that usually wins.

But essentially you are correct... get the training right and then if the kid is worth the Queens Commission (or national equivalent) he must be treated with the respect that goes with the rank... and that respect he will be expected to earn over time starting with his troopies.

Right now we have a completely hypocritical system, full of double speak and we hang our junior officers out to dry. We set them up for failure continuously. Our BN and BCT commanders will stand up at a promotion for 2LT going to 1LT and tell the troops that the LTs are just overpaid SPCs, then turn around and dismiss the formation and expect the LTs to go "lead" those platoons, after the big commander told his troops the LT is effectively a SPC.

Being a platoon commander is not for the faint hearted. On my first operational deployment I read the map wrong and put my ambush in on the wrong place. I was hung out to dry so I know where you are coming from. But I learned more from that experience - the humiliation and snide remarks - that I became a master map reader using out of date maps in the era before the GPS. The failure of my then company commander to guide me/nurture me/ ease me in to the job was something I never repeated under any command I ever held. Take the positives out of negative situations.

When I returned to South Africa after Rhodesia I found that lieutenants - especially the conscripts -were treated appallingly by the other officers and with disdain by the snr NCOs. I could not change the system but I can assure you it never happened in my company.

I did what I believe you allude to as the requirement and that was to take the platoon commanders under my wing and help round off their training in preparation for the coming combat role. That meant I would often leave the company to the "IC (exec officer) and the CSM (company sergeant major) and take the platoon commanders out to the field to walk ground and work through the tactical field exercises we would conduct later with the company. it was hard work... but it was my job and it paid dividends.

Then, when a situation like Wanat takes place, the Army will come in and write the history books and effectively place the blame on a LT for not doing x,y,z. Wrong answer.

Read the stuff on Wanat and am not sure how much wider the responsibility for that should be spread. I would like to hear about the role of the platoon sergeant in that, the role of the company commander and so on. It would be difficult for the ground commander to wriggle out of it as he ultimately owns the screw-up if it happened under his command.

Working on "your brain in combat" needs further study. It's a fascinating topic. But, when it comes to officers and their brains in combat, the Army needs to invest more time and energy into commissioning programs and branch basic schools.

This would apply to all soldiers across the board. The difference with officers is that they are mostly direct entry into a command position possibly in a war where they are expected to perform (but have a platoon sergeant on their shoulder just in case) while NCOs rise through the ranks based upon their performance over a period of years at the different rank levels. This system is tested during times of war when newly commissioned officers are inserted directly into a command position in war.

There is a debate about whether officers should be drawn from the body of other ranks with service of three years or at least a year to 18 months prior service. This would be before the individual gets into the NCO (noncom) groove so to speak. The Israelis do it and it has been touched on in discussion elsewhere here before. There is genuine doubt that given the number of officers who drop out along the way whether initial officer training for more than a year is worth the investment. Another topic?