I don't subscribe to "Daily Dave" I've got enough to chew on already. I looked at the presentation, but I don't know much about cyber warfare but for grins and giggles.

1. Cyberwar is asymmetric.
2. Cyberwar is non-kinetic.
3. Cyberwar is not attributable.
Of course cyber war is asymmetric. If you put "cyber" and "war" together than cyber is the modifier of war. War is inherently asymmetric otherwise it is a stalemate. That is as Clausewitz, Sun Tzu as you can get. Why would you engage in conflict it it was symmetric? That is why peer competitors rarely are aggressors towards each other.

The technical dimension or "cyber" expertise adds another dimension to the conflict spectrum of cyber. This technical dimension is also an element in the semantic layer of the cyber warfare domain. Of course that is if you take a multidimensional approach to cyber and don't try and smash it in with big war analogies and such. This also requires a spectrum approach rather than "silo" approach to cyber.

Cyber is kinetic. Stuxnet isn't only the proof, but dozens and dozens of other examples exist in the SCADA realm. Stuxnet is actually proof that "all ur air gaps belong to us". That is what is cool about Stuxnet.

As to attribution? Yes another fallacy. The best logic breaker on this one though is from other areas of forensics. How long does a full DNA screen take in a competent forensically sound manner? Weeks? At least days? How long does it take to do computer forensics on an attack? Weeks? At least day? But, the Internet is anonymous? <bs> It is only that way to a very few people, and you can detect those kinds of attacks too.

So. Three myths? I don't know if they are myths or just simple misunderstood. They may have had a bad childhood.

The point about the "OODA" loop is kind of out of left field. The OODA loop is nothing more than another explanatory model for the decision cycle. Decision sciences is filled with them, (SPA- search predict act; IPDE - identify, predict, decide, execute). The 1950s were rife with them as ways of managing risk or industrializing management processes. OODA isn't really anything special just something most military folks understand. So seeing "This isn't an OODA loop" has me fussy.