Good news -- the insurgency is over! Now we need a new strategy for the Iraq War.

[jcustis]

There are more than a few on this board who got to the outskirts of Baghdad and thought "what next" in mid-to-late April 2003.

Freaking Amen.

[Fabius Maximus]

Can anyone comment on this?

Previous posts discussed that "everyone can have their own facts" about Iraq, as the data is so poor. That is, everyone except those at the "front." Note the news article posted below about this.

That is, our data about the situation in Iraq has often proved off by 10x or more -- even about critical factors. Statistical data from war zones do not have error bars, but this seems extreme. We had this problem in the Vietnam War, which probably to some extent contributed to our defeat.

For a current example, see this excerpt from the Iraq Study Group report.

In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep events out of reports and databases. ... For example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.

http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_g...206/index.html

[SWCAdmin]

Sure, I'll take a crack.

Ref earlier discussion on semantics.

Facts, data, and statistical data are not the same thing.

Not a perfect analogy, but ground truth, metrics regarding observations, and descriptive or sampling and extrapolating or interpolating approximations of those metrics are not the same thing.

Thus the (terrorist / jihadi / punk who knocked off the 7-11 / hit and run driver) had on a blue jacket. Observer B said "I think he was wearing a red jacket." Both are facts. The second one happens to be an incorrect observation, but still a fact (he really did say that) though not an accurate ground truth (saying it doesn't make it so). Good thing people always fill out surveys accurately, and there is no culture of deception of obfuscation, especially in the ME, or we'd never get any accurate statistics.

Fact is, 72% of statistics are made up on the spot.

And maybe everyone can think they have their own facts, but only some of them are worth a damn.

[SWCAdmin]

And thank God wars are not fought by statisticians.

[Culpeper]

And thank God wars are not fought by statisticians.

A good example is that Robert McNamara doted on statistics and his "team" came pretty close to fighting a pure statistical war from the Executive Branch. Didn't exactly work out too well. Whiz Kids and all. McNamara wanted numbers. Made a lot a decisions based on statistical and analytical analysis.

[Culpeper]

Can anyone comment on this?

Previous posts discussed that "everyone can have their own facts" about Iraq, as the data is so poor. That is, everyone except those at the "front." Note the news article posted below about this.

That is, our data about the situation in Iraq has often proved off by 10x or more -- even about critical factors. Statistical data from war zones do not have error bars, but this seems extreme. We had this problem in the Vietnam War, which probably to some extent contributed to our defeat.

For a current example, see this excerpt from the Iraq Study Group report.


http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_g...206/index.html

I have a funny feeling that the likes of Pershing, Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall, Bradley, and even Patton would be be stating that the facts are irrelevant on the home front for the good of the war effort. What matters are results in the field and civilian think tanks are to be avoided. They would also wonder how we came to the point that over 3,000 KIA in 4 years had become the major war of our era. I'm saddened for the lost of our men and women on the front but this is in all aims and purposes has been a low intensity war as far as good guy casualties are concerned. The American public was very upset of the carnage of Tarawa but they knew there was going to be yet another bloody battle. And there was. More than enough. Iraq doesn't compare. I'll accept over 3,000 casualties in 4 years over Iwo Jima, Chosin Reservoir, or the entire Tet Offensive any day of the week. What is really sickening is that most Americans with a big mouth never even heard of these places. For example, from the initial build up in 1965 through 1968, America suffered nearly 36,000 KIA during Vietnam. Do we even have any MIAs in Iraq? I think there are a few but not too sure. So, we choose to believe what we want to believe whereas Iraq is concerned. For personal selfish reasons some folks want to portray Iraq as another Okinawa. Kamikazes and all. That fact that Iraq is eating its young is the real story here. Let's face it. Most of us don't have a need to know and we really aren't that important.

[Bill Moore]

Facts in war are elusive, but perceptions are abundant. Initially I didn't count the bodies, or the number of reported killings, how many refugees I saw etc., all considered valid metrics by some pencil neck geek. When we got settled in and our systems matured we started capturing information, but it was obviously incomplete, it was only what we saw and heard (what didn't see and hear?), so one couldn't draw any conclusions from the so called data. You had to trust your gut instincts, which improved with time as you learned about your environment.

There is a saying that every soldier fights his own war, and only sees the war from his from his foxhole. That became very true for us in 2003, and every opportunity I would get I would ask an embedded reporter about how the war was going beyond the range of my 20/20 vision, because I had no access to news the first few weeks.

After we took our objectives, then we too had a moment to ponder the now what question, and when it became apparent higher wasn't going to provide it, we did what we thought was right.

It's called the fog of war, and you don't have to be comfortable with it, but if your going to walk in our boots, you better be able to operate in it.

We had a flawed strategy, that much is granted, but to be constructive, we need ideas for how to undue our mistakes, not empty philosophical quotes that have no relevance to the issue at hand. If those leading the fight now determine it can't be won, then I'll listen, but I won't listen to someone with unknown credentials.

[tequila]

Do we even have any MIAs in Iraq? I think there are a few but not too sure.

Let's not forget Matthew Maupin or Ahmed Qusai al-Taayie.

[Fabius Maximus]

Ed. by SWCAdmin, discuss this post and article in this new thread
------------------

Just an FYI…

As a response to the oft-said -- and quite correct -- comment that my work just criticizes (easy, simple to do) but does not propose solutions (difficult, complex to do), the second in this series has been posted. This looks at geo-pol strategy. Use of force is discussed in the following two parts.

How America can survive and even prosper in the 21st Century
4600 words
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_amer...sper_GS-IV.htm

[RTK]

Recommend new discussion in new thread.

[slapout9]

Recommend new discussion in new thread.

I second that.

[Fabius Maximus]

Recommend new discussion in new thread.

I posted this only as a specific reply to a point (a valid and important one, in my opinion) expressed several times in this (and earlier) threads, such as your post #19.

[RTK]

I posted this only as a specific reply to a point (a valid and important one, in my opinion) expressed several times in this (and earlier) threads, such as your post #19.

That wasn't so pointed at you as the groundskeepers.

[SWCAdmin]

Roger that, RTK and slapout9. That second article is broken off into this new thread. Continue here back on original topic (whatever that was ).

[Culpeper]

Let's not forget Matthew Maupin or Ahmed Qusai al-Taayie.

To date we have 13 MIA. 2 military; 11 civilian.

http://www.aiipowmia.com/stats.html

I don't vouch for this website. Just found something high on the search engine with the information.

[Fabius Maximus]

Looks like the GAO read my op-ed and issued a report supporting my assesment of Iraq. (Not really, but reads as if this is true.)

STABILIZING IRAQ
Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces
March 13, 2007
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07612t.pdf

To some extent the GAO supports all of these findings (excerpt below from my text):

The “Iraq Army” is in fact a lightly armed force consisting of
* regional militias organized along a religious (e.g., Shiite) or ethnic (e.g., Kurdish) basis,
* privately organized forces operating for the state, much like regiments in 16th or 17th century Europe,
* an army organized and run by the Coalition, typical of colonial forces in a bygone era.

Supporting the earlier comment about everyone "having their own facts about Iraq", the GAO notes lack of reliable data about the number and readiness of forces working "for" the Iraq gov't. "Ghost soldiers", indeed.

[Fabius Maximus]

The following was a reply to a question by RTK:

3. From the start I shared the opinion of the real experts, the A-team, in the 4GW community. Most were of this opinion before the war started that we can destroy a state but not build one. We’re in the era of “the decline of the state” as described by Martin van Creveld. Failed or wrecked states easily fragment into situations like the 30 years war, where many factions – divided among varying lines – fight one another.

This suggests another reason to stop fighting the local elites. If we do break them, that might not build the center. Rather it might initiate another round of disintegration. This is Lind’s worst case, where we have nobody to negotiate with.

No longer theory or forecast, that is moving into the realm of fact. Probably a bad thing for us. For Iraq. For everyone in the ME region.

Shiite militia may be disintegrating
AP
March 21, 2007
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070321/...sadr_defectors

[Steve Blair]

Looks like the GAO read my op-ed and issued a report supporting my assesment of Iraq. (Not really, but reads as if this is true.)

STABILIZING IRAQ
Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces
March 13, 2007
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07612t.pdf

To some extent the GAO supports all of these findings (excerpt below from my text):


Supporting the earlier comment about everyone "having their own facts about Iraq", the GAO notes lack of reliable data about the number and readiness of forces working "for" the Iraq gov't. "Ghost soldiers", indeed.

"To some extent" is not the same thing as agreeing with you.

[Fabius Maximus]

"To some extent" is not the same thing as agreeing with you.

I said they were "not really" agreeing with me. Still, nice of you to re-enforce this point. Too much clarity is always a good thing (paraphrase of Mae West).

[RTK]

The following was a reply to a question by RTK:


No longer theory or forecast, that is moving into the realm of fact. Probably a bad thing for us. For Iraq. For everyone in the ME region.

Shiite militia may be disintegrating
AP
March 21, 2007
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070321/...sadr_defectors

Which question was that? I've somehow lost track.