The USMC in Helmand (merged thread)

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

The issue is: How to define the problem, mission, goal?

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports on May 3, 2010:

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=89003

"Over the past two weeks about 100 families have left Marjah in Helmand Province, and sought refuge in the provincial capital Lashkargah, according to aid workers.

“People are fleeing from Marjah out of fear and insecurity,” Ahmadullah Ahmadi, president of the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) office in Helmand, told IRIN.

“The Taliban are harassing people. Their war is not over but has just started,” said Ghulam Farooq Noorzai, provincial director of the refugee affairs department, adding that they were using civilians as human shields in sporadic attacks on Afghan and foreign forces.

Noorzai said his department had registered the return, to the Nad Ali District of Helmand which includes Marjah, of 974 families over the past two months, but that over 2,800 families were still in Lashkargah. "

Marjah is only won when at least 20,000 of its stable population has returned, is functioning in a normal, secure manner (whatever that means).

Any other measure only demonstrates that we can kill the patient to cure the disease, and destabilize others, drive insurgency through tens of thousands of displaced young men with no other future, and wait to see what happens next.

We won the battle for Marjah 3, but "we" can't win the war, either in Marjah, Helmand or Afghanistan if the "price" of victory is so high on the people of Marjah. When does fair, legitimate, and reasonably effective governance accepted by the people get established?

Want to hold a jirga with Marjah residents? Go to Lashkar Gah and Nad Ali (where the majority of Marjah's population have been refugees since February).

It is just starting, and a long way from a measurable result among "the people."

Stability is easily measured by traffic, trade, relatively free movement, tax collection willingly flows to government/community, and an economy no longer solely dependent of COIN/FID handouts (or the Taliban taxes).

When the majority of the population has returned, commerce and civil life has stabilized, and is beginning to develop sustainable self-governance, we should put a thermometer in the patient to judge recovery.

My opinion.

Steve

PS- I knew that Baghdad was returning to some reasonable stability in June 2008, simply by driving around town in an unmarked old Buick watching street life and trade return. Danger was, and remains high, but "stability" (albeit at security levels unacceptable to some) was returned. (This while Mosul, Diyala and many other places were still in open and activity danger.)

What is the corollary measure from Marjah?

[Bob's World]

Seasons are so important here. If something is a 2 on a scale of 1-10 for violence in February, all things being the same, it is likely to be a 6 or 7 in July. It's not the weather, it is the harvest of Poppy, the availability of unemployed workers and available TB cash, and the nature of resistance insurgency (i.e., they fight us because we are here, and when we "surge", guess what? More of us are here!)

I would simply encourage everyone to not sweat the day to day swings, to understand the natural surge of violence in summer, and to recognize that starting Afghan-style governance from scratch is a slow process. Better measures can be taken beginning in November than now. Everyone in the know, knew it would be a bumpy ride. Now that the ride is bumpy is no reason to get off.

But I do agree, that you don't need a platoon of PhDs to know if you are in an insurgency, just walk down the street and you will know.

[JMA]

Seasons are so important here. If something is a 2 on a scale of 1-10 for violence in February, all things being the same, it is likely to be a 6 or 7 in July. It's not the weather, it is the harvest of Poppy, the availability of unemployed workers and available TB cash, and the nature of resistance insurgency (i.e., they fight us because we are here, and when we "surge", guess what? More of us are here!)

So who has decided to leave the poppies in the loop? There lies a significant part of the problem.

[Bob's World]

Poppy decisions belong to GIROA.

But on a fundamental human level, its probably impossible to bring violence AND economic ruin to a man's house, and earn his trust and support at the same time.

Poppy can wait, there are bigger fish to fry in the near term.

[MikeF]

Poppy decisions belong to GIROA.

But on a fundamental human level, its probably impossible to bring violence AND economic ruin to a man's house, and earn his trust and support at the same time.

Poppy can wait, there are bigger fish to fry in the near term.

What about the illegal taxation and financing of opium by the TB. Do we interdict or is that a serparate issue?

[Bob's World]

Obviously the Opium pipeline is complex, and it is a multi-billion dollar business that all kinds of fingers are jammed deeply into. This won't be resolved overnight, and it also is neither the cause nor the cure for the insurgency.

We need to set our Puritanical value system on the shelf for a few months and pragmatically focus on what we need to focus on to produce the effects we need to achieve.

Besides, most of the guys who own the crops are share croppers, with the land owners living in the cities. Key is to engage poppy-related targets in a manner that doesn't alianate your target audiance (the populace); and that hinders insurgency. Mostly in going after dope though I think you just mess with the big business drug guys, and who know's what kind of dunghills that could kick open. The TB goes door to door and collects what it needs.

Anyway, I think drugs and corruption both are bad, but also are neither one particularly material to immediate COIN effects. To focus on them is to be distracted from things that are much more important.

[MikeF]

Obviously the Opium pipeline is complex, and it is a multi-billion dollar business that all kinds of fingers are jammed deeply into. This won't be resolved overnight, and it also is neither the cause nor the cure for the insurgency.

We need to set our Puritanical value system on the shelf for a few months and pragmatically focus on what we need to focus on to produce the effects we need to achieve.

Besides, most of the guys who own the crops are share croppers, with the land owners living in the cities. Key is to engage poppy-related targets in a manner that doesn't alianate your target audiance (the populace); and that hinders insurgency. Mostly in going after dope though I think you just mess with the big business drug guys, and who know's what kind of dunghills that could kick open. The TB goes door to door and collects what it needs.

Anyway, I think drugs and corruption both are bad, but also are neither one particularly material to immediate COIN effects. To focus on them is to be distracted from things that are much more important.

Well said. Is what I put in bold universally understood? It seems to be of big significance.

[Jedburgh]

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 6 May 2010: The Meaning of Marjah

BG John Nicholson

Frank Ruggiero, Dept of State


Recorded Hearing

[Steve the Planner]

Some might not agree with the logic, but it represents much collective wisdom, not inconsistent with a lot of other knowledgeable folks like Dorronsoro:

http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS..._10000148.aspx

Comment: One BBC commentator described the Taliban statement as "part of a sophisticated propaganda campaign.…" Readers should tire of such blather. The Taliban already have begun to surge attacks in Kandahar. It is not propaganda.

In this they are buoyed by the American and Afghan failure to secure Marjah. It is just too insignificant for the Afghan government to waste its assets on. Old hands knew that about Marjah before the US attack. Its capture was not a centerpiece or a turning point. Whoever said it contained 80,000 people never looked at the satellite imagery.

It was pretty much a waste of time and energy, unless as part of a larger campaign to impose and sustain positive control of Helmand Province. The salient evidence that such a larger plan does not exist is the quick change of focus to Kandahar, a geographically, socially, economically and ethnically different target.

If the maneuver forces cannot stay and cannot be back filled with competent home defense forces, the result of a large scale offensive is no different from the many smaller scale operations in past years. NATO forces can win every battle, but still lose the war and the country.

On the outside looking in, the US command looks muddled. There simply are not enough forces to create a security environment in which nation-building has a chance. The single most important lesson of past counter insurgencies is that no farmer will plant a single seed unless he is confident he will live to see that seed bear fruit. The US and Afghan government cannot provide such a guarantee at this time, but the Taliban can.

[davidbfpo]

With a sub-title:

Three years after he first travelled to Musa Qala, Nick Meo returns to Afghanistan and finds a town fearful that Nato's war is not going well, and dreading what may happen when they leave.

A lengthy article and some key phrases:

Insurgent control begins just a few miles from the town centre...Many of the attacks are thought to be paid for by drugs barons who flourish in the opium-rich region. Their business thrives when it is lawless and they want the foreign soldiers out.

Corporal Vincent Song, who is based next to the governor's compound, was appalled at the semi-secret meetings taking place there, as ex-Taliban fighters drink tea with the governor. "I don't agree with it at all. These are people who are trying to kill me," said Cpl Song, 21, from Washington, who joined up two years ago to fight terrorism. "So many of my brothers have died here. I hate the thought that the governor is meeting the Taliban."

A man identified to The Sunday Telegraph as a Taliban sympathiser, a mullah who attends meetings called shuras to find out what the marines are saying to the Afghans, insisted that the war would get worse before it got better.
"The police arrest the wrong men when bombs go off, and the foreigners kill innocent civilians," he said. "Then their cousins and friends want revenge and join the insurgency. "More clashes create more war, and the Taliban will not do deals to end the war. They want power again in all of Afghanistan. They have tasted its delights before and they want them again."

Says it all IMHO.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...war-again.html

[jcustis]

"They have tasted its delights before and they want them again."

...and is important that we take heed as we try to move forward. If the carrot does not produce the results desired, the answer is not always more carrots.

[tequila]

New America Foundation report on Helmand province. Some really interesting stuff on local power dynamics in here. Not an optimistic report at all.

Another one on Zabul and Uruzgan.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to FRI for this initial report:

Marjah is still being called “the most dangerous place in Afghanistan” by embedded media which is, in my professional opinion, not true. I’ve just returned from a three day trip into Marjah after being lucky enough to catch a ride with the CO of Regimental Combat Team 1, Col Dave Furness who was taking a road trip to visit his battalions in the field. There is too much information from that trip to post in one sitting so the first dispatch from the trip will cover Marjah.

Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3734

Some of the photos are different, psyops = nails. Look yourself.

The comments and the author's replies are worth a read too.

[Jedburgh]

ISW, 5 Jan 11: Counterinsurgency in Helmand: Progress and Remaining Challenges

...It has been nearly eighteen months since comprehensive counterinsurgency operations began in southern and central Helmand in July 2009. The progress that has been achieved throughout these areas is notable. The insurgency has suffered important losses in Helmand. USUS, coalition, and Afghan forces have established security in many parts of southern and central Helmand, which has enabled significant portions of the population to assist in supporting Afghan governance. Yet, a number of challenges remain—a reminder that the fight is not yet over.

The progress in southern and central Helmand demonstrates that counterinsurgency can work in Afghanistan if adapted properly for the conditions in each province. This report offers a detailed assessment of counterinsurgency efforts in Helmand province since the summer of 2009. The report analyzes the coalition’s progress along five primary lines of effort: security; Afghan National Security Forces development; counternarcotics; governance; and reconstruction and development....

[davidbfpo]

Catching up after a gap and KOW recommends a HBO documentary, broadcast 23rd February, made by a British journalist, Ben Anderson:

I watched the HBO documentary, The Battle for Marjah, last night and would recommend anyone interested in Afghanistan to see it. It is a fairly depressing tale. A Marine company is dropped into what appears to be the middle of a field outside Marjah. They quickly attract the attention of local villagers and others, but are unsure of how to act as they can’t distinguish friendlies from insurgents. Exposed and vulnerable from all sides, the Marines are, somewhat predictably, ambushed. They take cover as best they can, fight back and find refuge in a place that might offer a little more protection than the barren field, namely an inhabited house. The original residents are told to go elsewhere and the house is used as a base to hit back at the attackers. Yet the sense of vulnerability is still acute, as the new base is totally surrounded and could easily be breached.

Within a few days of grueling battle, the Marines actually make it into Marjah’s centre where they, having painstakingly ‘cleared’ the area, proceed to ‘hold’ and to ‘build’. The holding and building only last so long though, because the clearing appears to have been less than definitive and the company keeps losing Marines in firefights and explosions – and with it much of the morale generated during the clearing phase. Forced to retreat, and unable to get either the local or central government ‘out of the box’, the progress initially made seems to be unravelling. Despite an apparent lull in violence, the local population is angry at the instability that the offensive has wrought and seem to have preferred Taliban rule, if only for its predictability. The local security forces are too weak to take over and replicate that sense of predictability, so a local militia is recruited. Problematically, this ‘Home Guard’ are not at home at all, but from another region of Afghanistan, and there are signs of distrust and tension, never mind incompetence. Suffice to say that the final step, the ‘transition’ phase cannot proceed as planned. The documentary ends on a very downbeat note, suggesting that all of the Marines’ hard work and sacrifice seems to have produced much less than initially hoped for. Certainly, this offensive did not ‘break the back of the Taliban’, nor was it ‘decisive’ or a ‘turning-point’ in the campaign as promised by heads of state and senior commanders.

The documentary resonates with much of the fairly pessimistic coverage of the Afghan war and is definitely worth watching in full.

The article has a long critique of Tom Ricks too:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/02/hbo...n-afghanistan/

Link to HBO (not available in the UK alas):http://www.hbo.com/documentaries/the.../synopsis.html

Anyone able to comment on the programme? Plus pointers to if it has appeared elsewhere for non-US viewers! Thanks.

Update: this HBO programme appears to be a re-titled edition of a BBC-TV Panorama documentary, which focussed on Sangin, not Marjah (thanks to a JMA posting on the UK in Afg thread and a link to YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6A6AJteEwdg

[TDB]

Catching up after a gap and KOW recommends a HBO documentary, broadcast 23rd February, made by a British journalist, Ben Anderson:

The article has a long critique of Tom Ricks too:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/02/hbo...n-afghanistan/

Link to HBO (not available in the UK alas):http://www.hbo.com/documentaries/the.../synopsis.html

Anyone able to comment on the programme? Plus pointers to if it has appeared elsewhere for non-US viewers! Thanks.

Update: this HBO programme appears to be a re-titled edition of a BBC-TV Panorama documentary, which focussed on Sangin, not Marjah (thanks to a JMA posting on the UK in Afg thread and a link to YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6A6AJteEwdg

Here's a link to the documentary on the Channel 4 website so U.K residents can wathc it http://www.channel4.com/programmes/d...es/4od#3142827

[jcustis]

There is an Afghan in those Free Range International photos who is the most brightly shining example of a man working to help that country. Despite the unmistakable dark skin, he wears a medium reg haircut and is pretty fit (there was speculation among some circles that he had served beside SF teams in the early years of OEF). At first I had a tad bit of difficulty pegging his nationality, and thought he might be from Latin America.

When I first met him, he was supporting Enhanced Mojave Viper exercises as a trainer, controller, and evaluator. I'm not sure whether he was a contractor from our CAOCL, or working some other support requirement, but I typically saw him in the box, headset on, making notes and observing the interactions between Marines and the role players. When the battalion leadership gathered for the final exercise review, he provided a synopsis of our performance across the cultural interaction skills.

He started out speaking in fluent Pashto, and then transitioned to fluent English, where he thanked us for performing well during the exercise, taking up the mission, etc., etc., etc. He also thanked us on the behalf of his people, and implored us to keep an open mind when we got on the ground.

Fast forward seven months to I think Sept 2010, and I ran across him at a Regional Security Shura in Garmsir, where he was serving as Col Furness's linguist. We had a nice chat during a break, and although I cannot recall the everything we talked about, I can definitely remember that his passion for trying to help his country move forward burned just as brightly.

[davidbfpo]

TDB posted:

Here's a link to the documentary on the Channel 4 website so U.K residents can watch it http://www.channel4.com/programmes/d...es/4od#3142827

Thanks. It is not the Panorama programme I thought it was, but the same reporter, Ben Anderson, working for Channel 4 this time.

[TDB]

TDB posted:

Thanks. It is not the Panorama programme I thought it was, but the same reporter, Ben Anderson, working for Channel 4 this time.

Ah I clicked the link, saw his face and assumed it was this one. Bravo's Deadly Mission, I was surprised not to see it up for a bafta.

[davidbfpo]

From my "armchair" a good article by Tim of FRI, maybe very tactical, but has some snippets of note.

The only thing the local people of southern Helmand are concerned about, when it comes to Marines, is that they are going to leave soon. They would much rather see them stay - This is is told to me everywhere I go, and I go just about everywhere in this Province.

Earlier on:

An ANP commander pointed out a village where his men have hit 3 IEDs in as many weeks and each time the villagers poured out with AK’s to start a firefight. So, a few nights later the Marines blow a controlled det on the road to simulate an IED hit and when the villains rushed out with their flame sticks they met what we lovingly call the ‘L shaped ambush’.

Anyway the link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=4352#comments

Thread title changed 2nd October 2011 to reflect next post.