I don't know what the US system is.
I suggest that the time spent in officer selection is wisely invested.
The better the selection the lower the drop out rate and the more optimal use of instructor time and resources. I would be interested to look beyond mere training statistics (like how many start the course and how many get commissioned) to longer term results like how many make it to major (in the A-stream) and then beyond. This will help to ensure selection and focus is in the correct areas.
I agree too that receiving a commission means you can be trusted to be placed in command of a platoon. If there is any doubt the person should not be commissioned. I Brit idea to send newly commissioned officers on a Platoon Commanders Course for 8 weeks is getting the sequence wrong IMHO. I believe the brief to Sandhurst must be that they must produce an officer ready to command a platoon in battle and not some "thing" that needs 8 weeks of tactical and leadership training after being commissioned. Whose responsibility is it for what the final product is? Sandhurst or the Battle School?
How long should a platoon commander command a platoon? Unless he gets fired it should be the standard Brit 30 months. This also takes some of the pressure you talk of off the platoon sergeants. With the right mentoring and guidance you can produce an efficient youngster who can lead his platoon to close with and kill the enemy within a year of platoon commanding. If he can't then I suggest he should be thanked for his contribution and sent on his way.
A lot of how a young officer performs in combat will depend on how he was selected and the quality of the training received. I suggest that when the initial selection is poor we start to hear things like "leaders can be created" and "courage can be developed". Really one needs the basic ingredients from the get go which can be honed and polished and whatever.All in all, looking at the direction this thread has gone, I think we have some obstacles getting in the way of developing our 'brains in combat'. Namely, the pers system and selection/training. They are providing significant barriers to a cohesive and comprehensive force generation process. It's hard to refine a product when your means of producing it are inefficient.
The source document to this thread suggests that officers and sergeants should receive special training on how to command during combat by reporting, issuing orders, calling in fire support and those good things while the soldiers to his left and right are returning fire. Well I suggest that should assessed and that ability proven before the person is commissioned or long before the person makes sergeant. The ability to be able to think and act under fire is IMHO a non-negotiable precondition of any infantry officer or NCO. Outside wartime to test this one needs to create conditions in training to test this ability. Not foolproof but the better armies get it right.
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