Why are we still leading missions, instead of supporting Afghans conduct them?

[JMA]

I would go along with davidbfpo when he states -

It is all a question of each race's psychology.

I can give an example of the Indian Army.

We have a mix of all types of Regiments with different classes (tribes/ races, if you like). Handling each is a totally new experience.

We all have the same doctrine and training and yet handling each is a totally different experience.

The Sikhs are noisy and gung ho (even without reason or rhyme!). They can never stop jabbering or shifting unnecessarily even when they are close to the enemy lines. Very fidgety chaps.

The Gorkha is silent and inscrutable. You will never know what they are up to. In fact the story goes that a Gorkha broke the line on a route march, went into a village, did his whatever with a woman, paid well, return to the line of march and none knew! They are also very obstinate. And if you give a Gorkha an order, you must check back he has understood.

My chaps, the Mahars, are laid back and can go without food for days without complaints. As officers, one had to go an extra mile.

And so on.

The Afghan, I presume, is not much of a fighter in structured battles. But will be dangerous as special forces. They have an independent streak and tend to be individualistic. (My uncle commanded Pathans and so this is what he told me). He also said they are great ones and brutal so long as they are winning. If they smell defeat, it is another story!

Therefore, I would be surprised if the Afghans would synchronise with the American concept of warfare application! I presume, it will take time.........a very long time!

Therefore, Afghans will have to operate with the Americans if they are to adapt to the American minor tactics format and also get a hang of the American psychology that makes a success of the American tactics.

The Vietnamese experiment of 'Advisers' with Afghan troops may not work.

And the biggest handicap is that the American, appear to us, as very impatient and want instant results.

Another oddity we find is that a US officer after giving instructions say 'It is an order'. In the subcontinent, if your superior officer says something, then it is automatically taken for granted it is an order. This can lead to loss of authority that is automatically built in in a superior officer since, out here, if you say 'it is an order', it appears that the superior officer is not confident and he has a doubt if the chap will obey it or not.

In our part of the world, that just does not happen.

Just my thought.

Well the Indian experience together with that of the Brits of old would allow for the best formula for the training of an Afghan army.

Scratch units formed quickly seldom work other than for a short period where they by chance have the correct leadership in place. Take that leadership away and it all falls apart.

Yes patience is not an American characteristic. But that will not stop them attempting to cobble together units and an army in a few years. Obviously such efforts are destined to fail, that is a certainty.

The other ludicrous approach is to ignore a 1,000 years of history and try to put multi-ethnic units together. This later made worse by deploying troops from another ethnicity to police another's area. Never going to work.

So one really needs to structure any Afghan army around what they need to deal with regional threats (and internal threats) and not on some NATO organizational structure where the logistic challenges will prove insurmountable. The Taliban structure when the government would be useful as would Masood's structure which allowed him to defend the Panjshir Valley against both the Soviets and later the Taliban.

The problem I see is recruiting the right people who are committed to the cause and not there to receive the US$ at the month end. Personally I believe they are on a hiding to nothing by supporting the Karzai government but as an academic exercise it would be interesting to discuss how best to facilitate the establishment and development of a national army (if that is what is required).

[JMA]

Training of indigenous troops in another culturally remote country is a skill few countries have while even fewer are willing to commit to the long term input required.

A three part series from Stars and Stripes:

Part 1: Trainees try to be a force that can overcome child-abducting rebels – and their own horrific past

Part 2: Congolese battalion trained with purpose, but armed mostly with promises

Part 3: Congo’s challenge: Feeding troops consistently

A classic quote from Part 2:

Lt. Col. John Pierre Molengo, the commander of the Kisangani camp, downplayed the significance of the food and salary problems, instead blaming U.S. troops who introduced a standard that is difficult to match.

“We were spoiled by eating like Americans,” he said. “The soldiers’ normal way of eating changed.”

So where does the problem lie?

[Bill Moore]

JMA, I couldn't agree more with your last post. In SF we used to eat the local foods, or for larger events we may have deployed our own cooks for our troops, but not for the local troops we were training. This is just one of many examples where we attempt to introduce unaffordable standards of living, equipment, training, C2 procedures, etc., and we wonder why our training efforts have no long term effect? I noticed this shift in the 90s when former SECDEF Chenney started pushing Brown and Root support to the forces resulting in a decrease of our own internal capacity to sustain ourselves. B&R provided great support, and while many may disagree I think they provided too much support that over time had a negative effect on the way we fight, how we interact with others when deployed, etc. Want to make developing nation people hate you, all you have to do is invite them to dine at one of our outstanding dining facilities in a combat zone so they can see how we're living compared to the average citizen in that country. This creates the false perception of what the standard should be, and perhaps contributes to our naive belief that the locals are not good enough. I suspect if we were working with the Taliban, we would claim they weren't ready to fight on their own yet either. We could save millions of dollars and be more effective at the same time if kept striving to make war a four star hotel, and focused on what needed to be done.

[Ray]

I think JMA's and Bill's point is worth serious consideration.

Training locals and getting their administration to high US standards and standard of living appears fair but it makes them 'soft' (in terms of how they would have fought had they been fighting on their own, supposing they were doing so before the ISAF came).

While one concedes that one cannot fight modern battle solely on 'old' ways, yet the modernisation must be compatible to the local combat and social parameters.

For instance, over dependence on motor transport or helicopter lifts for people who are used to movement on foot for long distance without tiring, slowly downgrades their psychological, mental and physical endurance (while it does not do the same to the Taliban who do not have such 'modern' facilities) and their natural fighting capabilities that would be best for use against the Taliban.

An Indian example - For instance, the MRE or what we call composite rations and survival rations that the IA used were the same as what was issued during WW II. Much of it was wasted since the troops did not eat most of the stuff as it was not to 'Indian' tastes/ food habits. Nowadays, it is on an Indian menu and has been, as per reports, well received. Thereby, loss to the exchequer is less and tonnage hauled has been put to productive use.

[carl]

Bill Moore: At the risk of being blown out of the water, I think you missed the point of the references to feeding the Congolese troops. The 3 meals a day were provided so they would have enough energy and attention to be trained at all, not because of extravagant American habits. The Congolese way of 1 meal a day is not because the troops can function on that, the record of the FARDC proves that. The food money gets stolen before it gets to the troops. That Congolese colonel is just covering his thieving from his soldiers. The object of that mission is to get some troops trained. If they weren't fed properly they wouldn't have paid attention, couldn't have paid attention and wouldn't have listened because they would have been to busy figuring how to acquire or steal their next meal.

[Bill Moore]

Carl,

thanks for the clarification. I'm not launching any torpedos, but will leave my rant in place, because it still addresses part of the whole on why we don't do capacity building well.

[JarodParker]

Lt Gen Caldwell gave a presentation today at Brookings (shown on CSPAN) regarding the training of Afghan forces. He stated that they should be able to take charge in Dec 2014. Currently, only 1 of 84 infantry battalions is ready to operate independently (no advisers, etc). He added that there's another larger group (presumably several battalions) right behind them in the pipeline.
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