The internet is everywhere, and I have a bit more time than I anticipated.
Yes, it is no longer an insurgency.
No, it is still an insurgency.
I've lost track
Wasn't he suppose to go on vacation....like last week ?
Last edited by Stan; 03-22-2007 at 10:54 PM.
How nice of you to remember!
The internet is everywhere, and I have a bit more time than I anticipated.
RTK -- this article referenced back to your post #50
A fracturing of the Shia might move Iraq away from a national gov't, away from a federal system, towards chaos. This was a major point of my text, that we should consider working with local elites -- not attempting to knock them down. Lind has also written about this.Originally Posted by RTK
You mean work with local tribal leaders, sheiks , politicians, and Imams?
Gee, I never thought of that.
Neither did DoD or DoS.
We have fought Muqtada al-Sadr and many Sunni Arab leaders since the start of the war, and this has perhaps been the war's defining theme. Perhaps (who can say for certain?) this is the conceptual error leading to so much blood spilled and treasure waster, with nothing to show for it.
Don't feel personally responsible just because you never thought of it. Neither did the big folks in DC.
Martin van Creveld has some interesting things to say about this in his new book, The Changing Face of War.
Evidently the sarcasm didn't come through the message as thick as I had laid it on while typing. Seems like what you're saying is very similar to what Kilcullen said in the 28 Articles. To insinuate this isn't happening is false.
The fact of the matter is that 80% of the time in theater is spent engaging the local populace and their leaders. I had one MRE last time I was there. The rest of the time I either ate in the dining facility or at a sheik's house. Most (if not all) of the people I know did pretty much the same thing.
The bottom line is engaging isn't enough. Getting local leaders to take ownership of their community to minimize sectarian violence. That's a tougher sell, particularly in a society where poor performance reflects as a sign of weakness and shame.
Last edited by RTK; 03-23-2007 at 02:24 PM.
It was a strategic recommendation.
If you believe that the Coalition leaders have seriously attempted to negotiate with Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sunni Arab insurgent leaders, fine. As I said earlier, in this war everyone has their own facts.
I doubt it. Nor do I see any indications of this in the public media or private analysis (i.e., think tanks, Stratfor).
That we have not struck such deals is a fact which I think will prove difficult to dispute.
Also, I doubt that local leaders have not taken "ownership of their community". The guys with guns seem to have done so quite effectively, if not according to our standards.
That they have not acted "to minimize sectarian violence" seems true, but obviously they do not believe this to be in their interest. Since they are the "world class experts" in their communities, I suspect we have to strike deals -- not attempt to "educate" them concerning their own affairs.
As for dining with local leaders, I (and everybody) agrees that this is tactically effective, to some extent. But not quite the subject under discussion.
FM,
DoD has been doing this for years. Nothing new here. Just because you don't hear about it often enough, doesn't mean it's not taking place all over the world. You won't receive such information second hand, it comes from experienced soldiers.
RTK was and is personally responsible for every soldier under his command. I don't know if I could even explain that to you.
We're back to parachute packing. Do you want your's packed by a guy that reads newspapers, or by the guy that knows how to and does so with grave detail ?
Don't feel personally responsible just because you never thought of it. Neither did the big folks in DC.Evidently the sarcasm didn't come through the message as thick as I had laid it on while typing.
If we're talking about tactical actions with strategic implications it's very much the subject under discussion. You can't seperate the two in this environment.
I also don't think DOD is responsible for checking in and reporting every move they make with private think tanks or the like. This whole discussion is becoming circular again.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Agreed. This has been heavily discussed both here and in other locations. To get back to one of FM's points, "Also, I doubt that local leaders have not taken "ownership of their community". The guys with guns seem to have done so quite effectively, if not according to our standards." - the guys with the guns are not necessarily the same thing as local leaders in the sense that RTK means (and if I'm mistaken in your meaning, RTK, please feel free to correct me). If the local leaders do not feel they can contain the outside influences, or extremists within their own organizations, they are most likely to step aside. And they also may not have been the first to assume control or direction within their areas. The complexities here are very deep and multi-faceted.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
No need to correct you, Steve. You're all over it. How you interpretted it is exactly what I meant.
Cool. I was pretty sure that was what you meant, RTK, but didn't want to put words in your mouth.
As an aside, I noticed that FM quoted some questions you posed at one time. Were those ever really answered? I thought they were quite good, and also reasonable.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Not to my satisfaction. They were never specifically addressed.
Misc replies
Please share with us if you have signed a treaty with Muqtada al-Sadr over dinner.
This has nothing to do with RTK's -- or anyone on this thread -- direct responsibilities in Iraq or who packs whose chute.
Deals on the scale we're discussing are made at high levels, based on strategic policy decisions made at senior DoD and White House levels. There is of course an interrelationship between tactics and strategy, but the distinction remains on a hierarchical basis. Based on available evidence, it seems likely to me that we have not altered our strategy, continuing the so-far failing strategy of attempting to suppress the insurgents. That's a guess -- most discussions about Iraq on SWC and other blogs are about guesses. Still, major policy changes make large waves. Of course, something might have changed so recently that the impacts have not yet appeared.
As for Steve Blair's point -- he is, of course, correct that deals can be made without public announcements. But if significant they would have had visible consequences during the past 4 years. Do you see any evidence of substantial deals with the leaders of the Mahdi Army or the Sunni Arab insurgents?
As for "the guys with the guns are not necessarily the same thing as local leaders" -- perhaps. Who can say on the basis of public information? At the least, an insurgency that remains so effective despite almost 4 years of massive Coalition COIN programs ... with little evidence of substantial external support (e.g., little or no anti-air) -- likely has deep local support. The long history of insurgencies suggests that they are typically plugged in, or perhaps even subordinate, to key elements of the local elites. That is an important foundation of their strength.
Rply to RTK
I don't believe you questioned any specific aspect of my reply. I might have missed it, as there were several cross discussions going on.
Only because I was fairly certain you knew that your answers weren't anywhere near sufficient.
You clearly don't understand the concept of the Strategic Corporal.
See the work of COL MacFarland's 1/1AD in Ramadi over the past year. It doesn't happen by itself.
"When 1-1AD arrived in Ramadi last June, it was welcomed by six cooperative tribes and twelve hostile ones. Today, it boasts the support of 15 and the enmity of just three." http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20070219&s=kaplan021907
Once again I think you're confusing a number of points here, as well as showing what appears to be a selective understanding of insurgencies. Iraq is not a single insurgency: it is a number of them, mixed in with terrorist groups with no interest in a solution, some criminal elements interested only in plunder, and others with interests that may span all the elements listed above and add in a few of their own. COIN is effective against the insurgency; it has limited value against terrorist groups. Your comment about insurgencies being "typically plugged in, or perhaps even subordinate, to key elements of the local elites" is also misleading if not incorrect in a number of particulars. You would first need to define local, and then get into the question of which elite (most societies, even the most primitive tribal groups, have more than one functional elite) 'controls' them, although our own history indicates that often these elites have little control over the actions of some within the group (review Native American history if you doubt this; the actions of the Kiowa during the 1874 Buffalo War or the conduct of the Apache at just about any juncture of their history are but two examples).
Another thing that seems to get lost here is the fact that most effective COIN initiatives begin at the BOTTOM, with the sort of deals and meetings that RTK is mentioning. If you can sway and influence the tribal groups behind a leader, you don't NEED a treaty with that leader. By removing his local support you've rendered him ineffective. I would think with all your 4GW stuff you'd understand the value of the political indirect approach...flanking the fish, if you will, by chlorinating the water they live in. The true work, effort, and success in most COIN initiatives comes from the bottom and rises. It cannot be shoved down from the top.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
One of the best explanations I have seen!
My 2 cents - we have more insurgents in the US Congress than ever before (Demo-rats) this business of a date certain and then we cut off the money is nothing but a guaranteed loss!!Another thing that seems to get lost here is the fact that most effective COIN initiatives begin at the BOTTOM, with the sort of deals and meetings that RTK is mentioning. If you can sway and influence the tribal groups behind a leader, you don't NEED a treaty with that leader. By removing his local support you've rendered him ineffective. I would think with all your 4GW stuff you'd understand the value of the political indirect approach...flanking the fish, if you will, by chlorinating the water they live in. The true work, effort, and success in most COIN initiatives comes from the bottom and rises. It cannot be shoved down from the top.
They're losers [Congress] . Idiots are using a small war for political gain instead of getting this thing completed correctly. First they screamed about the troops not getting enough and now they want to fight on a zero budget. Troops didn't have enough to begin with and now they come up with a budget of, "if you don't use it you're going to lose it." Let's see....You had one Humvee that you never took out on patrol. You lose it as well as the personnel assigned to it. That goes for the armor plating as well. It's called withdraw on paper. It's still a guaranteed loss. You got that right. Commander-in-Chief should veto their asses off.
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