Interesting article. It does leave one question unanswered, for me, however. While other countries have been adopting much of our culture (tennis shoes, television, coca cola, etc), they are most decidedly rejecting our military culture, i.e. stand up battles conducted with high technology in accordance with the laws of land warfare. This may simply indicate that they are not mentally defective. However, it does pose a continuing problem.
I'd prefer not to use loaded terms like terrorism, guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare or suchlike to describe this problem. I believe each is too limited (as I'll describe below). The problem is that many people, faced with overwhelming conventional firepower, rely on a strategy of attack by informal groups who rely on stealth and deception. Moreover, they frequently conduct acts which are criminal or barbarous in nature. For example, the murder of civilians, random killings, kidnapping (for ransom and intimidation), assassination, mutiliation (including of the dead), torture, intimidation, theft, piracy, sabotage, arson and even graffiti. I mean here to consider the actual acts, rather than the motives of the individuals or groups performing them, which is why I feel terrorism (for example) is too limiting a term. Somali crowds who dragged the bodies of U.S. servicemen through their streets were not terrorists, but they pose the same tactical problem. I think of this as the bandit problem - although I'm open to better terminology.
The tactical problem, in short, is that such groups are particularly adept at stealth, camouflage and deception (all of which they practice in order to survive). Whether it is a Habr Gidr militiaman hiding in a Somali market or a Taliban soldier in Afghanistan's mountains (or a Viet Minh soldier in the jungles of his country), the enemy has considerable advantages provided by terrain, population or both. The United States military is, compared to its opponents, blind, vulnerable and helpless to strike back efficiently. There is the Hama strategy of simply devastating the enemy's sanctuary, but that is anything but efficient.
I guess that word, tactical, is at the heart of the issue. Our strategy must be dictated by capabilities, and our tactics by our strategy. Our enemies have a limited set of capabilities - which makes their strategies rather predictable. However, in the hundred or more years it may take for American culture to colonize the world, we're going to have to deal with countless foes who are willing to use those capabilities. Is the issue merely a matter of not responding at all, rather than relying on military force? Given the US record in Iraq and Afghanistan (and the cost of those questionable achievements), we may be best off with a policy of ignoring such outrages.
The issue is one of moral victory in tactical defeat. Our bandit enemies gain notoriety and strength every time they merely survive the American juggernaut. From Pancho Villa to Zarqawi, enemies of the United States have mainly profited by being wily and creative - hitting wherever they sense an opening and relying on the sheltering protection of an adoring populace and forbidding terrain. Our every mistake is an outrage to world opinion and a victory for the bandits. The bandits, because they retain the initiative, rarely make mistakes.
It seems to me that with relatively few changes to force structure (and virtually none to weapons systems) we could implement a more effective force for dealing with such foes. Obviously, it would require better human intelligence capabilities. It would also require soldiers who are capable of thriving in the thicket jungle or the highest mountain. Combined with the advantages of air and seapower, such forces might not even have to outnumber the enemies they fight. The problem is one of strategy - under what conditions to we insert such forces? Conditions must be right for U.S. involvement (as they were in Afghanistan in 2002).
How do you propose the U.S. resolve the issues of a bandit enemy while we pursue a strategy of minding our own business militarily while winning a cultural and economic war?
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