Winning the War in Afghanistan

[carl]

I never said raid until they submit, I don't expect any state or non-state actor to submit unless we conduct total war like we did against Germany and Japan (where "we" killed tens of thousands of civilians). The intent of the raid is to change an actors cost-benefit assessment, and once the U.S. shows the will to act (and not my launching missiles or dropping bombs from airplanes, but by putting boots on the ground) and inflict pain, the groups will be "less" likely to strike (or if they're fanatical like AQ, their hosts will be less receptive to allowing them to act out their fantasies). Raids can serve multiple purposes, but I'm focused on two, first is the pre-emptive strike (that doesn't mean invade and then occupy a country) and second a retalitory response. Both are viable and affordable options, not permanent solutions, I don't think there are any permanent solutions. If you think occupying Afghanistan and breaking our piggy bank is going to lead to a permanent solution well then just keep hoping away...

I don't see the US military ever doing something like that given the culture. I don't see the politicians ever giving the ok. I don't think it practically possible unless there are big bases nearby. I don't think we would ever be able to figure the variables enough to insure we would hurt them more than they hurt us. For example, what if the subject government fell even if you didn't want it to? The new gov has a different outlook and isn't going to do what we want. What would we do, restore the old one because we had them figured? I just don't see it working at all.

The only thing permanent in human existence is human nature and death. Given that, I am happy with results that last for a few decades.

What breaks our piggy bank is entitlement spending. Military spending is a drop in the bucket.

[ganulv]

What breaks our piggy bank is entitlement spending. Military spending is a drop in the bucket.

Well, a ladleful, maybe.

[Dayuhan]

The fact of the matter is AQ was hanging out in Afghanistan, killed a bunch of us and then the Talibs didn't give them up. What would have happened, or not have happened is immaterial. That did happen. We reacted as is normal for a nation subject to mortal attack.

Going there and stomping some people was indeed a normal and predictable reaction. Staying on and trying to transform the place into a democracy... maybe normal and predictable for us, but I wouldn't say advisable.

Success is achieving your goal. The first step toward success is selecting a specific, practical, achievable goal. The transformation of Afghanistan is none of those.

[Ken White]

Mr. Atta wasn't likely to collect much money, no fame, no ideology, no cachet; all things Mr. Bin Laden had. That was the hard thing to build up and OBL had the power to bring in the bucks.

As did and do many other people. OBL just had his 15 minutes of fame and grasped it.

I am a bit confused by the first part here. Military intervention will do more harm than good, presumably to our side.

No, it most always does more harm than good to the people and /or nation that the intervenors are nominally trying to help. Interventions rarely do the intervenor that much good either, they are expensive and seldom achieve their objectives.

But, a raid, which is military intervention, will do more harm than good to their side, but not to our side but it is military intervention which does more harm than good to our side. I'm lost.

I noticed. A raid is not a military intervention.

An intervention is the deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy in another nation or nations. It may be planned to be for a brief period or may be a long term effort.

A Raid is a surprise attack by a small armed force usually entailing sudden and often unannounced forced entry into an operational area with no intention of staying. It can be conducted to seize or destroy materiel or enemy forces or specific persons, it can be tailored be a spoiling operation a disruptive operation or a specific locale destructive operation.

The intervenor intrudes between two or more parties and this type of effort typically last for a period of time. A raid is specifically designed to be a brief operation.

True you do use the correct tool for the job. But you don't pick and choose the jobs you do because you only have one tool... I don't think it wise that you say no, I am not going to do that because I like using this one tool and don't feel like learning to use one of the others.

I agree with all that in principle but the fact is that ANY military force is or should be a tool designed to be destructive. It is not a building tool.

Just out of curiosity, which country is the most important member of NATO?

In what sense? The US money wise; probably Germany geographically, possibly the UK politically. It's an alliance of nations who all have importance in one respect or another.

Reference my statement "However, as I keep trying to point out to you, we will not -- indeed, we cannot -- do it 'right.' Ergo it's best not to do it.you said

I don't buy that. We can do it right and have done it.

Oh? What's your basis for saying we can do it right? I'm quite curious to know when we did "it right" as I sure can't think of one off hand where a large US force was committed. When you come up with one, be sure it's a post WW II example, we could do it reasonably well prior to that, since then the bureaucracy and the "fpe" have destroyed our capability to successfully perform such operations; so name me one.

To say we shouldn't because we just can't is a rationalization for laziness or fecklessness. And, it is an invitation for clever enemies to follow a path that will confound us.

That's funny. What I propose is far more work and more dangerous with more risk that an intervention. Nothing lazy or feckless about it. In no way is it such an invitation to our current clever enemies who are confounding us and you as we write here. You're advocating playing the other guys game on his turf -- that's where and when we get confounded.

We reacted as is normal for a nation subject to mortal attack.

We did and I've said I agree with that reaction. I did and do not agree we should have stayed much past mid 2002.

But didn't you just say we could bomb people into submission.

No.

You implied that if our raids hurt them enough, they would stop raiding back. And since the raids would mostly be air raids (they would have to be, we haven't done big punitive ground raids much and the one we did in Mexico didn't work well) and submission would consist of not raiding back...I don't get it.

Obviously. Strategic Raids do not have to be and should not be totally by air, those are ineffective. Nor should we attempt the big punitive ala Mexico 'raid' (that was not a raid BTW, it was a Punitive Expedition, it was not intended to strike one or a few targets and rapidly depart -- it was, in fact an intervention.... Small tailored ground forces air (or sea, location dependent) lifted in, quick strike and out.

How did Hezbollah get into this? When was the last time they attacked New York?

They got into this because I brought them in. They exist and are more competent and dangerous (and have more money) than AQ. The USSR never attacked New York either but they were a concern. Hezxbollah is also a concern, or efforts to disrupt AQ have been effective -- we have not done much to by, for or with Hezbollah. Yet.

Until human nature changes, that just isn't true. That is what humans do, try to win and beat the other guy.

I agree that's true for human nature and a grea many people -- I do not agree it applies to western democracies specifically and to most governments in the world today. I suggest that the world has changed to an extent and you seem to have missed it.

How you going to do all this without very large bases close by and a very large logistical effort and a whole lot of airlift? We don't have the airlift. Given the force-pro proclivities of the modern military, I don't see how we could move in and out of anywhere fast enough to make big punitive ground raids work. And I don't see how we could ever hurt them more than they hurt us given our probable greater sensitivity to casualties. All they would have to do is shoot down one, just one C-17 or Herc loaded with troops.

All valid concerns. We should have improved our airlift capability in the 90s to include procuring stealthy insertion and extraction transports. We did not but we can. We do know that the Armed forces of the US have been only marginally successful in most of our recent operations and we do know the way we've been operating is part of the problem and that we must change. We also need to improve our strategic reach as the large bases are an Achilles heel for us that we should have foregone twenty years ago -- but Armed Forces change slowly...

Most of the "fpe" wants to change minimally and many -- not all -- of them would indeed recoil at a bird or two getting downed (the obvious counter to that is to avoid it...). I disagree on the sensitivity to casualties. That too is a "fpe" mantra but most Americans will accept casualties provided they see some successes to counter that cost.

What am I advocating exactly? Something now or something in the future?

I don't know about now or the future but you seem to espouse intervention or military action for social engineering or humanitarian purposes.

I object to those. It's not personal but it is a deep seated anger. My anger is directed at the "fpe" crowd, civilian AND military, who lobby for foolish interventions that too often do more harm to everyone than they do good for anyone. The "fpe" desire to help other is truly laudable. I really mean that. However, their chosen methodology is just generally pathetic in insofar as results achieved are concerned and that is historical fact. My position is not based on an academic study of the issues or on the rights or wrongs of a given event, rather it is based on experience in implementing those flawed visions in a a number of places around the world and seeing the costs, short and long term, to everyone involved in them

We cannot change the world so that any and all follow in our image -- nor should we want to do so. Attempts to achieve such change cannot be made by force of arms, the changes may be induced or introduced but they in the end must be voluntarily accepted by the local population. The minute you intervene with an armed force you effectively preclude voluntary acceptance. You can impose a force on a people and that force will be respected because it has to be, however, the likelihood of force -- not necessarily used, just present -- convincing any locals to change lifelong attitudes and habits is infinitesimal. If the habits that are presumed to be in need of change have been imbedded culturally over many generations then its going to take at least two or three generations to achieve any meaningful movement, longer to achieve significant modification.

Strategic raids are not the be-all and end-all, they are just another tool and should and can be only part of our military posture. They are hard for some of the reasons you've stated and others -- but they are moire effective and will be better suited to the next decade or so than will long, costly interventions. The bad news is that the feckless and lazy thing is to do the interventions, it's easier on the "fpe" and they sound like those folks mean well, they like that...

But. How have they worked out over the last 60 years?

[Bob's World]

It may be a critical issue to us, but how critical is it to the various Afghan factions? I doubt that the Karzai crowd have any real interest in reconciliation, except as a tool to co-opt some Taliban leaders and increase their own hold on power. I doubt that the Taliban have any real interest in reconciliation, except as a tool to get some of their people inside the tent and advance their own quest for the power monopoly.

We shouldn't assume that our objectives are shared by any of those we have to deal with. Better to accept that it's their country and their system, and we aren't going to change it. If we take on a set of goals that require us to transform the way Afghanistan is governed, we set ourselves up for failure.

You miss the point. I too doubt any of the "Karzai crowd" have any interest in reconciliation. Why would they? They have all the money and power as it stands, so too do all of their friends, family and tribes in this patronage system. But for everyone with power in Afghanistan, there is someone behind him wishing that it was him. (Oh, and big typo, I wrote "Juma" but meant "Jan," I don't think Juma's star will rise now that his patron is gone, but who knows...).

The fact that ISAF has completely delegated reconciliation to the "Karzai crowd" is, IMO, outrageous. This is the essential task for any kind of stability born of compromise (rather than suppression born of brute force); yet we leave it to the one group with nothing to gain from such action; and then enable them to do nothing by committing ourselves to the protection of them and the care of their populace. Crazy.

My muse though, was who might be in the wings to potentially move up, and what deals such players might have cut or be willing to cut to stay alive while they build their own power and fortune. And we do need to care if we hope to be able to depart Afghanistan any time soon and not have the whole mess collapse in short order on those who actually trusted in ISAF while we were there.

Besides, if the eviction of AQ is still the main mission, no one can deliver that faster and more effectively than the Taliban. That was true in 2001, and it is still true today. That is a fine point that really needs to be moved to the top of the buffer.

[davidbfpo]

With political murders of late FP Blog has added context and a judgement on the tradition of bribery and killing reappearing with a vengeance:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...ssassin_nation

[Dayuhan]

You miss the point. I too doubt any of the "Karzai crowd" have any interest in reconciliation. Why would they? They have all the money and power as it stands, so too do all of their friends, family and tribes in this patronage system.

That's only half the equation. The other half is the Taliban, who have no reason to reconcile either. The goal, on either side, is not reconciliation but dominance. One had it, lost it, wants it back. The other has it and wants to keep it. We can dream all we want about getting them to share, but that won't make it happen.

The fact that ISAF has completely delegated reconciliation to the "Karzai crowd" is, IMO, outrageous. This is the essential task for any kind of stability born of compromise (rather than suppression born of brute force); yet we leave it to the one group with nothing to gain from such action; and then enable them to do nothing by committing ourselves to the protection of them and the care of their populace. Crazy.

To whom would you give the task? It's not as if ISAF, or any other outside power, can produce reconciliation. "Stability born of compromise" may be an ideal outcome for us, but if it isn't sought by either of the contending parties, what we want really doesn't matter.

My muse though, was who might be in the wings to potentially move up, and what deals such players might have cut or be willing to cut to stay alive while they build their own power and fortune. And we do need to care if we hope to be able to depart Afghanistan any time soon and not have the whole mess collapse in short order on those who actually trusted in ISAF while we were there.

If our ability to depart Afghanistan without collapse rests solely on our ability to produce "stability born of compromise", we have a problem. We can't force compromise on anyone, and the parties involved don't seem terribly interested in it.

Besides, if the eviction of AQ is still the main mission, no one can deliver that faster and more effectively than the Taliban. That was true in 2001, and it is still true today. That is a fine point that really needs to be moved to the top of the buffer.

Can deliver and will deliver are two very different things. The Taliban might decide to keep AQ out if they are convinced that the costs of harboring AQ are greater than the gains. It's not likely that they will offer up AQ as a bargaining chip to gain partial power when they see the likelihood of claiming total power in short order if they can only hold on until we leave.

Certainly it would work very nicely for us if the Taliban would give up any AQ connection in return for inclusion in a representative government. What works well for us is irrelevant if the parties involved aren't interested. Why would we think the Taliban, Karzai and the Northern Alliance, or anyone else in Afghanistan would want to rearrange their political culture to suit our needs?

[Bob's World]

That's only half the equation. The other half is the Taliban, who have no reason to reconcile either. The goal, on either side, is not reconciliation but dominance. One had it, lost it, wants it back. The other has it and wants to keep it. We can dream all we want about getting them to share, but that won't make it happen.



To whom would you give the task? It's not as if ISAF, or any other outside power, can produce reconciliation. "Stability born of compromise" may be an ideal outcome for us, but if it isn't sought by either of the contending parties, what we want really doesn't matter.



If our ability to depart Afghanistan without collapse rests solely on our ability to produce "stability born of compromise", we have a problem. We can't force compromise on anyone, and the parties involved don't seem terribly interested in it.



Can deliver and will deliver are two very different things. The Taliban might decide to keep AQ out if they are convinced that the costs of harboring AQ are greater than the gains. It's not likely that they will offer up AQ as a bargaining chip to gain partial power when they see the likelihood of claiming total power in short order if they can only hold on until we leave.

Certainly it would work very nicely for us if the Taliban would give up any AQ connection in return for inclusion in a representative government. What works well for us is irrelevant if the parties involved aren't interested. Why would we think the Taliban, Karzai and the Northern Alliance, or anyone else in Afghanistan would want to rearrange their political culture to suit our needs?

So, Dayuhan, your point appears to be: To do the right thing is hard.

Concur. I would add, that to knowingly do the wrong thing (unless some far greater matter elsewhere hinges upon our continuing to do the wrong thing in Afghanistan) is foolish. To continue to do the wrong thing in Afghanistan in a manner that actually puts much larger issues at a greater risk is criminal.

You assume that the Taliban would not negotiate a withdrawal of the sanctuary they grant AQ in exchange for the US either driving a Mediatied settlement with GIRoA or our withdrawal from the region (with the firm promise that we will be pack to conduct just the type of Strategic Raids advocated by Ken and Bill on this thread if they again turn to hosting NSAs who would do us harm). That is a fair assumption. But it is one that should be a high priority to put to the test. Worst case it goes no where and we are right where we stand currently. Best case it opens the door for a new era of Afghan stability.

You assume the GIRoA senior leadership would never be open to reconciliation. Again, a fair assumption that should be put to the test. Karzai needs an ultimatum with some balls behind it. So long as we convince ourselves that we can only protect America by either staying in Afghanistan to keep the Northern Alliance in power, or creating such a powerful security force that the Northern Alliance can keep themselves in power, we will be powerless to make Karzai do what he knows he must do for Afghanistan and will in turn enable him to do what he wants to do for himself.

I believe the interests we quote as our rationale for staying in Afghanistan are grossly over-stated.

I believe that we increase the threat of trans-national terrorism to the US and our interests through our current courses of action; as they validate AQ's message regarding the danger the US posses and they also motivate the populaces of an entirely new region of the world (from the one already so motivated on 9/11) to volunteer to assist AQ in their ends as a means to free their own people from excessive, unwanted US intervention in their national affairs.

I believe we are fixed to a minor, supporting effort in South Asia while the main effort (which is largely political and diplomatic) in North Africa and the Middle East goes largely ignored and not recognized for how critical it is to defusing the popular angst against a wide range of national governments and Western influence over those governments is to this mis-stated "War against AQ" that we are waging (why we wage war against an organization that is a symptom of the problem rather than addressing the policy and political issues that cut to the heart of the problem I will never understand. I realize it is easier to send the military out to punish those who disagree with obsolete approaches than it is to actually evolve those approaches for the world we live in today, but come on...).

So, test the assumptions. If your assumptions prove correct, then we pack up and go home. It really is that simple.

[Ken White]

A sensible and aware objection that is quite valid. Good hit.

I don't see the US military ever doing something like that given the culture. I don't see the politicians ever giving the ok.

You got that right. Those same politicians that do not have the moral courage to rein in entitlements and Federal spending in general are the ones that have not had the moral courage to stop problems outside the US because they are too busy getting reelected to be bothered. Most are capable of doing better but have succumbed to a culture. I believe you are quite correct in that statement for now -- what the future brings may alter that for the better. I think it will. I will acknowledge that if it does not, all your other objections will be more or less correct. Those other objections are real but easily overcome IF the political will and strategic acumen are available.

The military culture issue is less a problem. We used to do strategic raids, we even trained to do them as late as the early 60s. The Army lost its way after Viet Nam and is now groping for a better path. My sensing is that while the senior leadership is fighting and will fight that change, they're going to lose rather badly -- and this is a good thing...

My only fear is that the heavy Euro-centric folks will win the day aided by USSOCOM who quite wrongly IMO want primacy in all things other than Armored Warfare and the US Congress who wants to buy expensive toys to garner votes. I've got a gut feel that effort will be overcome but we'll have to wait and see...

As you probably know, the real issue here is that US politicians are so focused on the US internal dynamics that they pay little attention to foreign issues until it's literally too late and they go into reactive mode. I believe that changes in communication and international norms are going to force modifications to that model. They'll have to be forced, the Congroids on their own will never adapt and will fight efforts to make them do so -- but I think that's exactly what's going to occur. The natives are getting restless...

I don't think it practically possible unless there are big bases nearby.

Given our current methods of operation, valid point -- but also rather easily correctable. We need to quit the bases, they were necessary and they arguably led to the way we've been operating over the past half century or more but they are no longer vital, there are better alternative -- our elephantine bureaucracy slows our ability to change and the bases were problematic 20 years ago yet we've done nothing. That lack of strategic acumen thing...

I don't think we would ever be able to figure the variables enough to insure we would hurt them more than they hurt us.

We can differ on that. We are as mentioned pretty good at targeting, we just have a penchant for not attacking the critical targets because it's too hard or someone might object. That's an education and training issue that can be remedied.

The issue is to determine what would be an adequate hurt and then to ruthlessly inflict it with full realization that it might bring temporary hurt in terms of own and civilian casualties and such but that such hurt is acceptable and really preferable to the longer term and deeper hurt, even more casualties plus the other costs a protracted campaign is absolutely certain to bring. As someone said the other day, our current approach is the old "Boil the Frog" technique. Unfortunately, because we're sort of clumsy, what we do is turn over the pot, get hot water all over everything and have a pizzed off frog to deal with...

US Politicians used to almost encourage our numerous forays of varying lengths and intensities around the world from 1782 until WW II. What they and we have not done since 1950 or so is adapt well to changing world social mores and norms of behavior.

We are not ordinarily ruthless but Americans can be quite ruthless if properly led and or fired up. As I mentioned earlier, we really do Targeting fairly well, it is our execution that needs work. We need to quite recognizing a problem and then attacking something else as we've been doing for the past 60 years.

For example, what if the subject government fell even if you didn't want it to? The new gov has a different outlook and isn't going to do what we want. What would we do, restore the old one because we had them figured?

That's simple strategy; what result do you want, what will get you there, what are the possible alternatives or outcomes, what can be done to eliminate or minimize those not deemed favorable.

The fact is that in all our recent adventures, those within your memory, we did not get to or perform the last two steps -- we just reacted and then made it up as we went along. The US political system is designed to do things in that manner but that's easy to adapt to -- just consider it a feature, accept that its real and design accordingly. We have failed to do that because we have used flawed European models in politics and diplomacy (before Fuchs attacks, those methods are not flawed for Europe, they just do not work well for us...). Our good strategists -- and we do have some -- get over run by the civilian Think Tanks who mostly are not that helpful and they certainly are not innovative.

Here's a quote from Martin van Creveld that Backwards Observer placed on the front page of SWJ:

""As to the U.S, I do not see that it follows any particular set of principles except hypocrisy: meaning, the heart-felt need to dress up its extraordinary hunger for power with fine-sounding phrases about freedom, democracy, women's rights, etc.""

That's not totally accurate but it certainly is accurate enough to serve as an indictment of the way we've been using our military power since 1945. That really needs to change.

I just don't see it working at all.

Heh. Neither does the Army War College;

Note two articles in the SWJ Blog today. The US Army War College Key Strategic Issues List is scary -- it is a compendium of business as usual. So they're on your side (that culture thing -- which can be changed...). No pushing the envelope there. Hidebound uber alles, Conventional and constrained r us...

OTOH, for some fresher thinking, check the Monograph linked and available for download at "The New Aztecs: Ritual and Restraint in Contemporary Western Military Operations" It's impressive. Here's the important quote from it:

""The problem develops, however, when leaders are “anxious to go to war, but unwilling to fight.” Leaders, ignorant of the realities of war, try to limit the political harm flowing from an unpopular operation by heavily restricting the methods used in order to minimize the casualties and costs.""

Exactly. That's where we are now, that has not worked at all well for us -- and you want to continue doing just that?

[davidbfpo]

Originally Posted by Bob's World
The fact that ISAF has completely delegated reconciliation to the "Karzai crowd" is, IMO, outrageous.

Bob,

My recollection is that there was at the early stages considerable non-Afghan involvement, notably Michael Semple (who was expelled in 2007, see:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....e-through.html ) and MG Graeme Lamb in 2009 (see:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graeme_Lamb)

There is a review of reconciliation:http://www.ndu.edu/press/recalibrati...n-program.html

[Bob's World]

Bob,

My recollection is that there was at the early stages considerable non-Afghan involvement, notably Michael Semple (who was expelled in 2007, see:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....e-through.html ) and MG Graeme Lamb in 2009 (see:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graeme_Lamb)

There is a review of reconciliation:http://www.ndu.edu/press/recalibrati...n-program.html

David,

When I was there last year the message was simple and clear:

"ISAF does reintegration of local Taliban fighters back to their home villages in conjuction with GIROA and local leaders; while GIRoA does reconciliation of the larger issues between them and the Taliban leadership in Pakistan."

To me, that is "delegated."

Said another way, ISAF is totally focused on the resistance insurgency, while we leave the revolutionary insurgency to GIRoA to address.

The problems with that are, as Dayuhan points out, GIRoA wants to cling to the whole pie, and the Taliban would like to have the whole pie as well, so neither is particularly inclined to reconcile so long as they have hope of reasonably retaining or gaining said pie. The larger problem is that no amount of engagement against a resistance insurgency is apt to do more than temporarily suppress it in certain areas so long as the revolutionary insurgency is alive and well.

We default to the resistance (reintegration) because that is the more military mission and ISAF is a military headquarters. If we were wise enough to establish a civilian headquarters to run this effort perhaps then we would see it as more appropriate to shift the main focus to the main political / diplomatic matters of the revolution (reconciliation) that keep the insurgency alive.

[Bob's World]

Oh, and a critical point: Currently ISAF and GIRoA demand that any who reconcile or reintegrate swear allegiance to the current constitution of Afghanistan.

This fails to recognize that the current Constitution of Afghanistan formalizes a Northern Alliance monopoly on governance and also centralizes all patronage from the District level and up into one man. The constitution is the primary driver of insurgency, so swear allegiance to such a document a one who is currently ostricized by the same document is to volunteer for a life of marginalized servitude.

When one looks up "Marginalized servitude" in the dictionary one does not find a picture of a Pashtu man next to it.

For reconciliation to have a prayer of a hope the process must include a comprehensive constitutional loya jirga to create a document more tuned to the culture of Afghanistan, and better designed to protect the interests of all Afghans equally. It must allow legal competition for influence as well, and that means the West must be willing to accept what it produces.

[Ken White]

...that means the West must be willing to accept what it produces.

And as they say, "There's the rub..."

[Bob's World]

And as they say, "There's the rub..."

Indeed. Which brings us back to this:

[JMA]

Oh, and a critical point: Currently ISAF and GIRoA demand that any who reconcile or reintegrate swear allegiance to the current constitution of Afghanistan.

Well... (says I shaking my head) history should have thought that the word of a Pashtun should be taken with a pinch of salt (ask the Brit General Elphinstone)

Some people never learn...

...oh yes, Karzai is a Pashtun.

[JMA]

Indeed. Which brings us back to this:

Which is irritating because Maiwand was a battle between 2,500 Brit and Indian forces against 12,000 Afghans and the outcome would be predictable.

A more evenly matched battle where the Brits were soundly thrashed was Magersfontein (2nd Boer War) where 8,000 Brits were arrayed against 9,000 Boers.

[Bob's World]

Or Bunker Hill, Or New Orleans, or...

[davidbfpo]

Ken W.,

You cited in Post 849:

OTOH, for some fresher thinking, check the Monograph linked and available for download at "The New Aztecs: Ritual and Restraint in Contemporary Western Military Operations" It's impressive.

It is a SSI article available here, not on SWJ:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...cfm?pubID=1076

Synopsis:

The Western way of war has come full circle. After centuries of evolution toward increased totality and brutality, it has turned back once again to the ritualistic and restrained methods of primitive warfare. Largely, this has been due to an interaction between the perceived lack of utility in contemporary warfare, developing humanitarian public opinion, and increasing professionalism among militaries. The significance of these evolutionary trends in the way that the West engages in modern warfare is that they are potentially dangerous, and they include the possibility that the West will be unprepared for a future foe whose defeat requires more unrestrained methods.

The article got a critical response on KoW, taken from the first paragraph:

I must say that I profoundly disagree with its author. He misunderstands several of his key premises, including Clausewitz’s fundamental dictum. What is more, I think that the piece is a thinly veiled polemic which unhelpfully encourages an essentially militaristic perspective on the conduct of contemporary war.

Link to KoW:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/07/how...h-it/#comments

[Ken White]

Ken W.,

You cited in Post 849:

It is a SSI article available here, not on SWJ:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...cfm?pubID=1076

Yes, it is an SSI article but it is linked to from this SWJ Blog entry: LINK. I should have cited that entry by title. Thanks for the direct link.

The article got a critical response on KoW, taken from the first paragraph:

Heh. Yep, people will disagree about things. Thanks for that link also.

[Dayuhan]

So, Dayuhan, your point appears to be: To do the right thing is hard.

My point is that setting goals we can't achieve sets us up for failure.

Concur. I would add, that to knowingly do the wrong thing (unless some far greater matter elsewhere hinges upon our continuing to do the wrong thing in Afghanistan) is foolish. To continue to do the wrong thing in Afghanistan in a manner that actually puts much larger issues at a greater risk is criminal.

Agree. I don't think we should ever have tried to dictate how Afghanistan will be governed, and I think it's absurd to think that an Afghan Government put in power by Americans will not govern like Afghans.

You assume that the Taliban would not negotiate a withdrawal of the sanctuary they grant AQ in exchange for the US either driving a Mediatied settlement with GIRoA or our withdrawal from the region (with the firm promise that we will be pack to conduct just the type of Strategic Raids advocated by Ken and Bill on this thread if they again turn to hosting NSAs who would do us harm). That is a fair assumption. But it is one that should be a high priority to put to the test. Worst case it goes no where and we are right where we stand currently. Best case it opens the door for a new era of Afghan stability.

You assume the GIRoA senior leadership would never be open to reconciliation. Again, a fair assumption that should be put to the test. Karzai needs an ultimatum with some balls behind it. So long as we convince ourselves that we can only protect America by either staying in Afghanistan to keep the Northern Alliance in power, or creating such a powerful security force that the Northern Alliance can keep themselves in power, we will be powerless to make Karzai do what he knows he must do for Afghanistan and will in turn enable him to do what he wants to do for himself.

I think many people would be perfectly willing to negotiate and even reach a show of agreement, but the goal wouldn't be reconciliation. The process would simply be a step toward the goal of maintaining or achieving a power monopoly. We don't play those deception games well at all, and I think both sides would jerk us around like the world's richest yo-yo. Next thing you know we'd be dispensing vast sums to all and sundry, and the only ones holding their end of the bargain would be us. I don't think we need that.

Reconciliation can't work if it starts as our goal. It has to be their goal, and it has to be shared by both of the parties we propose to reconcile. We can only mediate effectively if both sides accept us as a mediator. Do any of those conditions exist in Afghanistan?

I believe the interests we quote as our rationale for staying in Afghanistan are grossly over-stated.

A - $%#@ing - men.

I believe that we increase the threat of trans-national terrorism to the US and our interests through our current courses of action; as they validate AQ's message regarding the danger the US posses and they also motivate the populaces of an entirely new region of the world (from the one already so motivated on 9/11) to volunteer to assist AQ in their ends as a means to free their own people from excessive, unwanted US intervention in their national affairs.

Agree again... but if we decree that the answer is reconciliation, and if we try to impose reconciliation, isn't that just more excessive, unwanted intervention?

So, test the assumptions. If your assumptions prove correct, then we pack up and go home. It really is that simple.

Ideally, yes. In practice, once we commit ourselves to a venture and invest ourselves in it, it's very difficult for us to let it go. Setting forth reconciliation as a goal - a goal we are not likely to achieve - is likely to draw us even deeper into the failed effort to control and dictate how and by whom Afghanistan is going to be governed.

I think mission creep dragged us to a set of goals that are too ambitiuos and too nebulous to be achievable, and that we need to scale objectives back to something specific, practical, and achievable.