Catch All OEF Philippines (till 2012)

[Dayuhan]

This one sounds pretty grim:

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/...88cbedf91d4b5c

7 Filipino troops die, 21 wounded in rebel clash

By JIM GOMEZ, Associated Press – 1 day ago

MANILA, Philippines (AP) — Abu Sayyaf militants killed seven Philippine marines and wounded 21 others who were about to raid their jungle camp Thursday in some of the fiercest fighting this year between the military and the al-Qaida-linked rebels.

About 30 marines maneuvered in stormy weather close to the encampment of more than 50 militants in mountainous Patikul township in southern Sulu province, setting off the gunbattle before dawn, regional military spokesman Lt. Col. Randolph Cabangbang said.

It was not immediately clear if there were casualties among the militants, who were led by Radulan Sahiron, a one-armed commander long wanted by U.S. and Philippine authorities for a string of bombings and kidnappings, Cabangbang said.

The Government is trying to spin it as a "strategic victory", but 7 dead and 21 wounded out of a unit of 30 sounds like the kind of "victory" you wouldn't want much of.

Subsequent coverage; apparently beheading and mutilaation are still very much part of the ASG repertoire:

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/33101/5...yaf-aquino-mad

And another angle:

Villagers 'set up' soldiers vs Abu Sayyaf?

MANILA, Philippines – Members of the Marine Battalion Landing Team-11 were not expecting to face 70 heavily armed terrorists when they headed to the base of Abu Sayyaf commanders Radulan Sahiron and Isnilon Hapilon in Barangay Panglahayan, Patikul, Sulu on July 28, authorities said.

One military official, who declined to be named, said the soldiers were "set up."

He added that several residents came to the aid of the Abu Sayyaf.

Reports are not entirely clear and some are inconsistent. Later reports refer to 7 dead and 26 wounded, though the Marine unit apparently numbered only 30. Possibly other Marine units arrived on the scene. Also very possible that some or all of the reports are not accurate... that's quite common with incidents in that area.

Not at all clear what actually happened, but it doesn't sound like anything good.

[Bill Moore]

The Philippine press isn't always accurate, but I suspect there is some truth to this, and if it happened as described then the locals in the area were very likely pro Abu Sayyaf and anti-government/military. This once again calls into question the efficacy of our approach to countering insurgencies through development efforts, since we have spent tens of thousands of dollars in that area on civil affairs activities, etc., and of course conducted MISO for years, and yet the ASG still maintains considerable support from the populace. This ties into another discussion we had on the blog about the importance of honesty when addressing problems, and not creating false perceptions of success by cherry picking happy stories to present to the public. There are deep structural problems within the Phlippine Goverment and its military, and U.S. assistance is only effective at the superficial level (tactically, and then only when the military is willing to listen and apply the lessons). Building a school, building a road, building a clinic are all humanitarian acts that have obvious humanitarian value, but they do not represent real change in the relationship between the populace and the government. The Filipinos need to honestly seek out why the populace supports the ASG and develop a more effective approach than the standard fare of random COIN tactics that have been applied again and again year after year with the same effect.

[Dayuhan]

Meant to include a link for the last story referenced:

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/re...-vs-abu-sayyaf

US development projects have generated some real goodwill... toward the US. This has not really extended to the Philippine Government, and there's no reason why it should. The local folks know where the largesse is coming from, and it only serves to underscore the decades of neglect they've had from Manila. They can also see for themselves that the local plutocrats are still very much in charge.

I don't really see the MISO side as having any meaningful impact on local sentiments. People generally know who their enemies are, even if they're told differently. People also have long memories, and there's a long history of human rights abuse in that area. It's going to take a fair bit more than what's been done to convince the Muslim villagers of inner Basilan that the Philippine military and government are no longer their enemies, and it's not something the US can do, even with all the miso in Japan, or wherever it comes from.

I recall a comment here (or in an article referenced here) from a US military officer, to the effect that we need information ops so the people will know how cruel the Abu Sayyaf are. That's just appallingly naive: they already know exactly how cruel the Abu Sayyaf are. The average Basilan villager knows more about the Abu Sayyaf than the CIA. They also know what we apparently do not: the Philippine military also has a long record of cruelty, and that cruelty has been directed at them.

I certainly don't know what specific grievances the villagers in this case had that led them to act as they are said to have acted, but I'd be willing to bet that it's local, likely personal, and has nothing to do with support a global jihad agenda or the very nominal Islamist agenda of the ASG.

The Filipinos need to honestly seek out why the populace supports the ASG and develop a more effective approach than the standard fare of random COIN tactics that have been applied again and again year after year with the same effect.

First they'd have to ask whether the people support the ASG or whether they simply oppose the government, and support anyone who fights against it.

Ultimately they will come up against the need for fundamental changes in governance, and against the desperate need to bring the government's own functionaries in the military, police, and local government within the rule of law. In Basilan and Central Mindanao they will also come up against the need to mediate long-festering fights between entrenched settler populations and indigenous populaces, which is going to be very close to impossible. Typically these issues are not addressed, because nobody in power wants to touch them. Again, there is very little the US can do to address this. It's not our fight.

[Bill Moore]

Typically these issues are not addressed, because nobody in power wants to touch them. Again, there is very little the US can do to address this. It's not our fight.

You're correct in my opinion, we have little leverage to push the Gov of the Philippines to change at the local and national level, and the locals in the Muslim south very well know that the acts of kindness they benefit from are "mostly" driven by the U.S., and if we weren't there it is unlikely that the military would reach out to the locals.

This isn't our fight, and much like other efforts we get involved in we find it difficult to extract ourselves from these activities. Our military involvement in the Philippines is small relative to Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps affordable, so the real question then is should it be sustained?

With the current President of the Philippines I think it is worth having a little more patience to see if he can push his promised reforms through, but to date he has not yet demonstrated that he has the leadership ability of Magsaysay, and doesn't yet appear capable of pushing his reform agenda through to completion. However, he does seem to have a good vision, one that we should support in my view. Of course it is the Philippines, and it may turn out he is as corrupt as everyone else.

[Dayuhan]

This isn't our fight, and much like other efforts we get involved in we find it difficult to extract ourselves from these activities. Our military involvement in the Philippines is small relative to Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps affordable, so the real question then is should it be sustained?

My own opinion is that we've achieved all we're likely to achieve, and that hanging around is not likely to accomplish more. The issue now is not achieving military dominance, which the government has and has achieved before, but to follow that up with meaningful effort to change the style of governance. This, honestly, is not likely to happen: the political will is simply not there, and the US can't make it be there. No point in staying there and being seen as an accessory to the return of business as usual.

With the current President of the Philippines I think it is worth having a little more patience to see if he can push his promised reforms through, but to date he has not yet demonstrated that he has the leadership ability of Magsaysay, and doesn't yet appear capable of pushing his reform agenda through to completion. However, he does seem to have a good vision, one that we should support in my view. Of course it is the Philippines, and it may turn out he is as corrupt as everyone else.

I wouldn't expect too much of the current President, especially where Mindanao is concerned (or for that matter anywhere). I don't think he's personally corrupt, but he also hasn't the commitment or force of character to drive real change (which requires more than just challenging corruption).

Historical side note: while Magsaysay effectively marketed the idea of reform, he also failed to push the agenda to completion, and actually produced very little change at ground level... one reason why the Huk rebellion subsequently re-emerged as the NPA.

The Philippine government has on several occasions achieved transient "victory" in its various COIN campaigns, but has never cemented that "victory" by following it up with real reform. The reason, in a nutshell, is that the local/regional elites refuse to surrender their traditional prerogatives, which are fundamentally incompatible with real progress.

[Rachamim]

When the AFP labels something a "camp" people tend to imagine a conventional setting. It is simply a village where most men of fighting age are fighters. Those that aren't are still effected by clan ties. The involvement of villagers is par for the corse on Jolo. The Xmas Eve IED in Camp Asturias? Though the church was inside a PNP compound the camp was protected only by chainlink and razor. All along the fence are squatter homes. ASG guerillas, assisted by friendly residents, infiltrated the compound via the roof of a squatter home. On and on and on.

Also, more would have been decapitated in this last incident but all they had was a rusted bolo (machete).

[Bill Moore]

On and on and on.

sadly I think that sums it up....