A couple of other thoughts related to the above post.

Much of our doctrine on COIN is centered on legitimacy, which in itself is a fuzzy term, but from a combatant perspective is legitimacy really the key to success?

While not a fan of the center of gravity concept, it can be useful if we're honest with our analysis. As a source of power, the ability to continue the fight, etc., if the Afghanistan government was considered legitimate by a majority of Afghans would that stop the Taliban from fighting (as many of stated, the Taliban is loose coalition of various militant groups, so more appropriately would it reduce the level of violence to a manageable level?).

On the other hand, if the power brokers in Pakistan felt the government in Afghanistan was legitimate how would that impact the level of violence?

I don't know, but again suspect the COG in Pakistan is more relevant than the population in Afghanistan for reducing the level of violence to a managable level.

Instead of jumping to assumptions, I think we need to ask a lot more questions to shed light on the problem, and then and only then discuss changes of strategy. I agree that our doctrine pushed us further and further down the wrong road, but I bet we disagree on what the right road is. We would probably agree if we had a common understanding of the problem that needs to be solved, and that is where we need to start anew.