Mainly terrorism in Indonesia: catch all

[Jedburgh]

Interesting paper published on-line today (13 Oct) by the International Crisis Group: Lessons from Maluku and Poso

In the wake of a second terrorist attack on Bali, the need to understand Indonesia's violent jihadist networks is greater than ever. Two incidents in May 2005 -- the execution of paramilitary police in Ceram, Maluku, and the bombing of a market in Tentena, Poso -- offer case studies of how those networks are formed and operate. Weakening the networks is key to preventing further violence, including terrorism. In Maluku and Poso, sites of the worst communal conflicts of the immediate post-Soeharto period, one place to start is with programs aimed at ex-combatants and imprisoned mujahidin due for release. These men are often part of networks that extend beyond the two conflict areas, but if they can be "reintegrated" into civilian life, their willingness to support mujahidin elsewhere in Indonesia and engage in violence themselves might be lessened. Addressing broader justice and security issues would also help.

[Steve Blair]

Maybe they could look at some of the US programs aimed at helping former gang members integrate into normal society when they're released from prison...both for things to do and possibly things to avoid doing.

[Strickland]

Indonesia has done a respectbale job of rounding up known or suspected terrorists. Whether it is done so out of self-interest vice concern for the GWOT is irrelevant. Unfortunately, recent governments have been handicapped by corruption, internal insurgencies, piracy, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting as to make them less than fully effective partners in the GWOT. What Indonesia does provide, along with Pakistan and Bangladesh, is a good example as a potential manpower pool for well financed terror organizations. With 55 million people living in absolute poverty and most illiterate, how do we begin to address their greivances in order for these folks not to become terrorists? Between Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia, you have over 100 million people living in total poverty and ignorance, thus making them susceptible to being deceived into actively supporting terror networks. What can be done about this? Are we prepared to embark on a global campaign to eradicate ignorance and poverty in order to eliminate those who turn to terrorist groups?

[YellowJack]

I'm kinda pessimistic about Indonesias hand in the GWOT. There was a report on this a few days back here in Australia. Take the report with a grain of salt. The liberal Islamist Wahid is going senile methinks, but the Indonesian police chief is spot on. POLRI (Indon Police) is incompetent and corrupt. The ICG released a telling report two years back on how POLRI members blatantly paraded a group through the town thereby stirring up violence. I think it might have been this report. The links between the TNI (Indon military) and militia groups is also well known. Seeing as though some of these militia are muslim oriented it kinda raises the question as to what extent the TNI are cracking down on extremists and to what extent they are interacting with them for their own purposes. So these social networks might have to be investigated and curtailed.

It's in my own view that a lot of the military members at the lower levels can get out of control. Because the TNI works right down to a village level, whereby members are actually embedded within the political structure of small communities, recklessness can get out of hand without any sort of authoritative oversight. Also considering the massive command and logistical strains over the archipelago which can leave military members isolated like a modern day Colonel Kurtz (just kidding, but you get my point on the ties between geographic isolation and information isolation).

On the political front the conservative political Islamists are doing an excellent job at separating themselves from the radical Islamists. This was seen in the 2004 elections. If anything the best warning signal for growing strife within Indonesia would be to watch their political parties and see which are starting to be influenced by the jihadi zeitgeist. Because the two can be closely intertwined it could pop out of nowhere. One way to weaken the extremist Jihadi political aspirations would be to support and strengthen the liberal Islamist movements within Indonesia, as they are an effective deterrent.

On the media front, if anyone peruses the Indonesian news on this board you'll be aware that corruption is the new black within the Indonesian media (that and their constant love of the paranormal, something that Ralph Peters would probably have something to say about in regards to bad information). So I would expect some of this news to either be: spotlighted for the international community on the corrupt links between terrorism and the military; or, for that news to be blowtorched by the government and military.

Also, in regard to the International Crisis Group ... they should be applauded for their work on gathering open source information on Jemaah Islamiyah.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 19 Nov 07: Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons

Even as the police are focusing their deradicalisation program on prisoners and ex-prisoners, they are the first to acknowledge that the current state of Indonesian prisons undermines their efforts. It is a telling indictment of the system that they do their best to keep top terrorists at police headquarters, out of the normal prison system entirely, because the chances of backsliding are so high.

Choices about isolation or integration are important but they cannot be made outside a broader program of prison reform, particularly an attack on prison corruption, which is very much on the agenda of the new director general of corrections. More important than choosing between two policies, in any case, is training prison administrators to look at terrorist prisoners as individuals and tailor prison programs to their needs.

Deradicalisation programs are important but they will inevitably be trial-and-error in nature; there is no single intervention that can produce a rejection of violence among a disparate group of people who have joined radical movements for many different reasons. Within JI alone there are the ideologues, the thugs, the utopians, the followers and the inadvertent accomplices; local recruits from Poso are motivated by very different factors than those who graduate from JI-affiliated schools in central Java.

Much more thought needs to be given to how to evaluate the “success” of deradicalisation programs, because there is a danger that many people deemed to have been deradicalised are those who were never the real problem, or that the reasons individuals renounce violence have nothing to do with police programs. Even if we could measure the number of people deradicalised according to specific criteria, that figure would only have meaning if we had some sense of the number of new recruits and knew that the balance was going in the right direction.

Focusing on the criminals-turned-jihadis in prison is also important. In all the prisons where “ustadz” are held, there is likely to be a small group of such men but it is not clear that anyone is tracking them or turning deradicalisation efforts in their direction. If it is important to design programs to ensure newly released JI members have vocational opportunities, what about the criminal recruits who may, like Beni Irawan, the Kerobokan guard, turn out to be more militant than their mentors? These men also need to be the focus of special programs and thus far have been left out.

It is hard to set performance goals for deradicalisation because it means so many different things to different people. But setting such goals for improving prison management is possible, desirable and critically necessary.

Complete 35 page paper at the link.

[Jedburgh]

22 Jan 08: Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso

Serious violence in Poso has had a ten-year history. Between 1998 and 2001, it had been the scene of Christian-Muslim fighting. After 2001 and a government-brokered peace pact, the violence became one-sided, with local extremists, many of them linked to and directed by the extremist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), mounting attacks on Christians, local officials and suspected informants. The 11 and 22 January 2007 operations were the culmination of almost a year’s unsuccessful effort by the police to persuade those responsible for criminal acts to turn themselves in. Fourteen militants and one policeman died in the process, but Poso is quieter and safer, by all accounts, than it has been in years. As a result of the January operations:

�� almost all the JI religious teachers from Java have fled the area;

�� the perpetrators of all the jihadi crimes committed since the 2001 Malino peace accord have been identified, and most have been arrested, tried and convicted, without any backlash;

�� the JI administrative unit (wakalah) in Poso appears to have been destroyed, at least temporarily;

�� a major vocational training program is underway aimed at ensuring that would-be extremists have career opportunities that will keep them out of trouble;

�� the central government has made new funding available, including for improving education in the hope of diluting the influence of radical teaching; and

�� no serious violence has taken place in Poso in twelve months.

Complete 12 page paper at the link.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 28 Feb 08: Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry

A handful of members and persons close to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesia’s most prominent extremist organisation, have developed a profitable publishing consortium in and around the pesantren (religious school) founded by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar in Solo, Central Java. The consortium has become an important vehicle for the dissemination of jihadi thought, getting cheap and attractively printed books into mosques, bookstores and discussion groups. The publishing venture demonstrates JI’s resilience and the extent to which radical ideology has developed roots in Indonesia. The Indonesian government should monitor these enterprises more closely, but they may be playing a useful role by channelling JI energies into waging jihad through the printed page rather than acts of violence.....

Complete 25 page report at the link.

[davidbfpo]

Due to a host of factors, Indonesia continues to witness an upsurge of religious radicalism. Some salient characteristics, the DNA of radicalism so to speak, stand out when one analyses the attitudes and behavior of jihadists.

The jihadist embodies the following characteristics:

Link:http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2...adicalize.html

[Jedburgh]

From ICG: Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks

The Indonesian police are closing in on Noordin Mohammed Top, South East Asia’s most wanted terrorist. In a dramatic pre-dawn raid on 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, Central Java, they shot and killed two members of his inner circle and arrested two others. If and when they capture Noordin, they will have put the person most determined to attack Western targets out of commission. But the problem of Noordin’s support structure will still have to be tackled.

For four years Noordin has tapped into jihadist networks to build a following of diehard loyalists, and those same networks may be available to others. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the region’s largest jihadist organisation, continues to provide the hard core of that following: the two killed in the Wonosobo raid were longstanding JI members, as was at least one of those arrested. But beginning in 2004, Noordin began reaching out to young men from other organisations and some with no previous organisational affiliation.

Many JI members reportedly see the group he has cobbled together – he grandly calls it al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago – as a deviant splinter that has done great harm to the organisation they joined in the mid-1990s. Noordin, however, reportedly sees himself as leading JI’s military wing, even though he answers to no one. He justifies his actions by citing jihadist doctrine that under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the enemy – a group of two or three or even a single individual can take on the enemy without instructions from an imam.

This report examines the way in which Noordin has relied on personal contacts to put his group together. It is based on interrogation depositions, court documents, and Indonesian press reports, with information crosschecked through extensive interviews with knowledgeable sources,
both official and unofficial.

[Jedburgh]

2 Jun 06 Terrorism Monitor: The Role of Kinship in Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiya

...The use of sibling relationships in jihadi recruitment is to provide further ideological support for the recruits beyond the group itself. Sometimes two or more brothers are recruited for jihad, helping each other during an operation and providing each other inspiration and reassurance. This particular type of recruitment is an effective use of kinship to ensure deeper engagement with the cause and group...

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 24 Jan 07: Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge

...This report examines how one neighbourhood in Poso became a JI stronghold and how a small group of men managed to terrorise the city for three years before their identities became known. It looks at the links between the JI structures in Poso and Java and the local grievances and resentments driving the ongoing violence and analyses the way forward...

[Jocko54]

The TNI have demonstrated a pretty good capability in COIN ops. Their performance in Lebanon has been solid, and their efforts in places like Poso have demonstrated the type of restraint that will contribute to winning some credibility. Gen Petraeus has asked for increased Muslim participation in the coalition. What are the councils thoughts regarding Asian Muslims and the help they can provide in OIF? How can we help MNF I?

[CSC2005]

The "JI Kinship" article is a great example of how local culture impacts the structure and relationships inside a terrorist group. To often I read about terrorist theories that try to explain all terrorist groups from Yemen to Colombia. It is not rocket science to think that a terrorist groups is a by-product of its local culture, but too often this angle is overlooked in favor of nodal analysis and number crunching.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 3 May 07: Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status

...We will have to wait for more arrests and more information from those detained in March for definitive answers to questions about JI’s current status. It is resilient but not invulnerable, and while it continues to recruit, the organisation as a whole may be shrinking. People have left for different reasons. In some cases, like Subur Sugiarto’s, it may be because a more militant wing finds JI too cautious and bureaucratic. Others, particularly released prisoners, may be co-opted, if only temporarily, by government officials hoping to infiltrate and divide the organisation. One alumnus of a JI pesantren said that he realised he had graduated with no useful skills, and the only occupation open to him, outside petty trade, was teaching in another JI school. If schools are critical to JI’s regeneration, then dissatisfaction with restrictions inside and opportunities outside may ultimately do more damage to the group than arrests....

[SWJED]

May 2007, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Where the War on Terror is Succeeding by Josh Kurlantzick.

In October 2002, Islamic radicals set off two powerful bombs on the Indonesian island of Bali. Detonated in the heart of the tourist district, they obliterated several bars and nightclubs, killing over 200 people—visiting Australians, Americans, and other foreign nationals, as well as Indonesians—and wounding still more. It was the worst terrorist attack in the country’s history. Shocked and taken aback by the carnage, the international media proclaimed the end of innocence for the tropical retreat.

To anyone who had been paying attention to political developments in Southeast Asia over the previous decade, however, the surprise was misplaced. Well before the Bali bombing, Islamists had turned the region as a whole into a front in their global jihad. In the Philippines, the radical group Abu Sayyaf, which received funding from the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden, had built itself into a powerfully lethal force. In Indonesia, an even deadlier terror group, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), had also expanded, bombing churches and ultimately putting in motion the Bali plot...

Today, less than five years after the attack on Bali, the situation in Southeast Asia has changed dramatically. Across the region, jihadist groups like Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiah are struggling to survive, Islamist parties seem to be weakening, and the region’s newest leaders openly wage war on terror. Moreover, the United States has played a leading role in these successes, and it has done so without creating much in the way of an anti-American reaction. Indeed, Southeast Asia is proving to be a model for the “long war” against Islamist terror. The lessons of its recent progress deserve to be studied closely...

[wm]

I wonder how much of this can be attributed to the good guys providing some pretty wonderful tsunami relief to the region while the bad actors did nothing to help the stricken.
It would be interesting to see how things stand with terrorist organizations in
Thailand , Malaysia, and Myanmar these days as well.

[SWJED]

15 June AP - 2 Terror Leaders Arrested in Indonesia by Robin McDowell.

The head of Southeast Asia's most feared terrorist group was arrested along with his military chief, police said Friday, claiming a breakthrough in the fight against extremists in the world's most populous Muslim nation.

Authorities warned, however, that Jemaah Islamiyah - blamed for the 2002 Bali bombings and other attacks - and breakaway factions could still carry out strikes against Western and Christian interests...

[Jedburgh]

Counterterrorism Blog, 17 Jun 07:

Major Changes within Jemaah Islamiyah Alleged

Based on initial interrogations of top Jemaah Islamiyah members who were captured over the past week, the Indonesian police are now painting a picture of a terrorist organization attempting to consolidate in the face of heavy attrition.

According to the police, JI has now done away with its earlier region-wide mantiqi ("regional command") structure. Previously, JI had four mantiqi covering large portions of Southeast Asia and Australia. At its peak (prior to late 2002), each mantiqi consisted of up to a dozen wakilah, and each wakilah were comprised of several fiah, or cells. Overseeing all this was a markaz, a small headquarters consisting of top JI members.

It is now understood that JI still recognizes a markaz. But under the markaz, JI now divides itself into four ishoba which only cover the Indonesian island of Java. These ishoba are named after historical figures in Islam....

[SWJED]

18 June NY Times - Indonesian Terror Group Limits Attacks by Seth Mydans.

Long before the arrests of two of its top militants last week, the region’s major terrorist group had been moving away from the tactic of large-scale attacks, experts said Sunday.

This is a time of religious and social ferment, as Indonesia’s tradition of moderation and inclusiveness is tested by a rise in conservatism and an increased focus on Islam as a religion and a moral code.

Islamist violence is only one factor, and there is division and debate among militants as well as among the population at large...

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 19 Jun 07:

Indonesia Neutralizes JI as Immediate Threat

...It is evident that the number of first-generation, al-Qaeda trained operatives is dwindling, which will have important ramifications for the strategies that JI embarks on in the coming years. A lesser-known cadre of leaders should be expected to emerge out of the more traditional Darul Islam wings who will be more engaged in fomenting sectarian violence as well as in social welfare and dawa activities to rebuild JI's depleted ranks. Two of its four wings focus on recruitment. Assassinations and kidnappings by fringe groups may also increase. In the short-term, however, Indonesian counter-terrorism police unit Densus-88 deserves inordinate credit for neutralizing JI as an immediate threat.