I could not find the Kunduz NATO report but I found interresting articles from credible German newpapers (Der Spiegel and Das Bilt) which disclose part of that report.

From the Spiegel:
The pilots, who felt that the Germans' instructions were odd, remained skeptical and suggested obtaining the approval of the higher-ranked US Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar on the Persian Gulf, so that both sides would be in the clear.
Red Baron's response was unambiguous. He told the pilots that he had the "approval" of Klein, who happened to be sitting next to him, for the strike to proceed, but that the bombs should only hit the sandbar and not the area along the riverbank.
There are strict rules of engagement within NATO, and the pilots were under the impression that a number of these rules were about to be violated. Once again, they repeated their request to be allowed to fly at low altitude over the river as a deterrent. The response from the German base was clear: "Negative. ... I want you to strike directly."
At 1:46 a.m., the American pilots asked the Germans one more time whether the people on the ground truly constituted an "imminent threat." Under the NATO rules of engagement, only an imminent threat justified an attack. Absent such a threat, the pilots would have been required to leave the area. But Klein was apparently intent on having the airstrike go forward, and his forward air controller, acting on Klein's orders, replied: "Yes, those pax (people) are an imminent threat." He said that the insurgents were trying to tap the gasoline from the trucks, and when they had finished, they would "regroup and we have intelligence information about current operations" and they would probably be "attacking Camp Kunduz."
It was apparently a white lie. The investigation report soberly concludes that there was no "specific information" or "hard intelligence" to indicate the Taliban "were either preparing or had a plan for attacking" the German forces that night. Based on everything the Bundeswehr and the Americans now know, the Taliban originally planned to take the trucks to a nearby village and, when the tankers became stuck on the sandbar, they decided to strip the vehicles instead. The report concludes that it was an "act of opportunity."
http://www.spiegel.de/international/...2468-2,00.html


German KSK Special Forces involved in deadly bombing
It has now come to light that the elite Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK) unit played a role in the attack on September 4 which killed 142 people including civilians.
BILD can reveal how the KSK intervened in the strike on two fuel tanker trucks in an overnight covert operation.
At least five officers and NCOs advised Colonel Georg Klein, commander of the German military forces in the Kunduz region.
All five belonged to a secret unit codenamed Task Force 47, or TF47, which had Colonel Klein as its presumptive head.
TF47 comprises approximately half of the KSK soldiers, whose goal is to hunt for Taliban leaders and terrorists. The unit has its own command centre with advanced equipment at the German camp in Kunduz.
The first tip arrived from an Afghan informant on the evening of September 3. The Taliban had reportedly hijacked two gasoline tanker trucks which had then become stuck on a sandbank six kilometres from the German camp.
TF 47 soldiers requested help from an American B1B bomber. In the 90 minutes it took the plane to locate the tanker trucks, Colonel Klein was called to the TF47 command post.
During the night Colonel Klein took over as acting commander of TF47. An internal review by the Bundeswehr said that according to NATO rules, Klein would be allowed to order an attack only in this role.
A TF47 officer spoke approximately seven times by phone throughout the night with the Afghan informant who identified four of the Taliban leaders who were with the tankers, as well as other details.
http://www.bild.de/news/bild-english...2584.bild.html

What is interesting in those articles, it high light the difficulty of having an acute information with indirect contact reports.

According to the first article, pilots state that they were first not convinced by the necessity of a kinetic action. Then they received confirmation of the presence of legitimate target on the ground.

According to the second article, that confirmation was given by a direct contact from a ground team (the TF47). Decision making officer had at least 7 contacts with TF47.
The question then is did he have other sources of information and did he have all information (evaluation of ground environment) at the time he took the decision. Quantitatively, 7 contacts could make it but qualitatively it remains a single source.
For his discharge, first information was given by an afghan informant. Due to the complexity of the environment, a confirmation from reliable source was certainly needed. And that is what TF47 did provide.
Now remaining question is how accurate was the assessment of civilian environment?
In addition to the high value of fuel tankers, if high value targets were present, this incident exposes the problematic of war necessity versus IHL.

On a legal aspect, it can at least be assumed that pilots are non responsible. They expressed in their testimony the fact they had doubts and they asked several times for confirmation. They were given information they believed credible and accurate which lifted their doubts. In a physical and technical impossibility to have direct first hand confirmation, they acted according to given orders.
If what is reported in the article happens to be true, there is now at least 2 level of responsibilities on the ground to be evaluated:
- The TF47 responsibilities: what was their real statement and assessment of the situation.
- Col K responsibilities in evaluating the information transmitted by TF47 and his requests of civil environment and collateral damages assessment.