Hush! All things Reichswehr are evil, didn't you know?
The current German officer candidates pay IMHO a very high price for their university education, as they do not get a proper platoon commander training. They start in special officer companies and have seen and led only a few months enlisted men before they are promoted to Oberleutnant. Are they really able to perform their role as deputy company commander?Originally Posted by Fuchs
Compare this with the Reichwehr when a OC had to serve as enlisted man with enlisted men for two years (a little bit excessive:-), then he got 1.5 years officer training (he was now Fähnrich). He was promoted to Leutnant after 3.5 years and served 4-5 years before attending staff officer courses (=university). Why don't we use this template?
Hush! All things Reichswehr are evil, didn't you know?
You don't have to tell the politicians that the "new" model is actually an old one. Good chance they do not know history.
SOMEBODY will find out. There's always opposition, to everything. Especially inside the bureaucracy.
They WILL use lame complaints like stupid Reichswehr analogies and myths.
Just look at the "Kriegsnah ausbilden" drama. Politicians hardly read it, but somebody read it and launched the PC complaint campaign.
We can propose smart yet non-PC stuff as outsiders or at least with protection of anonymity, but even a simple memo in the bureaucracy itself would be a powder keg.
Timothy F. Watson
Hey South Africa,
Change of Command Ceremony, 2nd Battalion - 4th Infantry Regiment, ~ 2007-2009 (youtube, 22 Mar 2009; LTC Watson to LTC Rickard)
Rebalancing Forces In Response to the QDR (Army Mar 2011):
The Officer Core (Letter to Editor - Atlantic Apr 2011) - still LTC.LTC Timothy F. Watson is a Senior Service College Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. Previously, he was assigned as a senior task farce observercontroller at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La. LTC Watson commanded the 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, at Fort Polk and deployed to Baghdad, Iraq, to perform full spectrum counterinsurgency operations.
And finally to vindicate your more than less on target crystal ball - this time (November 17, 2010 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE S7993):
RegardsTHE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:
To be colonel
.....
TIMOTHY F. WATSON
Mike
One wonders if Col Watson's views on this issue have changed over the years?
A paragraph of his Letter to the Editor of April 2011 is worth a quote here:
Could not have said it better myselfMuch of what combat commanders do can’t be learned in a classroom. Education and innovation, while important, are no substitute for experience. This is a significant difference from the business examples the author relies on. A better comparison is to a surgeon rather than a Silicon Valley entrepreneur. Some hotshot officer with fewer years in service and fewer deployments under his belt is probably not going to perform better in combat than an older guy who’s been there before. We’d rather work for the graybeard.
Last edited by JMA; 09-15-2011 at 05:05 AM.
As I mentioned before (in post#80) the bias is currently in favour of the academic in many (most?) cases. In the quote (I posted) it is 55% academic to 30% leadership performance with fitness and physical coming in at the remaining 15%. I believe that like the physical (which should be judged on a pass or fail basis - meaning you are either physically capable or you are not) the academic results should be based on whether the guy has absorbed enough of the theoretical part of the course to be able to draw on what he learned when operating in the field (again he is either able to do this or he is not). The initial precourse selection of aspirant officers must be that they are intellectually capable of passing a degree course within the military skills parameters.
Again I would state that the platoon commanding phase of an officers career is merely to provide the grounding and experience at that level to provide an understanding of how wars are fought on the front lines when he (at a higher command) sends soldiers into battle (from afar).
How much time and experience does an officer need at the platoon/company level? Perhaps another subject for discussion. Does an officer need to serve in the ranks before being commissioned? Perhaps another subject for discussion.
Regardless of whether the potential officer comes as direct entry or from the ranks my contention is that an accurate initial pre-course selection system will be beneficial and reduce the course attrition rates.
Well if the Reichwehr system was good then why does the current German not continue to use it? Surely the officer selection and training process can't be tainted by the past, can they?
If I understand you correctly it is the university education which conflicts with platoon commanding and training. Well if so that is why a speak of putting the horse before the cart. Which must be taken care of first? My view is that first you train and test for leadership and officer characteristics (at platoon level) then you select an education route most suited to his branch and career professional knowledge requirements. Remember the big picture. You are training future generals here.
Last edited by JMA; 09-15-2011 at 05:08 AM.
One of the central themes of the Bundeswehr is its integration in society - avoidance of becoming a state in a state, a closed sub-society. This is out of a fear that an army could become powerful politically.
The Reichswehr did never attempt a coup d'etat, its worst political influence was to face left-wing uprisings in force and be not available against right-wing ones (leaving them to the police).
Nevertheless, there's the image of a terrible, terrible right-wing out-of-civilian-control Reichswehr that would be unsuitable in a democracy.
As a consequence, similarities with Reichswehr, especially in regard to its officer corps are under scrutiny as a principle.
Here we may observe an fundamental difference in leadership culture between German (until 1960) and Anglo-American. The officer losses of the German ground forces in WW2were much higher than US or UK losses of the same rank - generals ~10 times higher. People who know much more about military history than me attribute the leading up-front for both, the higher losses and the higher performance of the German ground forces.
Serving with the ranks means an officer applicant has a chance to experience very early how his future subordinates tick. In an all-volunteer force the basic training for OC and enlisted men should have the same quality, so this time is well spent IMHO.
Another side effect is, you could observe wether the officer candidate has leadership potential, maybe a chance for bottom-up selcetion.
A longer time as platoon leader was used to give the officer the opportunity to serve in other units, develope a deeper understanding of the other elements in his regiment or division. The highest priority had the applied tactics, this meant combined arms warefare after 1919.
Concur
You describe my opinion much better than I could do myself.
Last edited by Ulenspiegel; 09-15-2011 at 10:46 AM.
OK, the Bundeswehr had officer schools for the first 18 years, then switch to the university system. So I am optimistic that the political issues could be solved when the wheel is re-invented.
OK, thanks I have a better understanding now.
In another 20 years?
That's a long time to evaluate officer candidates before sending them off to university. The U.S. way is to have the guy have his degree beforehand.
In the Imperial German Army and Reichswehr only a very small percentage (~6%) of the officers survived the selection for the Kriegsakademie and the three years there. A much broader training and educational effect was caused by the preparation for the Kriegsakademie, usually lasting more than one year.
My point is, if you do not need a degree for your job, it makes more sense to attend university at the end of your first 12 years, in a civilian branch if you want to leave, in a military branch or a civilian with clear application for your career path if you want to stay for 20 years or longer.
I have no problem with your model but oppose the current German one, which combines for my taste to many negative aspects.
A 10 times higher casualty rate for generals? Have you not considered that rather than this being a virtue this may have been a serious problem?
I suggest the initial higher performance of the German Army was due to their being better prepared at the start of the hostilities. But never underestimate the yanks, they a fast learners, which they certainly did after they got a bloody nose at Kasserine Pass. and the rest is history.
One needs to manage career time very carefully. There is a short 30 years to get to general staff (Brigadier) which would make you 48-50 (which is pushing the limits IMHO). Now if you take four years out of that for officer training and later a university degree and say 15+ years to Lt Col means the brightest would get there at 45-47 while the norm will be to make it just in time and get to stay on for another five years (talking loosely about the US system in terms of age here). Having generals over 60 is ridiculous and they should be put on pension and out to pasture at or before the age of 60.Serving with the ranks means an officer applicant has a chance to experience very early how his future subordinates tick. In an all-volunteer force the basic training for OC and enlisted men should have the same quality, so this time is well spent IMHO.
Having done the 'enlisted' recruit training and then it all again on officers course I see it like this. The principle difference would be that on a recruits course you are taught to be rifleman and how to take part in the various phases of war (as a rifleman) and how to use the various platoon weapons. On the other hand the officer needs to approach all training from the position of commanding a platoon in the various phases of war (through an understanding of the roles and duties of all the ranks in these activities). With weapons he must both learn how to use them as well as how to employ them. I found higher quality (and rank) NCOs as instructors on my officers course which was to be expected.
I don't regret my short time in the ranks before being commissioned (12 months) as I certainly learned a lot and it helped me settle in quickly (quicker) as a 2Lt, but I do believe that officer training should be geared to producing an officer capable of commanding a platoon from day one rather than relying on previous service to give him the confidence to do the job. The training itself must be good enough to achieve that.
Who observes? If the man with possible officer potential is in a platoon who is there to observe him? A Lt or 2Lt? Too light for that task. The NCOs? Not sure that NCOs of sergeant down are the best to identify officer potential.Another side effect is, you could observe whether the officer candidate has leadership potential, maybe a chance for bottom-up selection.
A longer time as platoon leader was used to give the officer the opportunity to serve in other units, develop a deeper understanding of the other elements in his regiment or division. The highest priority had the applied tactics, this meant combined arms warefare after 1919.
Again IMHO it is a case of how much time you can devote to this preliminary background learning. If on is to set a minimum time served I would say a year (being half training and half in a platoon - hopefully on active service) with a maximum of say three years. (I can explain this another time as |I believe the next entry into the commissioned ranks would be from platoon sergeants of around 7-10 years service through a differently designed course (probably shorter than a year).
If the young officer spends three years with his platoon then he will learn all the stuff you are talking about while being supported by an experienced platoon sergeant. Better to experience the active service as a platoon commander for three years than to have a few years in the ranks and then short time on operations as an officer IMHO. Three years is maximum with a platoon then its time to move on.
Last edited by JMA; 09-15-2011 at 08:11 PM.
Who pays the costs of getting the degree?
There's no perfect model in existence (it was, but times and demands were different then).
We have too many conflicts:
(1) officers who leave after x years - officers who serve till retirement
(2) officers to lead men in combat - offers who lead support people - officers who do very important jobs without many subordinates
(3) effectiveness - costs
(4) uncertainty about potential - desirability of having officers qualified all the time, instead of adding learning-intensive basic qualifications after many years in service
(5) costs of long education and training - benefits of the same
(6) specialization on military skills - ability to get a job after life in uniform, ability to grasp and respect civilian stuff
(7) need for high quality - need for great quantity (in case of mobilization)
I suspect different career / education / training patterns are justified for different groups of army officers
(a) young officers and former NCOs (promising NCOs get a second NCO course (Feldwebellehrgang) and as a test the opportunity to lead a platoon for minimum 1 year or an equivalent staff task)
(b) civilian experts joining with full civilian qualification
(c) proved officers, selected for staff service (i.G.)
(d) proved officers, selected for leading army field units
(e) useful officers, selected for leading other units
example:
(a) Quick (6 months) lieutenant course (~ "70% solution" for up to company command)
(b) Quick (3 months) officership training (use of personal equipment, survival, regulations).
(c) staff courses and academic studies (military history, logistics, intel, art of war, technology of war) that span years, but with interruptions by normal staff assignments - and much autodidactic learning effort is expected
(d) command courses and academic studies that span years, but mostly command assignments. These officers should not be branch officers, but become combined arms officers.
(e) Branch-related courses to add competence in management and the area of occupation (logistics, for example)
JMA's concerns about wasting too much training on duds should be addressed by this. The young officers would either be proved NCOs or wouldn't get much training till being commissioned.
Young recruits on the direct path to officer would not sign up for many, many years - instead, they would sign up for two years and becoming lieutenant of the reserves. The army could then invite as many as it needs to further active service (signing up for a few years with expectation to move up to captain and probably get a company command minimum for a year, then in a third step become career officers).
Here I disagree, the difference in generals becoming KIA is a problem of very low losses on the allied side (only 30 US generals/admirals died). The readiness of the German army was in most fields low in 1939/40, it was outnumbered and outclassed in men and hardware, the only difference was leadership. A very good discussion is Frieser "Die Blitzkrieglegende", IIRC there is an English edition. When this leadership causes acceptable higher losses it is worth to consider IMHO.
Found the book here: The Blitzkrieg Legend: The Campaign in the West, 1940
I must find a copy and read it to improve my knowledge of that era.
Prepared does not necessarily mean more tanks or planes. From my knowledge of that era I am aware that German officers were trained at a tactical level 'two-up' which would have prepared them for the mssive growth of the army after 1939 and it was probably a contributing factor to their tactical superiority at the outbreak of the war.
Excellent response. Let me chew on it and I will reply later or over the weekend.
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