The War on Terrorism is the Correct Label

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

First, I missed that key word. Well the US had essentially 102 years in a row of “continental” peace after 1899, until that day in September 10 years ago reset the clock. So there.

Second, your last line subtly implies that the US is repeating the Holocaust, or something similar. I don’t think we need to learn many lessons from the German experience, since most humans, and the majority of Americans, respect the sanctity of human life. What we do understand though, is that one doesn’t erect an entire infrastructure dedicated to the elimination of human life. Well, that is erecting it between working 60 hour weeks, having a wife, several children, plus getting awoken at night quite often because of air raids? Or did all those camps just show up one day? That's right it was all the SS's fault.

I like the “incredible rumours” part. Are you a Holocaust denier, Fuchs? Sorry, but your excuses are pretty thin to cover for “average” Germans exhibiting a huge amount of moral cowardice.

[Fuchs]

The difference between you and me is that I attempted to look at it from the perspective of the supposedly martial-spirited people. You didn't look at it from that perspective and thus you don't get the "incredible" thing.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

the most martial-spirited Americans sit at nice mahogany desks in a big marble building on a hill near the Potomac and have no problem throwing around their martial-spirit, as long as they or theirs do not have to do the fighting and dying.

But it occurs to me that there is a lesson to be learned from Germany. Hitler was too overconfident in 1939 when he decided to invade Poland. The Großer Generalstab did not feel the Wehrmacht was sufficiently prepared equipment wise for a potential protracted war. The lessons of the Polenfeldzug certainly helped make Fall Gelb the stunning victory it was, but Hitler then stretched the military even further by invading Crete (Merkur certainly was a Pyrrhic victory) and then getting involved in North Africa (Italy certainly was the “weak sister” of the alliance). Invading Russia, while initially successful, was the final straw and Germany was thus engaged on too many fronts without the resources (guns, tanks, and planes you can build but people are much harder replace). The early victories led to even greater commitments which lead eventually to over commitment. The Japanese had a term for it: senshoubyou (victory disease).

In similar fashion, I think the US is dangerously spread thin across a wide spectrum of commitments, both military and economic, and we are beginning to have a difficult time resourcing those activities. We must be careful that our own hubris does not give us a terminal case of senshoubyou.

[jmm99]

Here is "Terrorism Defined" by six Appellate Military Judges, United States v Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul (USCMCR, 9 Sep 2011), pp.52-53:

b. Terrorism - defined

The offense of “terrorism” warrants particularized discussion as it is invoked in each charged offense. The 2006 M.C.A. § 950v(b)(24) prohibits AUECs from committing terrorism stating:

TERRORISM.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills or inflicts great bodily harm on one or more protected persons, or intentionally engages in an act that evinces a wanton disregard for human life, in a manner calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government or civilian population by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct, and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death, as a military commission under this chapter may direct.

This definition of “terrorism,” is incorporated into “providing material support for terrorism,” see n. 68 (quoting 2006 M.C.A. 950v(b)(25)(A)), and may be appropriately characterized as the underlying offense. In addition, the specifications of the conspiracy and solicitation charges cite “terrorism” as an object offense. Accordingly, we will discuss “terrorism” as that offense is defined in the 2006 M.C.A. and international law.

The 2006 M.C.A. definition is more comprehensive than Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, API, and APII. All prohibit the “intentional targeting and killing of protected persons” and “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.” See supra n. 39. In addition, the 2006 M.C.A. requires the Government prove that “[t]he accused did so in a manner calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government or civilian population by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.” 2007 M.M.C. Part IV, ¶ 6(24)b(2). The 2006 M.C.A.’s inclusion of an additional element actually narrows the conduct subject to individual criminal liability, and places an additional burden of proof on the Government.

The 2006 M.C.A. definition is also consistent with the most comprehensive definition of “terrorism” by international treaty extant on September 11, 2001. Specifically, the 1999 Financing Terrorism Convention included in its prohibition of conduct meeting the definition of terrorism:

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: (a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex;[71] or (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

Article 2.1, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Dec. 9, 1999) (1999 Financing Terrorism Convention), 2178 U.N.T.S. 197, 39 I.L.M. 270, G.A. Res. 54/109 (emphasis added).

The similarity in these definitions does not suggest that a universally accepted definition of terrorism existed at the time of appellant’s charged conduct, or that such a definition currently exists in international law. A more accurate description of the treaty law addressing international terrorism would be ad hoc. Long-standing efforts to define “terrorism” have been the subject of persistent political dispute, primarily associated with national liberation movements, concerns inapplicable to al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States. See Alex Schmid, Terrorism on Trial: Terrorism—The Definitional Problem, 36 Case W. Res. J. Intl. L. 375 (2004).

At least 12 antiterrorism treaties or conventions predate appellant’s offenses.[72] .... [JMM: the opinion then goes on to discuss these treaties in depth]

71. The annex lists the nine treaties infra at n. 72, except Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Mar. 1, 1991), 30 I.L.M. 726; Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.

72. Those 12 antiterrorism treaties include: (1) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Dec. 9, 1999) (1999 Financing Terrorism Convention), 2178 U.N.T.S. 197, 39 I.L.M. 270, G.A. Res. 54/109; (2) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Dec. 15, 1997) (1997 Bombing Convention), 37 I.L.M. 249; (3) Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Mar. 1, 1991), 30 I.L.M. 726; (4) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Mar. 10, 1988), 27 I.L.M. 684, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; (5) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Mar. 10, 1988), 27 I.L.M. 668, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; (6) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Feb. 24, 1988), 27 I.L.M. 627, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; (7) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Oct. 26, 1979), 18 I.L.M. 1419, 1456 U.N.T.S. 1987; (8) International Convention Against the taking of Hostages (Dec. 17, 1979), G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; (9) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (Dec. 14, 1973), 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; (10) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sept. 23, 1971), 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; (11) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Dec. 16, 1970), 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; (12) Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Sept. 14, 1963), 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219. See Hamdan, 2011 WL 2923945 at *20 n. 59 (listing dates entered into force for the UN, ratified or accessed by the U.S., entered into force for the U.S., and number of signatories and parties). See also Karin G. Tackaberry, Time to Stand Up and Be Counted: The Need for the United Nations to Control International Terrorism, The Army Lawyer (July 2007) 1, 7-14 (discussing the relevance and limitations of additional terrorism-related treaties, conventions and agreements).

Please note that this opinion is concerned with whether acts during an armed conflict come under the war crimes prohibitions where "terrorism" is an element to the war crimes. The opinion is not authority one way or the other as to whether the armed conflict should or should not be called the "War on Terror".

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

What I find interesting in the definition of terrorism is that the term is used almost exclusively to describe non-state actors using violence against states. When a state uses violence in a manner calculated to influence or affect the civilian population by intimidation or coercion, is that not terrorism as well... whether the population in question is its own or that of another nation?

[motorfirebox]

What I find interesting in the definition of terrorism is that the term is used almost exclusively to describe non-state actors using violence against states. When a state uses violence in a manner calculated to influence or affect the civilian population by intimidation or coercion, is that not terrorism as well... whether the population in question is its own or that of another nation?

Well... that's not entirely accurate, in that we're not entirely that honest in our definitions. Lockerbie, for instance, is considered terrorism. Not to be trite, but it's mainly considered terrorism when they do it. Whoever "they" happens to be at the time.

[jmm99]

The absence of Violent State Actors from the statutory equation is scarcely surprising.

Could the definition of "terrorism" applied to Violent Non-State Actors be logically extended to Violent State Actors ? Of course, but it won't be.

Doesn't bother me in the least.

Regards

Mike

[anonamatic]

I went and downloaded the decision you cited to have it as a reference. People toss these terms around without thinking about it to no end. The results are often suboptimal when they do, because they make decisions made based on hysterical conflations.

[Jeffersonrion]

A Washington, DC-area attorney, writer, lecturer and anti-terrrism strategist, Jim Guirard was longtime Chief-of-Staff to former US Senators Allen Ellender and Russell Long of Louisiana. His TrueSpeak Institute and TrueSpeak.org website are devoted to truth-in-history and truth-in-language in public discourse.

[Bob's World]

Another perspective. Not definitive, just my initial effort at reframing a clearer perspective on what governments are so quick to simply label as "terrorism."

Al-Qaeda: An illegal political action group with no specific state affiliation conducting a networked approach to unconventional and guerrilla warfare, often employing terrorist tactics, in order to shape the political domain of the greater Middle East to their will. AQ uses an extreme Islamist ideology to gain influence with their target populaces of disenfranchised Sunni Muslims to promote revolution to address poor governance in their respective states, coupled with a global resistance campaign against what is perceived as excessive Western influence over the governance of the region.

AQ is empowered by the confluence of two major events occurring over the past 25 years:
1. The demise of the threat of Soviet dominion over the region, and the general continuation of Western containment policies and postures;
2. The unprecedented breakthroughs in information technologies

The demise of the Soviets removed much of the rationale for the degree of presence and influence exerted by the US and West over the political and security landscape of the greater Middle East. While most governments were satisfied with sustaining the status quo, there has been a steadily growing discontent among the populaces of the region with their domestic governance, as well as the perceive role played by Western powers in sustaining what has been viewed increasingly as an unacceptable status quo. This was the catalyst.

The role of advances in information technology has been both the expander and the accelerant. As populaces became more aware of the larger surroundings it fed frustrations across the political, social and religious spectrums. Those in control acted to exert greater control, and those disempowered acted to gain greater power. Individuals, nationalist and regional organizations were all able to leverage these technologies by pass state controls on everything from sharing information to organizing to conduct revolutionary activities.

Governmental response:
To date governmental response has primarily been reactive and designed to enforce the rule of law and preserve the status quo. Acts of terrorism have been met with programs of counterterrorism. Acts of insurgency have been met with programs of counterinsurgency. AQ has suffered tactical defeats but is widely assessed as being stronger now than it was on 9/11. While AQ’s UW efforts have failed to gain traction with the broader populaces of the region, those populaces have acted out of their own accord to attain the change they seek nationally through the on-going revolutionary events of Arab Spring. There are essentially two kinds of states in the region; those that are experiencing revolution now, and those that will experience revolution soon. The unwillingness of governments to make reasonable concessions coupled with the over-reliance upon some mix of social bribery and internal security to sustain an artificial façade of stability will become increasingly untenable.

[Dayuhan]

AQ uses an extreme Islamist ideology to gain influence with their target populaces of disenfranchised Sunni Muslims to promote revolution to address poor governance in their respective states

Again I think you're duistorting AQ to fit it into your own governance-centric model, rather than adjusting the model to fit what's actually worked for AQ. AQ has generally failed pretty miserably in their efforts to "promote revolution to address poor governance"... not because people are happy with the governance they get, but because very few seem to believe that AQ has anything better to offer. Where AQ and its precursors have succeeded is in firing up and exploiting anger at foreign military intervention in Muslim lands. AQ has tried to exploit a number of different narratives, but the only one that's ever drawn support beyond a very small circle is "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful".

I also think the impact of information technology on AQ's organizing is very much overrated, and I've yet to see any credibly supported argument to suggest that it's a major factor. Worth noting that AQ has had the most success in entrenching itself in environments such as pre-2001 Afghanistan, Yemen,m and Somalia, where neither information technology nor domestic governance exist to any significant degree. I suspect that direct contact through the madrassa network and other physical networks is a more potent (if less fashionable) force than social media. Not saying that these networks don't use social media as they would use any tool available, but I don't see it as a key enabler at all.

[Bob's World]

You name the places AQ hides, not the populaces AQ targets, in Afg and Somalia. Pre-9/11 I don't think AQ had much traction with Pashtun populaces, and there is not much governance in Somalia to revolt against. Yemen is both, a great place to hide for AQ and Yemeni and Saudi insurgents. Technology does not help one hide, it allows one to run a networked, mult-nodal approach to UW over a vast area, and coordinate terrorist attacks over an even larger area.

But more importantly, because one cannot "create" insurgency through UW, but can only leverage insurgency where it already exists; the advances in info tech are driving social evolution across many populaces feeding a growing discontent with governments that show little appetite to evolve as well to meet the growing, changing expectations of their people.

Motivations, issues, etc all vary widely. Insurgency, however is political. If not political it isn't insurgency. So yes, it is always about grievances with governance. Certainly other types of instability exist as well, tied to criminal activity and other issues unrelated to governance. Lumping these together by their symptoms and tactics leads to clumsy approaches intended to create stability. Attacking symptoms can suppress those symptoms, but ultimately makes the underlying problems worse. The fact that most insurgencies get involved in criminal activities to fund their movements, and that many large criminal enterprises can grow to challenge government muddies the water, but my belief is that governments achieve the best enduring effects by focusing responses on root causes and by better appreciating what the primary purposes of various organizations are and focusing on that.

[Dayuhan]

You name the places AQ hides, not the populaces AQ targets

AQ's targeting of populaces has only gained widespread support when those populaces were supporting a jihad against a foreign invader in Muslim lands. AQ's predecessors gained widespread support for their jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Once that war ended support quickly dwindled and AQ's subsequent attempts to raise war against Muslim governments were failures. It was only when they successfully baited the US into direct military intervention that they regained influence with any significant portion of any populace.

Insurgency, however is political. If not political it isn't insurgency. So yes, it is always about grievances with governance.

That's true of insurgency, but AQ is not an insurgency, nor has it succeeded in gaining widespread leverage with any insurgent populace. AQ gets support when it fights foreign intervention.

We don't have to try to disable AQ by reforming governments in the Middle East, which is a good thing, since we can't reform governments in the Middle East. We can refuse to provide them with the thing they thrive on: foreign military occupation.

[Bob's World]

Agree completely that AQ is not an insurgency. AQ conducts UW though, which is the leveraging of other people's insurgencies. Also agree that we cannot "fix" foreign governments and that increasing our presence in the region serves primarily to increase the credibility of those who attempt to convince Muslims that the problems of the Middle East cannot be resolved until our presence is completely removed from the region.

Currently we are heavily invested in CT against AQ, and conflate and aggregate those nationalist insurgents who AQ conducts AQ among as being part of that target set. Yemen and Pakistan and the Maghreb are all poster children for this. Keep CT on the books, but we need to separate and refine our target list. Better we conduct our own UW to out-compete AQ for influence with these populaces and work to help them find more peaceful ways to elevate their grievances.

Currently we also invest heavily in security force capacity building. Here too we also need to refine our approach. Where are we helping a government to maintain appropriate security while it works equally hard to address the reasonable concerns of the populaces groups their nationalist insurgents come from, and where do we serve more to help some government avoid having to make such necessary reforms?

We can't fix these governments, but we should not help them avoid having to fix themselves either. We need to put a finer point on how we think about these threats and look at a significant refresh in terms of how we approach them. Much of this is more diplomacy work than military work.

[Dayuhan]

Agree completely that AQ is not an insurgency. AQ conducts UW though, which is the leveraging of other people's insurgencies. Also agree that we cannot "fix" foreign governments and that increasing our presence in the region serves primarily to increase the credibility of those who attempt to convince Muslims that the problems of the Middle East cannot be resolved until our presence is completely removed from the region.

Generally agreed, though I'd point out that AQ's attempts to leverage insurgency against established governments (as opposed to pseudo-governments installed by foreign powers) have been generally unsuccessful. What AQ has leveraged successfully is resentment toward foreign military intervention in Muslim lands.

Better we conduct our own UW to out-compete AQ for influence with these populaces and work to help them find more peaceful ways to elevate their grievances.

This is the part where I start getting nervous. I don not like the idea of the US trying to "compete for influence" in environments where our understanding is incomplete or minimal and our efforts to compete for influence are likely to be construed as self-interested meddling, a perception that directly reinforces the AQ narrative. Once we decide to "compete for influence" it's terribly easy for us to try to give people what we think they ought to want instead of working with the many different things they actually do want; it easily becomes an umbrella under which we can pursue intrusive and counterproductive policies. Sometimes the best way for us to undermine the AQ narrative is to step back and leave things alone.

We must always remember that the antidote to bad meddling is not good meddling, it's less meddling. Trying to step in and adjust relations between governments and governed in other countries is not likely to get us anyone's affection and can create a lot of trouble and ill will.

We can't fix these governments, but we should not help them avoid having to fix themselves either. We need to put a finer point on how we think about these threats and look at a significant refresh in terms of how we approach them. Much of this is more diplomacy work than military work.

Where are we actually allowing governments to avoid having to fix themselves? That seems to me to somewhat overrate the extent and effectiveness of our efforts.

Sometimes it's less about military or diplomatic engagement than it is about stepping back, letting nature run its course, and recognizing that it isn't always about us.

[Bob's World]

As I look at the problem, there are essentially three fundamental dynamics at work that the US broadly bundles up under the the tactical, symptomatic heading of "war on terrorism."

1. Revolution Insurgency. (multiple, across many nations and populaces)

2. Resistance Insurgency. (Of a sort, also multiple and against several nations)

3. Unconventional Warfare. (Networked, ran by a Non State Actor targeting both of the dynamics above, or more perhaps more accurately, the support for opposing the conditions driving both of the above.

Revolution seeks to employ illegal and often violent means to force change of some part or all of some government. This is internal to a state between the government and those who are governed by that government. Revolutionary forces drive Arab Spring, the Shia aspect of insurgency in Iraq, the aspect of the Taliban insurgency taking refuge in Pakistan, the Palestinians against Israel, etc. Revolution is political, and while it often manifests to look like war or warfare, due to the unique nature of and between the parties is best classified and treated as a civil emergency.

Resistance is a natural response by a populace to some foreign presence that is exercising what is perceived by that populace as undue and inappropriate control over their general system of governance. It can be very overt, as in the German occupation of France in WWII, or Roman occupation of countless countries, French occupation of Algeria or Indochina, British occupation of India, Malaya, etc. But who says the occupation has to be physical to trigger this resistance effect in a populace?? During the Cold War the US-led efforts helped liberate many populaces from the colonialism they experienced prior to WWII (and turned a blind eye on others in favor of European allies seeking to recover their lost possessions); but also began to impose a systematic of intervention and manipulation of governance designed to build a belt of countries with governments committed to containing the expansion of Soviet influence. Not to debate the pros and cons of the containment strategy, it was largely tolerated by those governments and populaces it impacted as it was rationalized as being better than the alternative. As such it did not trigger the "resistance" response. Once the Soviet threat faded, many of the more autocratic regimes, primarily in the Middle East and elevated into power or at least protected by their alliance with the US-led West, opted to sustain the status quo. This was good for business and appeared good for security, so the US opted to sustain the status quo as well. this "virtual occupation" was no longer the lesser of two evils, so the moods of the many populaces affected by it began to change. The corresponding acceleration of the information technology breakthroughs also served to accelerate these changing perspectives, and conditions of resistance began to grow. Resistance against this external influence deemed as excessive in the eyes of those who live under the governments affected by it. That is the only perception that matters. The intent or the perception of the influencing party is totally irrelevant. Equally, the intent or perception of the influenced government is totally irrelevant as well.

Unconventional Warfare is the leveraging of someone else's insurgency, or multiple insurgencies belonging to several others, for ones own purposes. The Soviets and the US both employed UW throughout the Cold War in a form of "pawn warfare" as the competed for influence across the 1/3rd of the world not within their respective spheres. Similarly, al Qaeda employs a networked approach to conduct UW to leverage the conditions of insurgency in an effort to support their organizational goals today.

While revolution is political, and is best resolved by reshaping governance to better meet the evolving requirements of the mosaic of populaces under any particular government; Resistance is best resolved by a appreciating what is considered inappropriate and excessive about one's foreign "presence" and simply removing that offensive situation.

It is not about what AQ thinks or says. They are largely irrelevant, bottom-feeding exploiters of the situation. Yes they have a message, and an opinion on both the Revolutionary aspects of the Middle East as well as this Resistance aspect of the Middle East; but it is exaggerated noise intended to inflame and shape events to support their organizational goals. Like a petulant child throwing a tantrum because they want something that is not theirs to have. One can fixate and focus on such a child, or one can spank and/or ignore such a child. The latter is usually best, but we are so damn focused on the child. Better we focus on the Resistance.

The Revolutionary issues are internal to each state and must be worked out between those governments and those populaces, and any externally shaped solution will be presumptively illegitimate. That is the root problem of our approaches in Iraq and Afghanistan, as that the excessive role of the US in shaping those conditions places such an extreme presumption of illegitimacy upon them that they will both struggle to ever work through that short of a follow-on revolution to get to a more legitimate solution. (this is not legal legitimacy found in the recognition and and acceptance under the law, but rather natural legitimacy found in the recognition and acceptance of the people affected directly by this government).

The key for the US is to focus on how to re-shape our approaches to the middle east to reduce the perceptions that are triggering the Resistance response. This does not mean cut and run on our interests; this does not mean "abandon" our allies (though in truth, most were never true allies, and have abandoned us and their people long ago in their selfish pursuits of wealth and power). Not what AQ thinks or says; not what our own rhetoric thinks or says; but what the affected populaces actually think and feel. This is not a military problem, and frankly I see multiple signs that the current administration largely gets this and is working to address it. They may not think of it in terms of defusing this resistance to our virtual occupation of the region, but they are working in what is generally the right direction.

For the larger conventional force there is little role at all. Go home and prepare for real wars. They will come, and we must be prepared to deter and defeat them. For SOF, certainly there is a role in "spanking the child" of AQ. but focus specifically on AQ, there is no role for us in "spanking the child" of the many nationalist revolutionary movements directed at these many governments of the region (other than one of ensuring the actual parent is not too abusive in their own efforts). But we do need to be among and understand the populaces in areas where we deem our interests to be vital. Like "mad dogs and Englishmen" SOF must "go out in the noonday sun" to be among all manner of people in all manner of locations, most often in very benign and non-military kinds of ways, to be eyes and ears to gage the levels of revolution and resistance among them.

So, to this thread: The War on Terrorism is NOT the correct label, and is our largest foreign policy mistake in the past 40-50 years. It is a label that focuses attention on the symptoms of the least important aspect of this larger dynamic at work. Far better if we labeled it "The war on inappropriately outdated US foreign policy"; at least then we would be focused in the right direction.

[saveus]

I think we can continue talking about it for days without convincing each other as we all have our own point of view. Whatever is happening in the current scenario of world is regrettable and there's chaos everywhere. You can't blame AQ for everything, in the end we must remember that it was our government that created it.

[J Wolfsberger]

... in the end we must remember that it was our government that created it.

Ah, ... no.

That is the fantasy of a certain part of the political spectrum in Western countries, but it's fantasy. They self organized out of already radicalized groups in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We found them and gave them arms and some training. To claim that as some sort of act of "creation" is simply and completely false.

The roots of the current problems in the Middle East stretch back hundreds of years. The state of those countries today is what their leaders - secular, religious and cultural - have made them over all that time. The stoking of anger over the current state of their countries is a technique used by the malignant and/or insane to gain their own advantage.

Letting them off the hook for their responsibility might feel good to certain domestic elements of Western nations, it might even help them gain political advantage among the low information part of their electorates, but it makes thing much worse for the world in general and Moslem countries in particular.