I will bite; We can look at things at many levels, and all are valid in their own way. In this case, I was not looking at either the details of administration or military tactics and capacity (e.g. how corrupt is Zardari? how competent is Rahman Malik? what is the tactical plan for conquering Afghanistan? etc etc), I was looking at what I imagine to be "deeper trends" whose actual working out can be very unexpected and even paradoxical. My thinking is based on some extension of the following:
1. There is a certain network of ideas that is built around the "two-nation theory"and "an Islamic system of government". These ideas (like all such ideas) are partly someone's idea of "this works well to achieve my immediate and practical political aims", but they do have their own momentum and some sort of elastic but not infinitely elastic limits about what can be done in their name.
2. The second is a live issue in all Muslim countries and may eventually develop into a workable system (Iranians claim they have one example, though I personally think its workable parts are derived from Western sources and its problem areas from Shia theology and the two have not been fused as successfully as the Iranian regime sometimes claims). The first is a peculiarly Pakistani (or Indian) issue and is much shallower than the second. The second will eventually throw up workable systems, the first cannot bear the weight of any actual contact with reality and all attempts to align it too closely with actual practice run into brick walls that are visible to outsiders but sometimes invisible to true believers. These are large claims. I can write a book about them and not answer all possible questions. But with time we can clarify what I mean.
3. These ideas (two nation theory or TNT in all its manifestations, and “Islamic system of govt” as currently imagined in Pakistan though not necessarily in all future forms) are inherently illiberal (in the classic sense of the word liberal) and difficult to reconcile with currently fashionable notions of nation states and their permissible aims and methods. To make Pakistan work as a modern nation state, they have to be "defanged", e.g. by being relegated to meaningless propaganda rather than being used as actual guides for decision making. The Pakistani state initially ignored some of their implications because the administrative apparatus and political forces were creations of British India and in practice (if not always in name) they functioned like any other post-colonial state derived from the British empire (naturally, with many local variations and historical contingencies). But over time, the karma of British raj is fading and what is being put in its place is insufficiently imagined (and, in my view, see 2 above, the Pakistani elite cannot possibly find the a way to make it “sufficiently imagined”).
4. The army, for various reasons, has systematically undermined the British colonial administration and the parliamentary system created in Pakistan in 1969 (and formalized in 1973). But it has nothing to put in its place except its own organizational strength and a superficial and shallow ideology of “Paknationalism”. Not only is this inherently flawed, the army leadership lacks the intellectual ability to even comprehend what the problem may be. It is constantly surprised by the fact that its “patriotic” attempts to save Pakistan reliably end with public upheaval and ever more serious fractures in the ideological foundations of the state. But over time, the army has improved and perfected its levers for manipulating public opinion and politics at least within the Pakistani elite. The entire elite (not just the army high command) tends to mindlessly repeat some (but never all) of the army’s own shallow and self-destructive worldview.
5. In the 1980s, general Zia and his henchmen added a more potent form of Islamism to the army’s toolkit. This new addition was never a majority view, even within the army. Its hardcore is relatively small and their full set of beliefs still has the capacity to shock naïve bystanders. But this jihadist hardcore has successfully manipulated the anti-Indian obsessions of the majority (those derived in turn from the so-called “two nation theory”) to get its way. For example, what sane military high command would actively encourage, support and facilitate the creation of multiple militant armies WITHIN its own state, all led by fanatical ideologues and all protected from “ordinary” law enforcement by the army and its ubiquitous intelligence agencies? Yet that is exactly what the “secular” officers of the Pak army did in the 1990s (see the moron Musharraf for details). EVERY village has some youngsters who were trained in jihadi camps and madressas that provide new recruits. Dozens of such organizations long ago escaped from their controllers and creators and became autonomous. Even those that are still in control (e.g. LET) are committed to an ideology that is completely at odds with the existing “system”. Many armed men have become professional kidnappers, extortionists etc. It’s a recipe for disaster and its STILL cooking.
6. 9-11 created an opportunity to bring this monster under control. That attempt was undermined by continued to commitment to the (irrational) anti-Indian component of Paknationalism, which in turn led to policy decisions that distinguished between “good” and “bad” jihadis and aimed for a vision of “India-free Afghanistan” that doomed the entire enterprise.
7. Departure of American forces and receding American influence will be followed by a return to “full-frontal” paknationalism. This will initially look like an improvement to many people. Maybe there will be more effective administration in the core areas. But the jihadi problem will become even more acute. It has been built up as an alternative to the existing (barely existing) political system based on parliamentary democracy and the “Wesphalian” state. The army imagines that everything will be fine because their own organization will run the country so there is no need for “bloody politicians”. They have no idea with which to provide legitimacy to that state beyond their juvenile notion of paknationalism. They don’t know what disasters await them once the “bloody politicians” are all put in their place and the existing decaying state structure is further undermined. They also have no idea of the differences between their own position and the position of the Chinese communist party in China. They also think their Chinese patrons will take up the slack where Uncle Sam left off. That will not happen. The effects of operating without a near-coherent ideology are not immediate, but they are very persistent and cumulative. Disaster will follow.
Got to run, but you may be starting to see what I mean….more to follow.
Originally Posted by Bob's World
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