Initial Officer Selection

[JMA]

From the paper Officer Selection in the federal Armed Forces of Germany - Wener Birke we learn:

Military officer selection, for the most part, still takes place according to principles that were introduced 1955, which had the objective of preventing as much as possible, any misuse of the armed forces.

and

Aptitude tests did not, therefore, initially focus abilities the candidates needed in order to meet certain performance requirements, but on personality traits, attitudes and motives that had been declared selection criteria for political and moral reasons.

and finally:

By filling in questionnaires and talking to examiners in interviews, applicants had to prove that they were prepared, without any reservations, to uphold the values of the new democratic Constitution and to treat their subordinates as “citizens in uniform”.

One certainly hopes that the Germans have got over their angst over their past and once they do (if they have not done so already) it will probably take 30 years to cleanse its military from the people who were appointed on the basis of their political acceptability (and probably the absence of the warrior character so desperately needed in an army and once so adundantly available in Germany).

[Fuchs]

The written word and reality weren't exactly in convergence during the 50's and 60's...actually, they were much more apart than even nowadays.
This plus the fact that we're running out of witnesses for the period who were sufficiently high-ranked and are still having a clear mind means that such studies have to be taken with a grain of salt.

Btw, there was a intra-Bundeswehr cultural war going on during the 50's and 60's about "Innere Fhrung", which adds complexity to the issue. Some authors (such as Uhle-Wettler) were still discussing Innere Fhrung critically in the early 80's (and Uhle-Wettler still made it to LtGen and chief of NATO Defence College!).

[JMA]

The written word and reality weren't exactly in convergence during the 50's and 60's...actually, they were much more apart than even nowadays.
This plus the fact that we're running out of witnesses for the period who were sufficiently high-ranked and are still having a clear mind means that such studies have to be taken with a grain of salt.

Btw, there was a intra-Bundeswehr cultural war going on during the 50's and 60's about "Innere Fhrung", which adds complexity to the issue. Some authors (such as Uhle-Wettler) were still discussing Innere Fhrung critically in the early 80's (and Uhle-Wettler still made it to LtGen and chief of NATO Defence College!).

OK... but the bottom line is that the German military is still carrying baggage from the past. Time to get over it?

[Fuchs]

OK... but the bottom line is that the German military is still carrying baggage from the past. Time to get over it?

Some people place an emphasis on the idea that you won't be happy to have a strong defence against tyranny by foreign powers if you have tyranny at home.
The Bundeswehr is supposed to be loyal to the constitution, obey the law and to obey all lawful orders of its civilian leaders (peacetime: Minister of Defence, wartime: Chancellor).

It doesn't make much sense to ditch these requirements from officer selection, especially as only really, really few candidates of today will have any problem with this hurdle. Those who (would) fail to master this requirement are people whom nobody wants to see as a German officer.


Overall, you miss entirely the point regarding shedding historical Bundeswehr baggage. The actual improper burdens are different ones.

[JMA]

Some people place an emphasis on the idea that you won't be happy to have a strong defence against tyranny by foreign powers if you have tyranny at home.
The Bundeswehr is supposed to be loyal to the constitution, obey the law and to obey all lawful orders of its civilian leaders (peacetime: Minister of Defence, wartime: Chancellor).

It doesn't make much sense to ditch these requirements from officer selection, especially as only really, really few candidates of today will have any problem with this hurdle. Those who (would) fail to master this requirement are people whom nobody wants to see as a German officer.

Overall, you miss entirely the point regarding shedding historical Bundeswehr baggage. The actual improper burdens are different ones.

No, no, no Fuchs the Germans have got the wrong end of the stick.

Were Hitler and his cronies generals who conducted a military coup? No.

Hitler was a politician who was elected to power. And (to be kind) the military would have been required to support the elected government of the day. (As the US military is required to do regardless of what insane plans the incumbent president comes up with - the ease (and timidity) the US military allow their presidents to send them to the slaughter does not remind you of the German military back then?)

So in the post-war era to wrap the military up under the strictest political control was insanely stupid for an otherwise intelligent nation. (Post war traumatisation of the German nation must be the reason)

The German military should have been rebuilt on the principle of the independence of the military not as a bunch of emasculated supposed soldiers all dressed up in pretty uniforms and merely going through the motions and under the whip of their political masters.

The aim would surely have been to prevent the politicians (from ever again) misusing the military. What checks and balances have been put in place to ensure that? Now the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme where the forces are little better than your average gendarmerie or militia. Such a damn pity.

[Fuchs]

The Nazi period isn't the key influence here.
The generals cooperated with Hitler because most of them were national-conservatives and thus in the political spectrum that formed the coalition which Hitler needed to get a majority. Plus they executed orders that they shouldn't have executed. But that's not the formative experience.

The Reichswehr -albeit never doing a coup d'etat itself- was not protecting the young Weimar Republic against right-wing coup attempts, only against left-wing uprisings.
It was disloyal and practically not under control of the government, especially not governments led by social democrats.
As such, it was a lingering threat to the republic.
This disloyalty (coupled with a desire to not have a "brown" army) is the story behind the Bundeswehr-politician relationship of the 50's to 70's.


I don't see any reason why the really not very restrictive hurdles and rules that shall ensure lawfulness and loyalty of the Bundeswehr should be removed.

The lack of orientation at combat (commonly the buzzword "Armee im Einsatz" is used to push personnel towards more caring about this war) is a consequence of 55 years of peacetime service, 35 of which happened with the assumption that in the event of war we'd be nuked anyway (and heroic Stotrupp exploits would thus be irrelevant).


We also have a rank inflation and top heaviness, results of force reductions that did cut more % of the indians than of the chieftains.

[JMA]

The Nazi period isn't the key influence here.
The generals cooperated with Hitler because most of them were national-conservatives and thus in the political spectrum that formed the coalition which Hitler needed to get a majority. Plus they executed orders that they shouldn't have executed. But that's not the formative experience.

The Reichswehr -albeit never doing a coup d'etat itself- was not protecting the young Weimar Republic against right-wing coup attempts, only against left-wing uprisings.
It was disloyal and practically not under control of the government, especially not governments led by social democrats.
As such, it was a lingering threat to the republic.
This disloyalty (coupled with a desire to not have a "brown" army) is the story behind the Bundeswehr-politician relationship of the 50's to 70's.

I don't see any reason why the really not very restrictive hurdles and rules that shall ensure lawfulness and loyalty of the Bundeswehr should be removed.

The lack of orientation at combat (commonly the buzzword "Armee im Einsatz" is used to push personnel towards more caring about this war) is a consequence of 55 years of peacetime service, 35 of which happened with the assumption that in the event of war we'd be nuked anyway (and heroic Stotrupp exploits would thus be irrelevant).

We also have a rank inflation and top heaviness, results of force reductions that did cut more % of the indians than of the chieftains.

Yes I accept that the post-war Germany did whatever it could to prevent the same happening again. I accept this. My point is simply that in the process they have probably got it right to the extent they wanted. Where does that leave them now? As far as the military is concerned it does not look good and despite the opportunity to put on a good show in Afghanistan they remain an unknown quantity. I'm sure there are many German soldiers who are up for the fight but are not being allowed to do so. I do not wish to go on and on about the German military but quite frankly the modern German Army has a long way to go to build a reputation.

[Fuchs]

Reputation?
Our Allies know our relative performance in multinational exercises, and so would potential aggressors if there were any.

[JMA]

Reputation?
Our Allies know our relative performance in multinational exercises, and so would potential aggressors if there were any.

Exercises?

No, the word must get out that the Krauts are back... screw with them at your peril! That reputation is earned the hard way.

[Fuchs]

Exercises?

No, the word must get out that the Krauts are back... screw with them at your peril! That reputation is earned the hard way.

OMG. Old problem.

You want to see great proficiency in firefighting by sending men repeatedly to building fires so they're prepared for when a house nearby burns while I do not want any houses to burn.

Do you get it?

[JMA]

OMG. Old problem.

You want to see great proficiency in firefighting by sending men repeatedly to building fires so they're prepared for when a house nearby burns while I do not want any houses to burn.

Do you get it?

I'll tell you what I get. It is the old problem of those who have not been in action playing down the significance of the experience as opposed to those who have been in action recognising the value of the experience.

Your analogy of the firemen sounds good but is not accurate it would be better to frame it in the manner of saying that in the event of a fire the whole team that will arrive at the scene will be attending their first fire. The expectation is that because they have simulated many fires during training that they will perform well.

The reality is of course that it's more like saying the doctor and his whole team who is about to carry-out open-heart surgery on you have never done an operation before but have practised on the odd doll and even one dead monkey. I guess you'll be okay with that?

Combat experience is of course not essential but does give soldiers an understanding of the combat situation and believe it or not the more experience they get the better they learn to handle it (there are of course some who don't learn to handle it and the sooner you can identify these people and move them on the less likely it will be that they will get people killed).

[Fuchs]

There's not going to be a problematic asymmetry as long as potential credible aggressors (if in existence) have no major combat experience.

Even in case of an asymmetry, there's still huge doubts about the usefulness of small wars experiences for great wars.

The German army got almost nothing out of the Spanish civil war (and that wasn't even very small), the British were awfully ill-prepared for great war little more than a decade after the 2nd Boers War.
The Russians didn't impress much in 1914 (two armies of theirs being mauled in Eastern Prussia) despite having more than a handful of "combat experienced" leaders from the 1904/05 war with Japan.
The U.S.A.A.F. had volunteers in England and China, but was still poorly prepared for air combat in December 1941.
Dozens of colonial wars did not help the British to be a major land power in 1914.
Nor were the French aware in Summer of 1914 that their supposed furor gallicus or how they called it (the idea that French infantry is uniquely well-suited for offensive action) was bullocks - despite having had lots of colonial wars, too.
Israel's edge in conventional warfare was dulled, not sharpened, by the low level conflict with Palestinians.
The Russians blundered into Grozny mere five or six years after completing their long Afghan small war experience.



You are greatly exaggerating the importance of having some leaders had their baptism of fire in a small war.
A war that's big enough to give most leaders their baptism of fire is on the other hand so costly that the mere idea that the (quickly perishable) experience was worth it sounds ludicrous to me.

[JMA]

You are greatly exaggerating the importance of having some leaders had their baptism of fire in a small war.
A war that's big enough to give most leaders their baptism of fire is on the other hand so costly that the mere idea that the (quickly perishable) experience was worth it sounds ludicrous to me.

I don't think I am.

As I said those who have not experienced combat tend to underrate the value of the combat experience both to the individual and as a means of assessing him.

Here I am talking about officers... young platoon commanding officers.

There are two aspects I believe to be important and they are:

* The experience of combat itself.

* The ability to lead and command his men in combat.

Putting young officers through this experience in any war (we only seem to have small ones since Korea) is valuable. The man learns about himself and the institution learns about him. Some make the grade and some don't and yes it is more than just pass or fail it is a question of degree.

This takes us into the realm of courage/bravery/fear/cowardice.

IMHO it is the personal characteristic of unselfishness that is the most important in this regard. You see it is this characteristic which you seek in officers because they must put everything and I mean everything before their own self.

‘Unselfishness, as far as you are concerned means simply this - you will put first the honour and interests of your country and your regiment; next you will put the safety, well-being and comfort of your men; and last - and last all the time - you will put your own interest, your own safety, your own comfort’. - Field Marshal Sir William Slim Courage and other Broadcasts (1957).

A young officer is expected to place his duty to his men ahead of the selfish emotion of fear (for his own life). It actually makes it easy (for an officer) to conquer fear if you are driven by doing your duty to the men you command. Good officers at platoon and Army level are those who put duty first. Those who can't trump fear or their personal interests with the call to duty at platoon level will not make the grade as general officers IMHO.

So it is not exposure to combat merely for the sake of it but really much a deeper exploration of the character of the officer. He either makes it or must be on the next plane home (as you can't sacrifice the lives of soldiers because you are trying to be nice or fair to the officer in question). My theory is (and it is not scientifically proven I accept) is that the degree of selfishness or rather selflessness is a pretty accurate predictor of a persons combat courage.

Now selfless duty of officers to their nation and their men is an absolute requirement for an officer IMHO and combat exposure as a young platoon commander is a brutal and unforgiving test of this characteristic.

The Canadian article/paper Courage Under Fire: Defining And Understanding The Act - T. Robert Fowler is a must read in this regard to get the context of what I mean.

Now, to what extent during officer selection is his degree of selfishness or selflessness tested for and established? And if not adequately, why not?

[Fuchs]

I don't think I am.

As I said those who have not experienced combat tend to underrate the value of the combat experience both to the individual and as a means of assessing him.

As I wrote you seem to underrate if not ignore entirely the costs that are associated with the generated "value".

[JMA]

As I wrote you seem to underrate if not ignore entirely the costs that are associated with the generated "value".

Run those costs by me again will you?

[Fuchs]

Run those costs by me again will you?

Nation at war? Build-up of hate? People dying or being maimed? people wasting their time instead of being productive? Distraction from actual domestic problems? Fiscal cost? Diplomatic relations degraded? Risk of exposing weaknesses, thus weakening national security through a weaker deterrence?

[JMA]

Nation at war? Build-up of hate? People dying or being maimed? people wasting their time instead of being productive? Distraction from actual domestic problems? Fiscal cost? Diplomatic relations degraded? Risk of exposing weaknesses, thus weakening national security through a weaker deterrence?

The military does not start a war. I do not suggest that politicians start a war so as to exercise their troops and test their weapon systems.

Therefore all of the points you raise are not applicable.

All I am saying is that if the opportunity presents itself (in a small war) to test your officers (and men) in combat (as it has high value) it should be carried out deliberately as a matter of policy to make sure you test and assess the right people (being the young officers in this instance). Simple as that.

[Fuchs]

Either you talk about the war/peace decision or you're wasting our time with utterly trivial points.

Of course do soldiers gain combat experience in combat. This only becomes relevant to the discussion in any capacity once there's a decision about whether and how many of them do so.
That means the war/peace decision.


Besides that, I simply don't believe you.
You do obviously yearn for seeing the nation's military leaders seasoned by war in regular intervals. That's implies periodic involvement in wars, which usually means periodic decision for a war of choice.

You can't have it both ways; reject needless wars and yearn for a combat-experienced officer corps.

[JMA]

Either you talk about the war/peace decision or you're wasting our time with utterly trivial points.

Of course do soldiers gain combat experience in combat. This only becomes relevant to the discussion in any capacity once there's a decision about whether and how many of them do so.
That means the war/peace decision.

Besides that, I simply don't believe you.
You do obviously yearn for seeing the nation's military leaders seasoned by war in regular intervals. That's implies periodic involvement in wars, which usually means periodic decision for a war of choice.

You can't have it both ways; reject needless wars and yearn for a combat-experienced officer corps.

OK so I'm a war monger now?

You seem intent on creating a connection the political peace/war decision with the military using a war opportunity to test their officers in combat.

If a war comes along the opportunity will present itself and should be used.

Can we move on now please.

[JMA]

I stated in post #7 to this thread:

..., I am still not sure why there is a need for a degree before commissioning when there is plenty of time in a 25-30 year career to take three or so years for the purpose (around the senior Capt/Maj level for the infantry). Too much time and money (again IMHO) is invested in training of officers the majority of whom (it seems) will leave the service before they have justified the initial expense.

It seems from the private messages and off board conversations I have had recently that this remains and issue.

One normally serves 15-20 years from commissioning to Lt Col. There is sufficient time there to fit in a degree and the command and staff course.

My contention is that it is not just a question of a degree but what degree that is important and this must be in the hands of the military.

I would suggest that the academic equivalent of a military MBA must be considered and take place over two years and must be completed before promotion to Lt Col. Probably the best time is after the age of 30.

Initial officer selection can accept SAT/ACT results. This is all that is needed to assess future likelihood of academic success. It is a pass or a fail.

To go a step further the same should apply to the physical assessment at initial selection. A pass or a fail. It is ridiculous to believe that a stronger man will make a better officer than one of adequate physical ability.

Also when the physical and the academic are weighted it tends to diminish the importance of leadership qualities that are required and need to be selected for. The leadership qualities requirement should be absolute and not part of a balancing act with weighted scores from SATS/ACT results and a physical rating.

Sadly the US seems to have bought into the 'whole person' stuff when selecting potential officers.

From the document OFFICER SELECTION (RTO HFM 023 – RSG 31):

All three service academies use the “whole person” concept for evaluating applicants. At West Point, a “whole person score” (WPS) is derived from weighting three factors: academic aptitude, which combines SAT or ACT scores with high school rank (60 percent); leadership potential, which is estimated from athletic participation in high school and high school teacher recommendations (30 percent); and physical aptitude, which is measured with the Academy’s Physical Aptitude Examination (10 percent).

What seems bizarre is that the most crucial aspect being the leadership potential is relegated to a mere 30% and based on a school teachers assessment. Can't be right can it?