This won't be anything like El Salvador because the situations are not all the same and the LRA isn't anything like the FMLN. The FMLN was, I believe, a classic (as much as anything can be) insurgent group that took advantage of popular grievances to advance itself politically. El Salvador was tiny. The LRA is basically a bandit group that couldn't care less about the people. Its' primary goal is survival and it does that by looting, killing and enslaving so it can survive to loot, kill and enslave some more. It is led by a genius, and evil one but a genius nonetheless. It operates in a huge, a huge area and is good enough at small unit infantry work that it must be taken seriously by anybody, including us, who goes after them.
If this were going to be like anything in the past, I would guess it would be more like Crook following the Apaches into Mexico. As I said, I don't know how SF is going to handle this but maybe they would do something like Crook did, with tiny groups of SF mixed in units of African troops, getting on the trail of LRA groups and staying on the trail come hell or high water until they are run to ground. We provide aerial re-supply so the groups can stay out. Maybe a variation of Fireforce tactics would help also. I'll bet pygmy trackers would help too.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Because it's the first step into another series of mistakes.
We have got to change the process that requires 'missions' and commitment of forces to justify existences -- and budgets; that's just stupid.
Threat-driven strategy is like 5 year-olds playing soccer.
Fun for others to watch as we wear ourselves out running all over the place not accomplishing much of purpose. We may all get participation trophies that make us feel good, but we won't get a juicebox and a nap at the end...
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I do wonder if a LRA-like group was active outside Africa and in the 'developing world' it would get such attention from the USA. Given AFRICOM's perceived failure to gain traction with African nations, is this LRA action seen as a way of gaining credibility as being there to assist Africa beyond CT?
I base my use of 'AFRICOM's perceived failure' on a discussion in 2010 with two African peacekeeping advisers and their frustration with annual visits pushing the same agenda, with no "beef".
All this aside I wish the small US contingent good luck hunting the LRA.
It would be more impressive if capable African partners could also contribute, idealism lives on!
davidbfpo
Without having done any homework on this particular organization, or the "road to intervention" that has led to this thread, no, in general terms, I do not think this is a good idea.
I suppose if I pulled the string on this I would find a large body of well-developed intelligence products telling me all about why these are bad guys, and making obscure linkages to either AQ, or to some group with linkages to AQ. I suspect I would also find a GCC and TSOC staff tasked to stare hard at Africa for threats to defeat that has deemed this to be a priority for their focus in their assigned AOR (and reporting back that "NSTR" ['nothing significant to report"] is not what Flag-level commanders tend to do. That would indicate that they were insignificant as well. There is little balancing as to how this "threat" stacks against an overall global security picture, only how this "threat" stacks up against other "threats" in their AOR).
No one wants to be idle while others are active, and this does tend to inflate things. Currently every theater has an inflated threat picture, IMO.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Bob's World:
They have nothing at all to do with AQ. They are not a threat to anybody much except the local people they massacre by the hundreds regularly.
I don't know what TSOC or GCC mean.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
as also to Libya (and Syria), is that it is outside my geographic bounds (Atl. Lit, WH, Pac. Lit).
That being said, I wish US troops good fortune wherever they are - regardless of how boneheaded USG policy happens to be re: that area.
Now, if a similar situation existed, say, in Bolivia, I'd probably hold up a green light.
Regards
Mike
At its' heart, it is a humanitarian mission. In that part of the world, the most effective humanitarian assistance that can be given is to kill some people dead. Ergo, the SF is the most capable humanitarian organization available.
I say this at the risk of having Ken launch into orbit never to be seen again.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
I am developing a hypothesis to explain U.S. interventions in the world after 1945.
I think its related with a world map and a dart.
and that isn't Isch on either count...
No, SF is not the most capable humanitarian organization around. Especially not for your purpose -- with which I agree; I just do not agree that it is in the interests of the US to provide that assistance, be it SF or whoever.
We have had people there, this is an excalation andI know how the US government works. Trust me, this is an Elephants trunk -- or a Puff Adder, too early to tell -- worming its way into the tent. This does not bode well...
I'm surprised at the number of hostile comments regarding this action. The President called this a crisis of conscience and he absolutely right. In some situations the atrocities are severe enough to make intervention in our collective interests, but I'm confident the spoiled children of Western Europe will remain on the side lines shouting meaningless criticisms (just as they would have if they were aware of the crisis and we chose not to intervene).
Beyond the sound humanitarian reasons to provide this support, in my opinion there are strategic reasons beyond humanitarian that add support to this decision. First Uganda has been a regional partner/friend for years, and they're one of the few countries providing forces to battle the Al-Shabab in Somalia (and were targeted by Al Shabab during the World Cup for their decision to do so). Since when is our national interests not intertwined with our friend's national interests? We asked for support from multiple nations for the war on terror and the efforts in Iraq, so of course other countries also have the right to ask for assistance, and in this case there is no moral ambiguity. Furthermore, unlike our recent adventures mislabeled as COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq (and our support to the resistance in Libya) we're not there to overthrow a government and impose our will, we're there to help multiple nations deal with a transnational christian (self identified as Christian, but not hardly so in most people's view) extremist group that has killed thousands and hindered development efforts for years. Regional stability is in our national interests, and maintaining influence in an increasingly important region of the world (one reasons is to remain competitive with Indian and Chinese influence) is also important. I hope we're not so myopic to believe that the only threat to our national interests is Al Qaeda, nor are we so myopic to believe that every intervention will turn out to be disasters like Afghanistan or Iraq.
More on the next post.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 10-15-2011 at 11:46 PM.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-...thern-uganda-r
One point of interest beyond this specific case is the power of activism to influence this particular White House, but in general there is a growing social awareness and collective action (activism) on a number of issues that will impact our national security objectives.I congratulate Congress for seizing on this important issue, and I congratulate the hundreds of thousands of Americans who have mobilized to respond to this unique crisis of conscience. We have heard from the advocacy organizations, non-governmental organizations, faith-based groups, humanitarian actors who lack access, and those who continue to work on this issue in our own government. We have seen your reporting, your websites, your blogs, and your video postcards -- you have made the plight of the children visible to us all. Your action represents the very best of American leadership around the world, and we are committed to working with you in pursuit of the future of peace and dignity that the people of who have suffered at the hands of the LRA deserve.
Back to the LRA specifically. This isn't new, we had Special Forces and other support in Uganda for years, and it wasn't an issue, at least prior to to our election cycle it was agreed to by both political parties for the reasons I stated in my previous post, so the Republicans and the anti-Obama crowd can’t cry foul on this one. Republician Senator Inhofe told GEN Ham he wanted to see this problem resolved during his command tenure.
See the hearing at this link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rbh-8QutON0&noredirect=1
AFRICOM Public Affairs:
http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=7334
President Barack Obama has authorized the deployment to central Africa of 100 combat-equipped U.S. forces whose mission is to help regional forces fight the notorious Lord's Resistance Army and its leader, Joseph Kony.
During an Oct. 4 military strategy forum, Army Gen. Carter F. Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command, commented on the LRA.Want to learn about the LRA just do a search on utube to get a snap shot. I have been following this group for a while off and on. This insurgency isn't about failed governance, it is about a personalty cult and the inability of the regional nations to neutralize this mass murderer without assistance ."If you ever had any question if there's evil in the world, it's resident in the person of Joesph Kony and that organization," Ham said.
This is a perfect mission for Special Forces whose motto is "De Oppresso Liber". It is a principle based mission that is achievable and could have long term strategic benefits for the region and U.S. influence there. Like any mission, it can go bad in a number of ways. You have to weigh the potential risks against the potential benefits, but I think they're correctly calculated and wish the combined effort success.The U.S. military, Ham said, has focused on facilitating intelligence, and in a State Department-led effort, U.S. personnel trained a battalion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s armed forces. Ham said the U.S. government was looking to increase support to the counter-LRA efforts by increasing the number of military advisors and trainers and training another battalion.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 10-15-2011 at 11:50 PM.
Why are you surprised -- I haven't seen a comment yet that is not consistent with long held and stated opinions.Unnecessary and incorrect slap at Europe who have intervened in Africa -- correctly; those are their former colonies -- far more than have we. The French virtually keep forces in several areas, the Brits do not stay but they do not hesitate to go when needed. Even the Belgiques, Italians and Portuguese have been and are more involved than the US.The President called this a crisis of conscience and he absolutely right. In some situations the atrocities are severe enough to make intervention in our collective interests, but I'm confident the spoiled children of Western Europe will remain on the side lines shouting meaningless criticisms (just as they would have if they were aware of the crisis and we chose not to intervene).
You and the President may call it a crisis of conscience but I beg to differ with both of you. Whose conscience? As you and I both note, we've had people there for years (and not just SF) -- and unstated is the fact that the LRA and Kony have been at it for over 30 years and that Uganda and its neighbors ares not totally clean in this mess -- in any event, this is an escalation * and the timing is deeply suspect. This nation has built a system that virtually requires such commitments to keep things humming; height of foolishness. Ponder all that for a bit...Remind me again what our strategic interest in Somalia is?Beyond the sound humanitarian reasons to provide this support, in my opinion there are strategic reasons beyond humanitarian that add support to this decision. First Uganda has been a regional partner/friend for years, and they're one of the few countries providing forces to battle the Al-Shabab in Somalia (and were targeted by Al Shabab during the World Cup for their decision to do so). Since when is our national interests not intertwined with our friend's national interests?
Could you go into a bit of detail about that intertwining of interests? What, specifically, are our interests in Africa?Please also explain why this is so?Regional stability is in our national interests, and maintaining influence in an increasingly important region of the world (one reasons is to remain competitive with Indian and Chinese influence) is also important.
I thought the Cold War was over. Apparently not. Could you outlione to me this influence we have? Influence on a Continent that resoundingly rejected our influences (other than any money or goodies sent...) and has its GCC located on a different Continent because of the lack of influence...I, OTOH, hope we are not so myopic as to believe that AQ is a threat, not just simply the annoyance it is; and that we are not so myopic as to believe that the same forces involved in Afghanistan and Iraq when employed by the same government elsewhere are not subject to reinvent a few wheels subject to get mired in local ruts...I hope we're not so myopic to believe that the only threat to our national interests is Al Qaeda, nor are we so myopic to believe that every intervention will turn out to be disasters like Afghanistan or Iraq.Regrettably, that is a very accurate statement. Thus my comment that this does not bode well. We probably differ on the impacts -- I'm pretty sure they'll be adverse.One point of interest beyond this specific case is the power of activism to influence this particular White House, but in general there is a growing social awareness and collective action (activism) on a number of issues that will impact our national security objectives.That may not be the most stupid statement by a Senator in the last few years but it's in the top ten. What the good Senator wants and what is achievable may be two very different things. He was showboating, pushing a General in public. If anyone believes the Senator is driven by altruism and concern for Ugandans...Republician Senator Inhofe told GEN Ham he wanted to see this problem resolved during his command tenure.
I am reminded of Rick Sanchez sitting behind a desk in Baghdad and pounding on it while screaming that he wanted more intel, better results from interrogations.
Folks should be careful what they ask for...Once again; what's this strategic benefit?This is a perfect mission for Special Forces whose motto is "De Oppresso Liber". It is a principle based mission that is achievable and could have long term strategic benefits for the region and U.S. influence there.
I can see the strategic benefit to SOCOM and SF, I see some for Uganda and friends -- I see little for the US.
In another post above I also mentioned escalation { * ) but spelled it excalation. Freudian slip -- excavate, excalate -- when in a hole, do not dig...
I'm not all that concerned about Uganda -- my concern is that Trunk or Adder sneaking in the tent -- which nation or nations nearby will be next. Anyone want to bet there won't be a 'next?'We'll see, having been to Africa with SF (enjoying the interplay between Black SF troops and Africans... ) and also as an Eighty-deuce type and knowing a lot about US force mentality and a teeny bit about African fighter and governance mentality, I hope you're right but strongly suspect you aren't. Either way I hope the best for the Troops. We can agree on that one item.Like any mission, it can go bad in a number of ways. You have to weigh the potential risks against the potential benefits, but I think they're correctly calculated and wish the combined effort success.
Postd by Ken,
I respectfully disagree, and I recall when working for USEUCOM (before AFRICOM formed) it was a challenge to get any support from European countries to support peace operations and capacity building throughout Africa. The UK and France (most recently in the Ivory Coast) have intervened effectively (and occassionally ineffectively as we did in Somalia), but to claim they're doing more in Africa than we are is a bit of a reach. I recall the French Garrisons in a West African country, and they didn't do anything for that nation, and the locals hated them because of their arrogance. Presence alone does not equate to action. No European nation to my knowledge has invested in Africa like we have with the ACRI and ACOTA programs, then the follow on post 9/11 programs. Please point out where they have? With the recent exception of Libya what has Italy done militarily in Africa that wasn't self serving?Unnecessary and incorrect slap at Europe who have intervened in Africa -- correctly; those are their former colonies -- far more than have we. The French virtually keep forces in several areas, the Brits do not stay but they do not hesitate to go when needed. Even the Belgiques, Italians and Portuguese have been and are more involved than the US.
Any person that thinks mindless murder on a mass scale and recruiting kids into a militia may be a morally bankrupt practice may consider this a crisis of conscience. True we ignored the slaughter in Rwanda (that the French helped enable) and it didn't touch our shores, but it did leave many authorities wondering if ignoring the crisis was the right decision. President Bush made the statement that there would be no Rwanda's on his watch. President Clinton intervened in Bosnia, and then Kosovo (slowly and largely after the mass murder and mass migrations). We can debate whether it is right or wrong to commit U.S. troops and finally come to an agreement or respectfully disagree, but in this case Congress did debate it and agreed we should.You and the President may call it a crisis of conscience but I beg to differ with both of you. Whose conscience
I worked in West and North Africa, I haven't been to Central Africa, but I have seen the dynamic between U.S. black SF troops and locales and since they were high caliber soldiers they were respected. I didn't see or sense any hostility, but I suspect if you bring in young, undisciplined straight leg U.S. black soldiers that still project the inner city behavior they'll quickly be put on notice. Black Africans are embarrassed by that type of behavior just as Italians are embarrassed by our the U.S. reality show on Italian-Americans in NJ.
Since I am not a member of the National Security Staff, I borrow what others have written.Could you go into a bit of detail about that intertwining of interests? What, specifically, are our interests in Africa?
From the Congressional Research Papers:
The focus throughout the document was on partnerships, and if we're going to be a partner then that means occassionally committing ourselves as a partner (a two way street).The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002 reflected a need for a more focused strategic approach toward the continent: “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror.” To
address these challenges, the document asserted that U.S. security strategy must focus on building indigenous security and intelligence capabilities through bilateral engagement and “coalitions of the willing.” The 2006 National Security Strategy went further, identifying Africa as “a high
priority” and “recogniz(ing) that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.”
President Obama has affirmed his view of Africa’s strategic importance in numerous policy documents and public statements. In a speech in Ghana in July 2009, he said,
When there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems, they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response.... And let me be clear: our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold on the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa, and the world
In 1998 Ms Rice gave a talk explaining our interests there that are still relevant. Much more at the sight, but I included one paragraph where I think she addressed your concerns.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/rice4.htm
Some may point to these cowardly terrorist attacks as evidence of
Africa's fragility. When viewed in light of recent conflict in the Horn
of Africa, Congo, and Angola, cynics argue that the U.S. ought to give
up on Africa or, rather, never give it a chance. Recurrent instability
has led a number of commentators to conclude rather hastily that the so-
called "African Renaissance" has been a hallucination. Others maintain
we are witnessing the "birth-pains" of a new Africa.First, as one of our two major policy goals, we must work in concert
with Africans to combat the many transnational security threats that
emanate from Africa just as they do from the rest of the world. These
include not only terrorism but weapons proliferation, narcotics flows,
the growing influence of rogue states, international crime,
environmental degradation, and disease.No we're not in the Cold War, but we all are competing for market and natural resources, so access remains a national interest. I wouldn't label it a critical national interest, but still important, and committing a couple hundred SF troops is hardly a huge commitment. Again we're not trying to overthrow a government or anything near as ambitious as that, but simply give the regional security forces some additional capabilities to finish off the LRA. It may or may not work, but we don't own the problem, the regional nations do, so in the end we can pack up and go home if we're not effective in helping them. This isn't the same as sending the 82d and then ending up with a we can't pull out now or we'll look like we lost (as we did in Somalia).we must press ahead to achieve our second principal
policy goal in Africa; that is, accelerating Africa's full integration
into the global economy. Increasingly, the U.S. economy is fueled by
exports.
Posted by Ken,
I agree we over inflated and over responded to the AQ threat, but it is a threat, we know that to be a fact from the 9/11 attacks and the attacks on the USS Cole and our Embassies prior to 9/11. In regards to the same government well I can't argue that one, and if this fails it will likely be due to dumb decisions coming out of D.C.I, OTOH, hope we are not so myopic as to believe that AQ is a threat, not just simply the annoyance it is; and that we are not so myopic as to believe that the same forces involved in Afghanistan and Iraq when employed by the same government elsewhere are not subject to reinvent a few wheels subject to get mired in local ruts
As long as it is small scale and we remain largely in a supporting role I hope there is a next. This is simply DIME playing out in a smarter way than it did in OIF or OEF-A.I'm not all that concerned about Uganda -- my concern is that Trunk or Adder sneaking in the tent -- which nation or nations nearby will be next. Anyone want to bet there won't be a 'next?'
I already know none of my arguments have changed your mind, and as always I respect your opinion on these important issues. There were two primary reasons I wrote "I'm glad to see this happening for a number of reasons" on the first post.
First, I hope we don't enter a post Vietnam and post Somalia period where we're paralyzed by the failures of those missions (and now OIF and OEF-A) to the extent we don't intervene when we should.
Two, this is a feasible mission and IAW our doctrine prior to 9/11 that "may" intelligently synchronize the elements of national power to achieve the desired ends. SF will play a small but critical supporting role, with State Department in the lead.
I'm standing by for my punishment now
I said 'have' -- past tense. I acknowledge we're catching up net mission quantity wise even if most are Flintlock like efforts instead of killing bad guys.They're FRENCH, whaddya expect...I recall the French Garrisons in a West African country, and they didn't do anything for that nation, and the locals hated them because of their arrogance.No, presence dose not equate to action -- but it does add significantly to knowledge and capability for action. No, they have not invested like we have because they do not spend money as prolifically (note I resisted the desire to say 'stupidly') as we do, thus, as you know I can't point out that they have done 'more.' I can point out they have more commercial interests there than we do and they have former colonial ties (good and bad in that).Presence alone does not equate to action. No European nation to my knowledge has invested in Africa like we have with the ACRI and ACOTA programs, then the follow on post 9/11 programs. Please point out where they have?What has any European nation or the US -- or China -- done there that wasn't self serving? That's what it's all about. And the Africans are quite aware of that.With the recent exception of Libya what has Italy done militarily in Africa that wasn't self serving?Probably so; my problem is not how one gets from such a crisis to a responsibility to act, it is that what action is taken be intelligent and not a misstep.Any person that thinks mindless murder on a mass scale and recruiting kids into a militia may be a morally bankrupt practice may consider this a crisis of conscience.Congress agreed with all the interventions, including that in Iraq with which you disagree so I'm unsure that's a plus. My problem with 'humanitarian intervention' of the types you cite is that such efforts generally do more harm than good to the afflicted; they are terribly expensive in ALL aspects; they rarely achieve the nominally desired results and they tend to last for years -- they provide little or no benefit to the US except to make some people feel good. That is essentialy true for all those you named...True we ignored the slaughter in Rwanda ...President Bush made the statement that there would be no Rwanda's on his watch...President Clinton intervened in Bosnia, and then Kosovo (slowly and largely after the mass murder and mass migrations). We can debate whether it is right or wrong to commit U.S. troops and finally come to an agreement or respectfully disagree, but in this case Congress did debate it and agreed we should.They were -- but they in my observation were respected for their military quality and that overcame the fact that they were Black but not African. On rare occasions when they attempted to blend, it almost invariably failed.I worked in West and North Africa, I haven't been to Central Africa, but I have seen the dynamic between U.S. black SF troops and locales and since they were high caliber soldiers they were respected.Nor did I. Neither did I see any more or less acceptance than was accorded white guys or hispanics.I didn't see or sense any hostility.No disrespect to you but bunches to the National Security Staff, State and Congressional types who I think mean well but based on performance, I consider to be broadly inept and caught up in archaic thinking.Since I am not a member of the National Security Staff, I borrow what others have written.I acknowledge that some see it as being important and accept that it can be so considered, further agree that while an interest, it is not critical and that small SF commitment is tolerable. I do note that escalation is still occurring -- the Admin said 100, you say a couple of hundred...No we're not in the Cold War, but we all are competing for market and natural resources, so access remains a national interest. I wouldn't label it a critical national interest, but still important, and committing a couple hundred SF troops is hardly a huge commitment.
That's my concern. Growth. The 'system' will demand it...And what will that quitting and taking our marbles home do for our influence thereabouts? I do agree it is THEIR problem and I have no problems helping them work on it; the issue is how to help and a failed mission will not do our street cred a lot of good. The AO is a mess in all aspects with little to no infrastructure and we're sending a bunch of suburban dwellers who are well enough trained but are used to comforts of a sort and who do not know the terrain or the people on a short tour. I further suspect that the leaders of the incoming troops may not pay as much attention to the guys who have been there for a while as they probably should -- we're bad about that. Hopefully, it'll work out....we don't own the problem, the regional nations do, so in the end we can pack up and go home if we're not effective in helping them.I suspect tha had the 82d been sent to Somalia instead of all the folks who were, it might have ended differently. One of the more embarrassing days of my life was the day after that debacle when a Somali militia honcho was quoted in the NYT speaking of the Unit and 3d Ranger; "They did the same thing six times. Tactically you never do the same thing twice..."This isn't the same as sending the 82d and then ending up with a we can't pull out now or we'll look like we lost (as we did in Somalia).Often the case but not usually solely to blame. See Somalia example.In regards to the same government well I can't argue that one, and if this fails it will likely be due to dumb decisions coming out of D.C.It won't; we won't; and I hope not because we'll screw it up -- and that's from Ken, the incurable optimist.As long as it is small scale and we remain largely in a supporting role I hope there is a next. This is simply DIME playing out in a smarter way than it did in OIF or OEF-A.That's the question -- when we should...I have no problem with interventions that make sense, I have a big problem with stupidity and dumb forays against Windmills.First, I hope we don't enter a post Vietnam and post Somalia period where we're paralyzed by the failures of those missions (and now OIF and OEF-A) to the extent we don't intervene when we should.Yep, it is and hopefully State will in fact be in the lead. Yet again, I'm not that concerned with this mission -- I'm concerned with what will follow this mission. Mark my words, there will more and worse...Two, this is a feasible mission and IAW our doctrine prior to 9/11 that "may" intelligently synchronize the elements of national power to achieve the desired ends. SF will play a small but critical supporting role, with State Department in the lead.
One last trio of questions, though. This: "...intelligently synchronize the elements of national power to achieve the desired ends..." sounds good, great even. What's it really mean? What are those elements of national power? What, in fact, are the desired ends?
My biggest concern? We are focused on a "threat" rather than a "problem." Intel driven strategy. Foolish.
When our senior civil and military officials can talk about Uganda in terms of problems then my inner alarm will likely stop ringing. This is a country with a history of colonial disruption, a country divided north and south by two major ethnic groups, a country that has recently been deemed to be sitting on vast amounts of oil, a country with a "president" who rose to power in '86 as the leader of the Coup, and who recently was extended for another long term in an election that drew cries of manipulation and corruption....
Bottom line, there are a lot of factors in play, and I will engage with my Africa-smart people to learn more about these factors so that I can offer an alternative voice to those who talk only in terms of "threats." I suspect there is probably an oil company or two who are very interested in the greater stability of keeping the same leader in power and reducing those who attempt to challenge him violently, and that those companies are doing some serious lobbying in Washington.
As is often the case, the US does not fight for oil, we fight for favorable distributions of oil profits. Uganda, like all oil producing countries will produce oil and sell it into the global market no matter what. Who profits most is always the critical issue that is fought over. Also, as is often the case, we thinly wrap such true motivations in terms of "liberty" or "democracy" or "human rights." That is a line that is losing it's luster. At least that is what Smedley Butler thought as he looked back at his long career of such service.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
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