Small War on Basilan (catch all)

[Dayuhan]

Yes, JSOTF-P has made a marked influence on HOW the security forces of the Philippines engage the general populace that they encounter in the course of their duties in a very positive way. The reason this is creating what is likely an enduring effect is because the security forces have been pleasantly surprised that by treating the populace with respect and dignity and by infusing greater justice into their implementation of the rule of law they encounter far less violence directed against them.

Interesting, though, that this supposed attitude change doesn't seem to be reflected in other parts of the country, even where troops have moved in that were previously stationed in Basilan and Jolo. Obviously we won't know whether there's been a long-term change until we leave, but I'm a good deal less optimistic than some. We'll see.

So, in about 300 years this should have spread and elevated up to where it actually has an impact on the primary source of the problem up in Manila...

We delude ourselves with unsubstantiated theories of "bottom up" legitimacy and good governance. The anti-bodies projected downward from the central governance (that we too often refuse to engage at the strategic - policy level) prevent any true change from occurring.

As Dayuhan often, and accurately points out, it is the elite, the landowner caste, etc who project and sustain the system that promotes so much discontent, not the government. Same was true in the American South. It was not the federal government that was oppressing the African American populace, it was an overall accepted culture of oppression, primarily projected from local level officials, business, etc. But it was by implementing change at the very top and enforcing those changes throughout the system that put us on the path toward stability.

What I think you're missing here is that the local elites control the Manila government. They dominate the legislature and virtually everyone in the executive and judicial branches has their roots in that class. They're good at talking about reform, making a gesture here and there, and making very sure that any program threatening their power never gets off the ground. They also tend to stick together. Once in a while someone will become a liability and be tossed to the sharks, but for the most part they close ranks against any effort to diminish their power or bring them within the rule of law. They're generally pretty effective at it.

I think in the case of the American south you may be glossing over some things. The moves from the top didn't emerge from a vacuum and they weren't initiated from the top. They were a response to a whole lot of agitation from Americans who found that old order unacceptable. The moves came from the top, but they came because of pressure from the bottom.

One thing that makes the southern Philippines insurgency so intractable is that the majority populace lines up strongly on the side of an aggressive, repressive military response. If anything the Government is more inclined toward accommodation. The majority populace doesn't want to talk about root causes, they want to crush the rebellion and beat the rebel populace into submission.

Too bad we have a policy of no true engagement at that level for fear that those governments will not support perceptions of US interests that are the true reason for our presence in the first place. Those interests having very little to do with nationalist insurgencies in either case. Until then, we keep sending out the troops to mitigate the symptoms at the bottom, and attempt to convince ourselves that we are actually addressing the true problem and producing enduring good for the affected populaces and nations of such engagement. There is little evidence of that being the case.

Again, I don't think any level of US engagement is going to matter much. It's really not about us.