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Thread: The US & others working with Pakistan

  1. #401
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    Default Pakistan edges closer to victory..

    We will redefine "Pyrrhic victory"...http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/10/...er-to-victory/
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-26-2011 at 09:18 AM. Reason: Link changed at author's request

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Pressure on, pressure off: smoke signals

    Hat tip to Circling The Lion's Den for:
    Pakistan and the United States have patched up some of their differences. US Defence contractor ITT is to supply 18 hi-tech electronic warfare pods for Pakistan's fleet of F-16 fighter aircraft at a cost of $49 million. The ALQ-211(v)9 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare (AIDEWS) pods provide digital radar warning, high-power jamming, threat geolocation and situational awareness to the aircraft via a pod that is attached beneath the aircraft.
    Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....6-upgrade.html

    hat tip tp Watandost under the headline 'Secretary Clinton's Message to Pakistan: Help us Negotiate with Taliban and Haqqani Group', citing a Bloomberg report on her high-powered delegation visit to Islamabad:http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1...nsurgents.html

    Curiously the BBC will screen a documentary tonight, with Bruce Reidel interviewed, on Pakistan's alleged complicity with the Taliban and the link is to the supporting article:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15445047
    davidbfpo

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    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    No David. Nothing fundamental has changed. They still give us a story, and we still buy it.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Obviously I have very limited insight into the people at the american end of this "transactional relationship" (somehow that term seems to conjure an image of Elliot Spitzer and his emperor's club account) but I think at the Pakistani end its now a strange combination of stubborn determination to carry the game through to "victory" and absolute terror at the thought that we might be about to win...all overlaid (or undergirded..pick your metaphor) by an overwhelming need to get through this week and this month and God will take care of the future.
    In other words, they are no less confused and crazy than the Americans seem to be. Sure, they are not going to drop their "strategic assets" this late in the game ("sunk costs fallacy" also applies), but they ARE at war with many of the assets.
    No one is winning.
    My comment in the link above was: I think pakistani patriots (especially the Imran Khan variety of burger-jihadis, Guccis and paknationalists) are all caught up in the excitement of whether the glorious ISI is going to outwit the big bad Americans or not. My view is that whether America stays or goes or does any other stupid thing, it is Pakistan that has an unresolved problem and that problem is not going away. That problem is the existence in Pakistan of the Jihadi network and its supporters in the establishment. This network is not at the disposal of “secular” morons like Musharraf, to play games with and then bottle up whenever its not needed. And it is not compatible with peaceful coexistence with ANY of our neighbors (India is an obvious case, but so is Afghanistan, and so is Iran and even China). Whether America pulls out this way or that way, that network will have to be brought under control and there is no way to do that without exchanging bombs and bullets with those people. As Bhadrakumar points out, the Pak army may have bitten off more than it can chew here.
    I think they would have done better to actually work WITH the Americans and the Northern alliance and even India. Instead, they have spent ten years sabotaging the American invasion of Afghanistan and now they are in danger of winning (http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/09/29/what-if-we-win/_)

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    Default Interesting programme on BBC

    The BBC aired Part 1 of their documentary on Secret Pakistan. Most of this stuff was open source for ages and common knowledge to most but it was nice to see it addressed on public media.

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    Jemima Khan donates cameras to Pak tribal leaders to record damage done by US drones

    http://truthdive.com/2011/10/27/Jemi...US-drones.html

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    Quote Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii View Post
    The BBC aired Part 1 of their documentary on Secret Pakistan. Most of this stuff was open source for ages and common knowledge to most but it was nice to see it addressed on public media.
    Indeed. From my very limited view it seems as if many in the Paktisani elite are trying to play a refined and complicated piece of Realpolitik for perceived Paktistani interests and against an ever present foe, but turn a blind eye to current threads and opportunities and their implications for their countries future.

    So they may have played the USA like a fiddle and felt great during all the time, but they might have erred on their way a bit too close to the path of a certain Nero, ignoring the flames burning close by.
    Last edited by Firn; 10-28-2011 at 04:02 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Firn View Post
    Indeed. From my very limited view it seems as if many in the Paktisani elite are trying to play a refined and complicated piece of Realpolitik for perceived Paktistani interests and against an ever present foe, but turn a blind eye to current threads and opportunities and their implications for their countries future.

    So they may have played the USA like a fiddle and felt great during all the time, but they might have erred on their way a bit too close to the path of a certain Nero, ignoring the flames burning close by.
    Indeed!
    and I am happy to see that some foreigners are starting to get it. The Pakistani deep state is trying its best to kill Pakistan in their quest to save Pakistan. Its really sad.
    I think partition was a horrendous mistake (or an evil act..mistake is less judgmental, so maybe too mild a term) but with the second partition, Pakistan is now a viable geographic entity in itself. Due to the fact that subnationalities, neighbors and interested faraway powers will never be able to agree on how to carve it up and everyone is afraid of the chaos that may follow, I also expect others to work hard to keep it in one piece..for now.
    I also think its survival will become more pleasant if the border with India becomes a softer border, with mutual peaceful trade and travel, but most paknationalists and many Indian nationalists disagree.
    I also think that the version of identity and national interest currently promoted in Pakistan by the deep state (I am not referring to various versions any of us may hold on our own or in our small liberal/Gucci/westoxicated groups) is dangerous, is incompatible with peace in the region, and is an invitation to various parties (including relatively powerful ones like the USA and NATO) to try and pressurize or even undermine Pakistan because it is so genuinely dangerous and threatening. So I think that this paknationalism (you can see it in full flower at websites linked to the Pak army, like paknationalists.com or rupeenews.com) is going to have to be given up…one way or the other. With “one way” being less painful than “the other”. Thats a sort of summary of my views.
    But I think whatever our opinion about its desirability, its survival is still more likely than its demise…I think there are real links that hold it together...and the real (and well justified) fear of even its "enemies" that a collapse may be worse than the current headache. Of course, I could be wrong.

  9. #409
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    This recently popped up on Strategy Page, and while I understand it is meant to be a brief analysis, I'm scratching my head a bit at some of it.

    Taliban created in Pakistan? I've thought all along that the Taliban was essentially a manifestation of fundamentalist action taken by Mullah Omar and followers in response to the rampant warlordism that enslaved Afghanistan.

    One blurb does interest me in a positive way though, since I have tried to get it straight in my head for a very long time why ISI has interest in instability within Afghanistan. Does the following quote really boil down its involvement this simply?

    But Haqqani kept his organization separate, and his head down. He carries out terror attacks mainly in eastern Afghanistan. Haqqani has long supported itself via criminal operations (extortion, robbery, kidnapping) and handouts from the Pakistani government. The ISI supports Haqqani because they see this group as a potential tool in gaining more control over Afghan tribes, and the Afghan government. The Pakistanis also rely on Haqqani for terrorist training (of terrorists willing to serve ISI.)
    -------------------------------
    http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htt.../20111026.aspx

    October 26, 2011: If there were no foreign troops in Afghanistan, the Islamic terrorists would still be there. We have Pakistan to thank for this, which started down the road of Islamic radicalism in the 1950s, when the government changed the nation's name from Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Then, in the 1970s, the Pakistani government, or at least the group of generals that were running the place at the time, decided to adopt Islamic terrorism as an official state policy, and aim it at India. In the 1980s, Pakistan launched this new weapon at the Russian troops who had invaded Afghanistan. After that was over in 1988, warlords, the nominal (communist) government in Kabul and Islamic radical groups went to war with each other, to decide who would rule the country. That was a stalemate, so in the 1994, to create an Islamic radical coalition and unite the Afghanistan with a government friendly to Pakistan, the Taliban was invented (by Pakistan, in Pakistan) and sent in to take control. That never quite worked out, as when the Americans invaded in late 2001, the Taliban were still trying to defeat non-Pushtun (the Taliban were basically Pushtun) tribes in the north.

    The U.S. was mainly interested in destroying al Qaeda (which had organized the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S.). By 2011, the U.S. believed that al Qaeda was fading fast in Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially since the death of leader Osama bin Laden last May. An ally of al Qaeda in Pakistan, the Haqqani Network, was now seen as a larger threat, especially in Afghanistan. Based in North Waziristan (and adjacent areas). Haqqani has been at it for over two decades, and has long worked with Pakistani intelligence (ISI). Haqqani has been discreet, where the Taliban have not, and this has earned the group a measure of respect from Pakistani politicians and military commanders. Haqqani does not carry out terror attacks in Pakistan.

    The Haqqani Network takes advantage of the fact that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (sometimes called the Durand Line) is only semi-official. That's because it was established in 1893, between the British colonial government in India, and the Amir (Islamic king) of Afghanistan. It was not meant to be a border, just a way of determining where the British and the Afghans would not carry out military operations. The Pushtun tribes divided by the Durand line were free to cross, and there was no real border patrol or guard. When formal border guards were established, by the new government of Pakistan in the late 1940s, it was applied lightly, as the local tribes did not, and many still do not, recognize the border. The Haqqani Network took advantage of this to establish bases in Pakistan, and friendly relations with local tribes. This enabled Haqqani to move terrorists and weapons into Afghanistan and carry out attacks. When pursued, all the Haqqani men had to do was get across the old Durand Line, and they were safe. With the CIA UAVs overhead now, that safety is no longer assured.

    The Haqqani Network is led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, an Afghan from the eastern part of the country. He is now in his 60s, and runs a tight ship. He was a major warlord during the 1980s war with the Soviets, and a major player in the civil war that broke out after the Soviets left in 1989. But he quickly saw the power of the Taliban (being an Islamic conservative himself), and joined the Taliban shortly after he encountered them. But Haqqani kept his organization separate, and his head down. He carries out terror attacks mainly in eastern Afghanistan. Haqqani has long supported itself via criminal operations (extortion, robbery, kidnapping) and handouts from the Pakistani government. The ISI supports Haqqani because they see this group as a potential tool in gaining more control over Afghan tribes, and the Afghan government. The Pakistanis also rely on Haqqani for terrorist training (of terrorists willing to serve ISI.)

    Haqqani has over 5,000 men under arms (but many are part-time fighters) and several hundred suicide bombers in training or ready to go. Haqqani can call on over 20,000 armed tribesmen in North Waziristan and adjacent areas. Again, these are largely part-timers, and have to be convinced to gather and fight. A threatened Pakistani Army invasion of North Waziristan would be convincing, and that has kept the Pakistani soldiers out so far. The only government forces in the area are the Frontier Constabulary, a border guard recruited from the local tribes. These guys guard the Afghan border in North Waziristan, but have an understanding with Haqqani men sneaking into or out of Afghanistan; they leave them alone. The Haqqani gunmen return the favor.

    Despite protests from the Pakistanis, the U.S. has increased its use of missile armed UAVs to hunt down and kill terrorist leaders. These missile (mainly Hellfire) attacks have already killed or wounded several members of the Haqqani clan, and that will apparently increase. The Pakistanis want only al Qaeda and Taliban leaders attacked, because these two groups have been launching a growing number of terror attacks in Pakistan. But Haqqani has behaved itself, and Pakistan (at least the army and ISI) wants to keep it that way. But Haqqani also allows al Qaeda to use Haqqani facilities (camps, safe houses and so on). This doesn't bother the Pakistanis much, but the U.S. and Afghanistan are not happy with all the terrorism Haqqani sponsors and carries out Afghanistan. So Haqqani leaders are going to be seeing more Hellfire missiles up close and personal. Pakistan denies any knowledge or complicity with Haqqani terrorism.

    The terrorist losses from these attacks have been severe, and include heads of operations, finance and intelligence. Many of the mid-level commanders were bomb making, and terror attack experts. These losses caused additional casualties as less skilled bomb makers died when their imperfect devices blew up while under construction. New bomb makers have been less successful because of poor instruction. The loss of operations commanders meant operatives were less effectively deployed, and more easily caught or killed. The damage to their intelligence operations meant there was less success in general, especially against the growing American informant network on the ground. The financial leadership losses have meant less income, and more reliance on stealing from locals, which makes the terror groups even more unpopular.

    Pakistan cannot openly complain about all this, because it's no secret that Haqqani have long been operating a terrorism training operation, and carrying out attacks against real or imagined enemies. But Pakistan does continue to protect Haqqani any way it can. That includes keeping troops out of North Waziristan, and tipping off Haqqani about any American operations the ISI is able to get wind of. Normally, the U.S. tells ISI nothing about anti-terrorist operations. But ISI is, after all, an intelligence organizations, and has spies in Afghanistan, keeping an eye on the Americans and always seeking closely held information on operations against Haqqani.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-29-2011 at 09:42 PM. Reason: Place text in quotes

  10. #410
    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    Taliban created in Pakistan? I've thought all along that the Taliban was essentially a manifestation of fundamentalist action taken by Mullah Omar and followers in response to the rampant warlordism that enslaved Afghanistan.
    Do you think it would be fair to say, that is what got them started, but a lot of what has kept them going is the Pak Army/ISI?
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    I scratch my head at that as well, because it would seem to be a smarter choice to just work with the official Afghanistan government, instead of opting to continue to foment chaos, terror, and instability.

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    That would seem to make sense but as Omar keeps pointing out, little that the Pak Army/ISI does makes sense in the long run. There is an ideological component there too perhaps.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    The discussion at this link may help to clarify my point of view and what I think is the background to Pakistan's unusual ideological position: http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/07/...rter-polities/

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    Lot of coverage today about the so-called "anti-American" rally by Imran Khan. My comments at: http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/10/...ut-imran-khan/

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default The origins of the Taliban?

    Jon,

    I understand your puzzlement at the origins of the Taliban. Wikipedia has this, which I found useful:
    In 1991, the Taliban (a movement originating from Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-run religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan) also developed in Afghanistan as a politico-religious force, reportedly in opposition to the tyranny of the local governor.[26] Mullah Omar started his movement with fewer than 50 armed madrassah students in his hometown of Kandahar.[26] The most credible and often-repeated story of how Mullah Omar first mobilized his followers is that in the spring of 1994, neighbors in Singesar told him that the local governor had abducted two teenage girls, shaved their heads, and taken them to a camp where they were raped repeatedly. 30 Taliban (with only 16 rifles) freed the girls, and hanged the governor from the barrel of a tank. Later that year, two militia commanders killed civilians while fighting for the right to sodomize a young boy. The Taliban freed him.[26][27]

    The Taliban's first major military activity was in 1994, when they marched northward from Maiwand and captured Kandahar City and the surrounding provinces, losing only a few dozen men.[28] When they took control of Kandahar in 1994, they forced the surrender of dozens of local Pashtun leaders who had presided over a situation of complete lawlessness and atrocities.[28][29] The Taliban also took-over a border crossing at Spin Baldak and an ammunition dump from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In the course of 1994, the Taliban took control of 12 of 34 provinces not under central government control, disarming the "heavily armed population". Militias controlling the different areas often surrendered without a fight.[10]
    Link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taliban

    Now I shall rely on reading a few years ago. Once the new Taliban movement gained traction Pakistan did allow the large-scale movement of willing students from madrassah's and numbers of soldiers / advisers etc.

    What is important to recall is the Afghan tradition of flexible loyalties, limited fighting and negotiation.

    As the Taliban spread across Afghanistan; not just in the north, active opposition dwindled - with the exception notably of Massoud in the Panjhsir Valley - whilst others joined the Taliban and the student numbers dwindled, partly by death. Wikipedia says approx. a third of the regular fighters were Afghans.
    davidbfpo

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    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    The Wikipedia article segment downplays the importance of the Pak Army/ISI in the rise and survival of the Taliban. Ahmed Rashid's "The Taliban" is a highly regarded history of the outfit and according to that book, the Pak Army/ISI's role was critical, without it, they wouldn't be.

    Now of course, they are absolutely dependent upon Pak Army/ISI support.
    Last edited by carl; 10-31-2011 at 01:58 AM.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Absolutely dependent?

    Carl,

    If only!

    Money talks, so the widely assumed income from the increasing heroin production alongside "taxes" should provide internal and external Taliban factions with a degree of independence. The place has plenty of small arms, remember how many disappeared from the ANSF? Most intelligence is locally acquired and given freely or coerced. Training, with a few exceptions is internal; after all they have the tactical skill.

    Where does Pakistani / ISI help fit in? Cadre and technical training. IED improvements (shaped charges allegedly via Iran) and big bombs. Providing sanctuary, subject to discretionary variance.

    Would, no could the Taliban continue to campaign without help from across the Durand Line?

    Yes.

    Now adjust safety helmet, wear fluorescent safety jacket and sit comfortably in your armchair.
    davidbfpo

  18. #418
    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    David:

    I used the phrase "absolutely dependent" intentionally, for they are.

    They have no true independence because all of the bosses for most of the major factions live in Pakistan. If they don't toe the line, the ISI picks them up. And the Haqqanis have been judged by competent people to be a veritable subset of the ISI.

    As far as small arms go, I don't know. The ISAF probably has figures on the origins of weapons captured but I don't know what they are. The small arms are useless without ammunition and I suspect, don't know of course, that after 10 years, most of that comes across the border.

    From what I've read, the Taliban doesn't exhibit tactical skill too frequently.

    People are too quick to dismiss the importance of sanctuary afforded by the Pak Army/ISI to the health, literally of the Taliban. If old man Haqqani, Mullah Omar, and Hekmatyar actually had to live full time in Afghanistan, I don't think they would live so long. A less grand example of the importance of sanctuary is the story last week or the week before in the NYT about Taliban rocketeers firing at American posts from within Pakistan or from inside Afghanistan within yards of the border. They do that because the border inhibits American retaliatory action.

    As you said, the Taliban would continue to campaign if they couldn't count of the Pak Army/ISI for support and sanctuary. However they would constitute only a small fraction of the threat they now pose to the Afghan gov and international forces. So, yes, in order to continue as they are now, they are absolutely dependent upon the Pak Army/ISI.
    Last edited by carl; 10-31-2011 at 02:48 PM.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    The Haqqanis, or the Pak Army/ISI, same difference, just blew a number of Americans to bits in Kabul. Apparently, they weren't nearly as impressed with the Sec. of State, the Chairman of the JCS and the director of the CIA as the blind rats inside the beltway thought they would be.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

  20. #420
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Shame it isn't that simple, Carl...

    You've identified the -- or at least 'a' -- problem. What's your politically acceptable, viable and potentially successful solution?

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