Big picture for me on the subject though--I know your average squad leader or platoon commander patrolling the streets still doesn't know exactly what we're trying to "sell" as our cause or narrative, be it in Iraq, America or globally. Thus we're violating Kilcullen's article #21: Exploit a single narrative. This isn't a good thing when our junior Marines/Soldiers are the ones with the most face time with Iraqis.
Exactly one of my frustrations too, even though I'm a couple of years removed from my second rotation over there. I think that when you look at all the servicemember generated media out there (blogs, message board posts, etc.) you are still going to find a lot of folks who were at the tip of the spear yet still don't have a basic level of respect for the average Iraqi on the street. It is getting a bit more balanced, but when you stop and take a serious look at a few trends, it's ridiculous in some ways.

Take for example the so-called "morale patches" that can be found and discussed at certain tactical forums. One of the recent ones is Arabic lettering stitched in a variety of colors to represent the phrase/word "Infidel". There are contractors and servicemembers who think it's chic to wear the patch in full view, and I saw a post from one Soldier who stated that he only moved the patch when some LNs became agitated. It is beyond me that it even came to that, so yes, we are failing at the single narrative and certainly failing to educate the troops that we are doing something not just because the general/special orders say so, but because it is elemental to success in the fight.

I also think that there is a certain divide that arisen between the various ranks (although I can't point to the exact level of the schism) and echelons of troops. REMF and Fobbits are despised now in much the same way they were in Vietnam, and higher headquarters are equally villified when they generate new fragos. I think it began with the lack of armor for vehicles and Rumsfeld's "Go to war with what you have," comment.

I concur totally that the bottom line may be security and stability, but to many at the tip it might hold the same degree of clarity that 4GW holds for me (absolutely none). Let's add a twist to the line of thought...how much does it matter?

Does a single narrative ensure that the troops take their eyepro off when talking to an Iraqi, and that they hand out sweets rather than throw it to the ground for children to pounce on? Regardless of the single narrative that might try to exploit, is the average Iraqi buying what we are selling?