Syria: a civil war (closed)

[Dayuhan]

If we selfishly put our own interests first (and that is what wise states do, but hopefully with a growing appreciation that now more than ever how the affected populaces feel about those actions matters), we will understand these events in Syria and elsewhere across the region for what they are and understand that there is a tremendous opportunity for the US to reduce the likelihood of Muslim terrorist attacks against the US if we act appropriately.

I'm curious... what action, exactly, would you consider "appropriate", and how would you expect it to "reduce the likelihood of Muslim terrorist attacks against the US"?

[Bob's World]

I'm curious... what action, exactly, would you consider "appropriate", and how would you expect it to "reduce the likelihood of Muslim terrorist attacks against the US"?

In general terms the US must come to grips with the fact that how others in general, and certainly those who live in the Middle East, perceive the US and US foreign policy far differently than the US government and US citizens view the same. That is not to say that either perception is accurate, or that one is better than the other, just to say that they are different. In this business, perceptions matter far more than facts. We need to understand that delta in perception. Agree or disagree, we need to understand and take it serious.

Next the US must shape, project, and nurture the perception that we are not for radical change, nor are we for the blind approval and sustainment of any particular government that we perceive as the best champion of US interests in that particular country. We similarly must not be for the promotion of US values and perceptions on democratic government that we have grown so fond of preaching as "universal" and the only "right" way to do things. Instead the US must simply go on record that we hold no corner on the market for good ideas on how to govern, but that for our own interests we believe that stability in the Middle East is important, and that the artificial stability of strongman regimes is proving to be an obsolete and failing model in the Middle East.

We should publicly encourage populaces to seek peaceful, but powerful (history shows that non-violent approaches to insurgency garner far more international support and are more successful) approaches to advance their concerns; while privately engaging governments to encourage them listen to their people's reasonable demands and to seriously consider the small changes that history shows can produce such dramatic effects in calming populaces in this stage of dissent.

Air strikes and public condemnations are not the best way to move these issues forward in a manner that also repairs public perceptions of the US in the process. Neither are invasions to change regimes, or train and equip programs that turn governmental thugs into more effective governmental thugs. We cling to the status quo for fear of the future. It is time for the US to rely less on the boldness of our military, and to seek instead bold efforts at private diplomacy.

The keys for the US are stability in the region and a repaired reputation. Any effort dedicated equally to both is better than any effort that ignores one for the other.

[davidbfpo]

Dayuhan,

You asked Bob a question:

I'm curious... what action, exactly, would you consider "appropriate", and how would you expect it to "reduce the likelihood of Muslim terrorist attacks against the US"?

Bob has given his strategic viewpoint, much of which is dependent on perceptions in the Middle East IMHO.

Jumping into the discussion, can I answer the second part first? The hard core Jihadist is not the target here. It is those who adapting Bob's words far back are angry about US / Western / national policy and the currently seen future and doing our best to stop them becoming motivated too. IIRC we touched upon this in the thread after OBL's demise - the possibility that the Jihad's external legitimacy was reducing and so fewer would join up. If more people say 'No' that will have little impact, if more people say 'No and I will oppose you' that is significant. Opposition may include street protests against outrages, as seen in Spain over ETA after individuals were murdered.

Such an overt public stance and a covert stance by the public, say within the family will reduce in my opinion the likelihood of attacks.

It is interesting to note, the victor's media hype allowed for, the gratitude shown in Libya for NATO's help in national liberation. As Libya enters a new period it will be interesting to see if any Libyans go join the AQ Jihad.

Small things matter; such as issuing visas, as those stories spread and rarely with any explanation why there is a delay or refusal.

[carl]

I wonder if some of those SA-24s that went walkabout from Libya might not show up in Syria. There probably isn't a group with greater immediate need than the Syrian protesters/rebels who want to fight it out.

[Dayuhan]

We should publicly encourage populaces to seek peaceful, but powerful (history shows that non-violent approaches to insurgency garner far more international support and are more successful) approaches to advance their concerns

Non-violent approaches succeed because they typically emerge and grow when despotic governments no longer have the capacity or will to use coercive force against them. What happens when you encourage non-violent resistance against governments that still have the capacity and will to violently suppress resistance, and the people doing the resisting start getting shot, as in Syria? If you don't back them up, that's the last time anyone will ever listen to your encouragement. But does our populace have the will to get involved in other people's rebellions?

If we're going to "encourage" non-violent resistance, are we going to take responsibility for the consequences if people do what we're encouraging them to do?

while privately engaging governments to encourage them listen to their people's reasonable demands and to seriously consider the small changes that history shows can produce such dramatic effects in calming populaces in this stage of dissent.

What sort of "small changes", exactly, do you have in mind?

I don't see any point in "encouraging" actions if we haven't got tangible carrot-and-stick influence to back up the encouragement. Without that it's just words and it accomplishes nothing.

It all sounds very good when portrayed in the most general sense, but I can't see how you propose to translate it into specific policies and specific actions.

[Bob's World]

Non-violent approaches succeed because they typically emerge and grow when despotic governments no longer have the capacity or will to use coercive force against them. What happens when you encourage non-violent resistance against governments that still have the capacity and will to violently suppress resistance, and the people doing the resisting start getting shot, as in Syria? If you don't back them up, that's the last time anyone will ever listen to your encouragement. But does our populace have the will to get involved in other people's rebellions?

If we're going to "encourage" non-violent resistance, are we going to take responsibility for the consequences if people do what we're encouraging them to do?



What sort of "small changes", exactly, do you have in mind?

I don't see any point in "encouraging" actions if we haven't got tangible carrot-and-stick influence to back up the encouragement. Without that it's just words and it accomplishes nothing.

It all sounds very good when portrayed in the most general sense, but I can't see how you propose to translate it into specific policies and specific actions.

As I recall, the US had plenty of capacity when Dr. King applied non-Violence in the US; same as to the Brits in India and the Soviets in Eastern Europe. Your facts are either flawed, or you are allowing yourself to be confined by definitions of insurgency that only focus on the violent guerrilla warfare phase/tactics.

Even violent insurgencies often have their greatest success when they shift to non-violent tactics.

As to US influence, reports of our demise are greatly exaggerated. The US has TONS of influence. Granted, we'd have more if we squandered less, but to keep posting that we have no influence and that none of these leaders in the Middle East care what we think or do is simply groundless opinion. Now, as I say, we do need to change our approaches and apply our influence in more productive ways. Silly sanctions like we levied against Iraq, and now against Iran serve more to alienate populaces and strengthen despots than to produce the effects we hope for. Shouting at despots to step down from a bully pulpit in DC surely does more to steel their resolve. Sitting on our hands as Assad slaughters his populace and threatens to slaughter more if anyone interferes (can't help picturing the scene in Blazing Saddles where the Sheriff takes himself hostage...) sure offers great hope to the Saudis that they will have free license to come down hard when their populace attempts to take actions to the next level as well. Do not judge our influence by our poor application of it in recent years.

As to "taking responsibility for the consequences" of encouraging peaceful tactics, are you serious? It is not like we are calling for them to storm the Bastille and promising fire support and then not providing it at the last minute. We need make no such promises of direct support at all, even a promise of moral support and a willingness to work with whatever government might emerge is better than our our current course of "wait and see."

You make a couple of dangerous underestimations:

1. That of the power, will and influence of the U.S.;

2. That of the power, will and influence of an oppressed populace.

Others have made these same flawed assessments, and have not faired well for doing so.

[carl]

Mr. Jones:

Aren't you buttressing Dayuhan's argument when you use examples such as the US gov, the British Gov and the Soviets of the late 80s? Citing the actions of two liberal democracies and a tired out, broke tyranny don't make your case very well. Your formula applied to a really tough place like North Korea is a recipe for mass suicide.

[Bob's World]

Mr. Jones:

Aren't you buttressing Dayuhan's argument when you use examples such as the US gov, the British Gov and the Soviets of the late 80s? Citing the actions of two liberal democracies and a tired out, broke tyranny don't make your case very well. Your formula applied to a really tough place like North Korea is a recipe for mass suicide.

No, his comment as I understood it was that non-violent approaches to insurgency only work where the government lacks the capacity to counter effectively with violence to force their will. The reality is that governments with tremendous physical capacity to counter insurgency have and will react to non-violent approaches.

For one, it is much easier to justify the use of state violence against the populace when the populace employs violence against the state first. Violent insurgents do not garner much support at home or abroad compared to non-violent insurgents.

Another important factor is that when faced with non-violence the government finds it easier to compromise without losing face. There is not "we lost the war so must submit"; but rather the ability to simply concede that they were wrong, make adjustments and move forward.

The Soviets had all the capacity in the world to turn Eastern Europe into a slaughterhouse, yet thankfully made the decision not to resist. That was not the most likely decision by a long shot. Presumably Mr Gorbachev determined that the costs (of all types) were not worth the benefits of maintaining the status quo. Certainly when I talk to Brits it was very much a cost/benefit analysis that drove their decision process in compressing the Empire and creating the Common Wealth.

Bottom line is that the employment of violent tactics by either the state or the populace is a choice, and does not define insurgency. Once one side goes violent it is hard for the other to avoid, but certainly for the populace it lends a credibility to their agenda that creates far greater challenges to most states than acts of violence do.

[carl]

But didn't Dayuhan's comment talk about no longer having the capacity OR the will? If the despotic government doesn't have the will to shoot people down in the street, their physical capability doesn't matter. The Soviets didn't have the will in the late 80s but they had it in the decades prior. Liberal democracies in the 20th century never showed much will to shoot down people in the streets. The Kim family in North Korea has the will and any resistance there of any kind will get you killed.

[Bob's World]

We like to throw that "Lack the will" phrase around lately when others don't act that the way we'd like them to. Kind of like playground taunting, questioning one's courage to act. Fact is that most state are fairly pragmatic and do what they think will be best for them in the long run if they can get away with it. Simple Cost/Benefit analysis. Violence is only one way to raise the "costs" for a state. Populaces have options, and smart populaces employ those options. Perhaps they convince the state of additional future benefits of changing, or they leverage other types of costs in form of reputation, productivity, etc.

Most of us go through our daily business and rarely consider "resort to violence" as our go to move when confronted with a problem. Some states fall into that role, and many insurgent movements do as well. There are usually options, and violence is usually a choice. Not always, but usually. The facts are there for those who care to do 5 minutes of research, but those populaces who ultimately adopt non-violent tactics are the ones who have been the most successful in attaining their goals in getting a government to evolve that has shut off all legal options for evoking such change.

[carl]

I don't understand. Are you dismissing the importance of "will", i.e. the willingness of a regime to violently kill people when confronted with resistance as a factor in determining whether non-violent attempts by the populace to change the regime or policies of the regime will work? I don't think you can do that. What most people or regimes will do is not important when trying to determine what a particular regime will do. If a particular regime is quite willing to cut 'em all down and not give a fig about what the world thinks, that makes a real difference as to whether a non-violent approach will work.

You are too casual when saying things like "Populaces have options...". Some have no options at all. That is why I keep bringing up North Korea. What are their options, other than conform or die?

[Bob's World]

Not dismissing will, merely noting that it is an overplayed concept in recent years.

For example, GIRoA does not lack the will to deal with the Taliban, they just do not see it as being in their interest to do so. Or in other words, they see greater benefit in maintaining the status quo than they do in effectively seeking resoultion of the disagreement. We blind ourselves to appreciating interests from their perspective, so we chalk it up as "lack of will." We do that a lot, and we are typically wrong.

[jmm99]

have a pretty good track record across the spectrum of strong democracies, weak democracies and even weak autocracies - e.g., thread Threat or Opportunity: non-violent protest? (links to Gene Sharp and Albert Einstein Institute publications, here & here).

However, bring a strong autocracy (such as Stalinist USSR) into the equation and non-violent protest becomes a self-inflicted death sentence. The strong state security apparatus of a strong autocracy will simply kill you.

The only state in a position to do anything about Syria is Turkey - if the Syrian Freedom Army were more than an illusion, Turkish "volunteers", etc.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

Not dismissing will, merely noting that it is an overplayed concept in recent years...We blind ourselves to appreciating interests from their perspective, so we chalk it up as "lack of will." We do that a lot, and we are typically wrong.

in others -- and ourselves, on occasion. Lack of interest does not equate to lack of will and it generally is predicated on a more realistic cost:benefit ratio...

[carl]

Mr. Jones:

However you call it-will, choice, cost-to-benefit calculation etc., if a regime is going to kill people if they resist non-violently and have the ability to do it and don't care what the rest of the world thinks, non-violence is a "self-inflicted death sentence."

I ask you a question about a specific country. Your position as I understand it is outlined by the following quote of yours.

"We should publicly encourage populaces to seek peaceful, but powerful (history shows that non-violent approaches to insurgency garner far more international support and are more successful) approaches to advance their concerns; while privately engaging governments to encourage them listen to their people's reasonable demands and to seriously consider the small changes that history shows can produce such dramatic effects in calming populaces in this stage of dissent."

Now, would that work if applied to North Korea?

[Fuchs]

Regimes fall to insurrection when they're ripe to fall - no matter armed or unarmed insurrection.

A regime that has a very elaborate and effective surveillance and police state such as North Korea and is backed up by ideology is very, very difficult to dislodge because it's very, very entrenched.

The East German and Polish way of shaking such a regime off was to use the institutions of what Germans call Zivilgesellschaft (civil society?). Namely, they relied on churches.
The Poles were greatly reinforced by knowing that the Pope was one of them and the Eastern Germans used churches as rallying point for their weekly Monday demonstrations for a reason.

On top of that their oppression was founded on the reinsurance that the Soviet Red Army would assist in crushing insurrections - but that guarantee went away in the Gorbachev era and the people knew it. From that point it wasn't such a great leap towards shaking off the fear and break the state organ's morale any more.

North Korea is different in many ways. Their regime appears to be stable, not ripe for collapse.
Neither armed nor peaceful insurrection appears to have promise there right now.

[Dayuhan]

As I recall, the US had plenty of capacity when Dr. King applied non-Violence in the US; same as to the Brits in India and the Soviets in Eastern Europe. Your facts are either flawed, or you are allowing yourself to be confined by definitions of insurgency that only focus on the violent guerrilla warfare phase/tactics.

I think you'll find that in each case where non-violent resistance succeeds, one of two things happens. Either the regime decides that it won't use unrestricted violence against the resistance (call it lack of will, lack of desire, whatever) or the regime tries to use unrestricted violence but the armed forces refuse to carry out the order.

If the regime is willing to use unrestricted violence and its armed forces are willing to do it, the resistance is either wiped out or goes underground and takes up arms. Look at Syria, in a vain and transient attempt to get back to the thread topic. Unless Assad's armed forces turn against him, non-violence is simply not going to work.

As to US influence, reports of our demise are greatly exaggerated. The US has TONS of influence. Granted, we'd have more if we squandered less, but to keep posting that we have no influence and that none of these leaders in the Middle East care what we think or do is simply groundless opinion.

Over whom, exactly, do we have influence, and what form does this influence take?

Influence is carrots and sticks, the ability to withhold positive incentives or impose negative ones. Any attempt to "encourage" action that isn't backed by those real, tangible, incentives is irrelevant and does little beyond underscoring our impotence. If we urge and encourage, get ignored, and do nothing, what does that achieve?

"Intangible influence" is an oxymoron. If it isn't tangible, it isn't influence. Nobody out there cares what we say or what we want: if we don't have the will or capacity to back up the words with meaningful action, what's the point in saying the words?

Sitting on our hands as Assad slaughters his populace and threatens to slaughter more if anyone interferes (can't help picturing the scene in Blazing Saddles where the Sheriff takes himself hostage...) sure offers great hope to the Saudis that they will have free license to come down hard when their populace attempts to take actions to the next level as well. Do not judge our influence by our poor application of it in recent years.

Ok, back to Syria: what would you have us do? What influence do toy want to wield, and how, and to what ends?

As to "taking responsibility for the consequences" of encouraging peaceful tactics, are you serious? It is not like we are calling for them to storm the Bastille and promising fire support and then not providing it at the last minute. We need make no such promises of direct support at all, even a promise of moral support and a willingness to work with whatever government might emerge is better than our our current course of "wait and see."

So we encourage people to resist but tell them that if they follow our advice and the merde comes down on them, they're on their own. That sounds pretty meaningless. "Moral support" means squat when you're unarmed and getting shot.

You make a couple of dangerous underestimations:

1. That of the power, will and influence of the U.S.;

2. That of the power, will and influence of an oppressed populace.

Others have made these same flawed assessments, and have not faired well for doing so.

I think you're underestimating some things as well... like our capacity to make a mess, especially when we stick our noses into other people's business without accurately assessing the practical influence we can bring to bear in a given situation, the potential for unintended adverse consequences, and a number of other things. We haven't always fared well when we've done that before, and I don't expect that to change.

[jmm99]

From VOA, Arab League: Syria Accepts Plan to Curb Crackdown (2 Nov 2011 at 8:50 pm):

The Arab League says the Syrian government has accepted a plan to curtail its nearly eight-month crackdown on dissent.

The proposal demands that Syrian authorities immediately withdraw security forces from the streets, stop violence against demonstrators and release all detainees jailed since protests began – a figure estimated to be in the tens of thousands.

Officials say that once Damascus takes these first steps, talks with the Syrian opposition can begin within two weeks. It is still unclear whether talks will occur in Cairo, as the plan stipulates, or in Damascus.

Opposition representatives based outside Syria said Wednesday that President Bashar al-Assad's government had lost all credibility. They said even if the opposition Syrian National Council accepts the Arab League plan, protesters and activists would reject it. ...

More details from VOA here and here.

From the Wash Post Editorial Board (several hours ago), the material question: Can the Arab League and Turkey stop the slaughter in Syria?

If there is to be such protection, a pivotal player will be Turkey, which is reportedly already sheltering leaders of a rebel Syrian army in a refugee camp. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is furious with Mr. Assad, whom he had cultivated for years, for ignoring Turkey’s pleas to stop the violence, and his government has said that it is preparing to impose sanctions. Even “targeted” Turkish economic sanctions, as promised by its foreign minister, could help peel away the support that the regime still has from the Syrian business community.

Turkey could also formally guarantee protection along the border for civilians fleeing the regime as well as for defecting soldiers. And if that is not sufficient, it could carve out a buffer zone inside Syria, protected by a no-fly zone. As a NATO member, Turkey should enjoy the alliance’s backing if Syria responds belligerently.

President Obama reportedly enjoys a good relationship with Mr. Erdogan and has already spoken to him at length about Syria. Now would be a good time to press for a robust Turkish response to Mr. Assad’s crimes — and offer assurance that the United States will support a Turkish effort to protect Syrian civilians.

The ball seems very much in Ankara's court.

Regards

Mike

[ganulv]

The East German and Polish way of shaking such a regime off was to use the institutions of what Germans call Zivilgesellschaft (civil society?). Namely, they relied on churches.

Gemeinschaft and gesellschaft typically get glossed as ‘community’ and ‘society’ in the U.S. if glossed at all. I suspect that the relationship between the state and gesellschaften is far, far more complex in Syria than it ever was in the GDR.

[Bob's World]

Mr. Jones:

However you call it-will, choice, cost-to-benefit calculation etc., if a regime is going to kill people if they resist non-violently and have the ability to do it and don't care what the rest of the world thinks, non-violence is a "self-inflicted death sentence."

I ask you a question about a specific country. Your position as I understand it is outlined by the following quote of yours.

"We should publicly encourage populaces to seek peaceful, but powerful (history shows that non-violent approaches to insurgency garner far more international support and are more successful) approaches to advance their concerns; while privately engaging governments to encourage them listen to their people's reasonable demands and to seriously consider the small changes that history shows can produce such dramatic effects in calming populaces in this stage of dissent."

Now, would that work if applied to North Korea?

From what little I have seen of the North Korean populace, there is little indicator that they are dissatisfied (currently) with their situation. When one controls information, one can control the populace. So, I suspect in many ways your question is moot, as insurgent causation is a mix of governmental policy and action as perceived by the populace. Currently North Korean popular perceptions appear to be largely acceptive of their fate. I suspect this will change in Korea as the populace there becomes more informed, and at that point, yes, I believe that such approaches will be insturmental to thier ultimate revolution of governance as well.

Popular non-violence is often met with governmental violence. But governments do not fare well in the court of public opinion when such clashes occur. We all know of Kent State for this very reason. We all appreciate the power of a lone Chinese citizen standing and staring down a Chinese tank.

The reality is that it typically takes a mix of violent and non-violent approaches when the government clings doggedly to a status quo that is no longer relevant in the eyes of their populace, but it is the unique power of non-violent resistance that sways domestic and foreign support to that of the revolution. The revolutionary remains the illegal actor and cannot escape that status, but once he attains the moral high ground he becomes a force of emense power.

It appears such shifts may be taking place as Turkey (who began their own revolutionary journey over a century ago, while Syria was a province and not a foreign land) weighs in. European powers peeled Syria off and retarded its social and political progress for their own interests. It is moving again, and it is appropriate that Turkey reach out to help stabilize that movement.