Concur Ken, wholeheartedly, and at the end of the day, raiding boils down to a few other principles (which you no doubt know already, but I will share for the benefit of others):Originally Posted by Ken White
What you say is true. What you and I apparently cannot say at this time is whether or not that move was known -- satellites and UAVs are better and more prolific now but they then existed... -- and the 'Raid' allowed to proceed for other reasons. Not saying that was the case, just that whether it was or not is not known to us.
You may assume that it was an intel failure. Could well be, even likely correct. However, having worked in the belly of the beast for a day or two, I've learned to reserve judgement. Folks in the ME and Asia are not the only ones who can makes thing to be not always what they seem...
-On the matter of intel, if the intel is spotty or just plain weak, causing lots of guesses, one needs to think about it in a bit more detail and weigh the go/no-go factors some more. It doesn't mean you stop planning.
-Raids are not an all or nothing proposition with regard to the quality of intelligence, and "good intelligence" is on a sliding scale. Intel will never be perfect, and if there are gaps, the planners just need to refer to the bullet above and try to get it in the box as much as possible.
-If the intel appears to be good to the planners at the time, there is no reason to do more than formulate the plan, apply the resources, and execute. Allowing history to creep in does little but confuse matters and a basic question - did the planners believe they had actionable, multi-source intelligence at the time of execution, when the GO decision was made. A lot of what I have read about Son Tay indicates that they did believe they had all the intel they could summon. It was sketchy and had some gaps, for sure, but they went with what they had.
Son Tay wasn't an issue of bad intelligence, if my armchairing has any bearing. The intelligence just wasn't up-to-date to match conditions, and so they went with what they had. The fact that the prisoners were moved in July isn't even relevant.
Although "rescue" is a relative term, my battalion rescued the seven American POWs being held by the Iraqis in Samarra (remnants of the 507th and the downed Apache) in April 2003. The intel was for sure sketchy and garbled, as to be expected during the often chaotic rush to attack Tikrit. My battalion commander told us something after the invasion that will stick with me forever.
He said, very plainly, that he took action because he wouldn't have been able to live with himself if he had continued to bypass the town as he had planned, and ignored the informant's tip, only to find out later that dead Americans had been exhumed from the city. Pretty good guts to try if you ask me. The intel wasn't even good, if you ask me, but he trusted his subordinates to execute violently and with precision, and sent them on their way.
All he did was monitor the radio from his CP to be ready to offer other resources to the force going in. Imagine that...
Bookmarks