Ken,
The Son Tay raid took place November 21, 1970.
The prisoners were moved from that camp in July of that year.
What does that tell you about the quality of the intel?
Moderator at work
Another thread 'Definition of a Raid' has meandered into a mainly historical discussion of this Vietnam War era POW rescue raid, so I have attempted to separate the two themes and created this new thread.
Original thread 'Definition of a Raid':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14474
I know several folks who went on that soiree and all complained of excessive caution and endless rehearsals (one wag said "... and each was a worse cock up than the one before..."). There was at the time some interesting rumors. One claimed that the move of the Allied prisoners was known and the raid went anyway for psychological purposes. Flaky. Another claimed that the move was known and the Raid went anyway as a diversion for another effort. Also flaky. Truth will be out in AD 2030 or so...
Regardless, while it did not accomplish the nominal mission of freeing prisoners neither did it result in a slew of own casualties. Interestingly, one guy on that Raid, SGM Galen Kittelson was also as An Alamo Scout on the more successful raid which freed hundreds of US PWs from the Japanese Cabanatuan Camp in the Philippines during WW II. Pappy and I were in the same unit when we went to Little Rock to put the kids in school.
You're right on Dieppe. It was always going to be difficult but could have gone much better than it did. One problem with both it and JMM's Marine item is that Amphibious Raids are very prone to interdiction on withdrawal -- you can only do so much on a body of water. I have this vague recollection of reading a Book years ago that discussed it and it was alleged that someone had suggested that the accepted plan was in essence making a frontal assault at the point of heaviest defense and that was the antithesis of the philosophy of a raid...
The fist "Thunder Run" through Baghdad in 2003 was essentially a very successful raid -- the second stayed in town so was not.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 11-12-2011 at 08:15 PM. Reason: New thread and intro added
Ken,
The Son Tay raid took place November 21, 1970.
The prisoners were moved from that camp in July of that year.
What does that tell you about the quality of the intel?
What you say is true. What you and I apparently cannot say at this time is whether or not that move was known -- satellites and UAVs are better and more prolific now but they then existed... -- and the 'Raid' allowed to proceed for other reasons. Not saying that was the case, just that whether it was or not is not known to us.
You may assume that it was an intel failure. Could well be, even likely correct. However, having worked in the belly of the beast for a day or two, I've learned to reserve judgement. Folks in the ME and Asia are not the only ones who can makes thing to be not always what they seem...
Ken,
Son Tay can most certainly be listed as a raid that failed (to achieve its objective) because of poor intel or the incompetent use of the available intel.
Much has been written about the Son Tay raid the conduct of which by the men on the ground was nearly flawless.
Having been involved in some raid activity myself it is the waiting that gets to you. You want to get it done and over with. Son Tay had a specific weather/moon phase window of opportunity which limited possible action to a few days in each month. They wanted to go in October but were scheduled for November. The prospect of another delay was not what the commanders (and probably the troops) wanted.
Here is the problem: From here
Sums it up pretty neatly doesn't it?Operation Kingpin, the final phase of the rescue of the POWs at Son Tay, was approved on November 18. The following day Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the new chairman of the JCS, received information that the POWs had definitely been moved to Dong Hoi. Unfortunately, the planners nixed the idea of moving on Dong Hoi. They felt that the raiders had rehearsed for months for a raid on Son Tay and that shifting camps at the last minute might prove to be disastrous.
What should Moorer have done? Ask any officer cadet and he will tell you that you cancel the Son Tay operation and plan a new one for Dong Hoi.
In fact lets take this further... go ask your grandson or any random kid of say 15 year old and ask him the following:
Now one must surely wonder how this guy made it to CJCS?????????????You have been rehearsing for months to attack a POW camp and free American prisoners there. You find out two days before the raid is to take place that the prisoners had been moved to a new camp. What would you do?
a) Attack the empty camp anyway.
b) Cancel the operation and prepare a new plan to free the POWs from the new camp.
When imbecilic decisions like this are made at the top of the military it just opens the door for politicians to demand and get oversight of military operations to the micro management levels.
Then of course the spin doctors got hold of it and turned a flawlessly executed yet failed operation into an act of heroism (which it was at operational level) instead of a case stud in the failure of command decision making at the most senior level of the US military (which it most certainly was).
This was a strategic raid and the commanders were able to draw from the best available and have plenty of time to prepare which makes it different from raids conducted on the fly by units engaged on a battlefield.
Simmons was of the best (as once again proven by the Ross Perot funded Iran raid) but if you have an accurate 'weapon' and you don't know how to aim it then failed raids like Son Tay happen. Thank heaven there were no KIA or serious casualties.
Last edited by JMA; 11-08-2011 at 04:45 PM.
But...Sort of -- but Moorer wasn't an imbecile. Does that negate your complaint?
May not negate it but it certainly calls your comment into question. The truth is that neither the Wiki, you or I know for sure the 'why' of that decision -- as I said, it'll be released about 2030. Stick around to find out...Yes and no. I suggest that it was a tactical raid that got -- wrongly IMO -- elevated to the Strategic plane by the US desire to make some things more important than they really are...This was a strategic raid and the commanders were able to draw from the best available and have plenty of time to prepare which makes it different from raids conducted on the fly by units engaged on a battlefield.Simons, not Simmons and having worked for him, he was okay, not the best...Simmons was of the best (as once again proven by the Ross Perot funded Iran raid) but if you have an accurate 'weapon' and you don't know how to aim it then failed raids like Son Tay happen. Thank heaven there were no KIA or serious casualties.
Aside note -- he also made the Cabanatuan Raid.
I said Moorer was an imbecile? No I did not but he clearly made an imbecilic decision.
One must surely question how this man reached the pinnacle of the US military without it being established that he was unable to make (in this case) an intelligent decision under stress.
This links back to the post by Red Rat in the What Are You Reading Now thread about the book The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions
I would welcome a review from him on this book as to any insights he has gleaned from the book as to the military in this regard.
Ken, how did Moorer manage to get to CJCS when his was unable to make a simple decision a 15 year old could make and does this indicate the the joint chiefs are merely rubber stamp yes-men?
For the OBL strike it was troops from stateside that were used and not those based then in theatre? A pattern here?Yes and no. I suggest that it was a tactical raid that got -- wrongly IMO -- elevated to the Strategic plane by the US desire to make some things more important than they really are...Simons, not Simmons and having worked for him, he was okay, not the best...
I'll look it up.Aside note -- he also made the Cabanatuan Raid.
To you it is clear, others without your vast knowledge, experience and inside information do not know enough to make that call...
You may, however, make as many standing broad jumps at possibly wrong conclusions as you wish.I suspect that he did it like countless others around the world before and since -- by making more, mostly intelligent decisions involving far more persons while under stress than you or I ever had to do. Note also that we do not know that the decision was not intelligent, we only have your assumption based on limited information that it was unitelligent.One must surely question how this man reached the pinnacle of the US military without it being established that he was unable to make (in this case) an intelligent decision under stress.
Note also that you're basing your possibly fallacious assumption on one incident of which you are but partially aware and informed as opposed to possessing (or citing) more detailed knowledge of his over 40 years of service in which, among other things, he was both CinCPac and CinCLant, two major commands and something no one had ever done before (or since...).The 'how' is discussed above. You do not know that it was a simple decision, it merely suits your purposes to so assume. Been my observation that 15 year olds make a lot of hasty --and bad -- decisions. Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs are like ordinary mortals, some are yes men, some are not. All have far more military experience than you, most good, in more areas of the world and more varied circumstances. Most also have more sense than to leap to judgement based on limited knowledge and most are concerned with far more than minor tactical problems. They can be legitimately accused of being excessively cautious but it must be recalled that they are dual hatted as both the military adviser to the President (not Commanders, they command nothing) AND as guardians of the institutions that are the entire US Armed Forces with worldwide and not just current Theater (or current political administration) concerns. Those are somewhat conflicting roles and the balance is always uneasy.Ken, how did Moorer manage to get to CJCS when his was unable to make a simple decision a 15 year old could make and does this indicate the the joint chiefs are merely rubber stamp yes-men?That too is an assumption and not necessarily correct.For the OBL strike it was troops from stateside that were used and not those based then in theatre? A pattern here?
However, you raise a good point. The Cabanatuan raid was ordered by the local commander using in-theater troops. There were some unheralded but deep and successful raids in Korea that met those same parameters. Son Tay, OTH was the harbinger of excessive control from Washington and of the use of out of theater forces. That raised those efforts from a military operation to a political action (please note and consider that FACT). As was / is the OBL effort. The OBL thing was a mixed bag, theater wise but was emphatically a Washington orchestration. I suspect little good will come from that trend...
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Mag.../1195raid.aspx
Sounds like single-source reporting said one thing, and the planners attempted to verify, but could not, but made heavy decision nonetheless. That's what they get paid to do. It certainly doesn't sound like the information about moved prisoners was as definitive as some articles allege.Bad News Develops
Bad news developed in Washington when a usually reliable intelligence source in Hanoi stated that the Son Tay prisoners had been moved. Reconnaissance aircraft tried to get last-minute photographs of the camp November 18 but failed. However, another report indicated that the camp was occupied by "someone."
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird was briefed on the possibility that no prisoners were in the camp. General Blackburn and DIA Director Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett recommended the raid proceed, weather permitting. Mr. Laird agreed and so advised the President, who acknowledged that it was worth the risk. The "go" message was sent to General Manor at Takhli.
General Manor laid on the mission for the night of November 20. In the Red River Valley, little cloudiness was expected, as were good visibility and light winds. As the General reported later, "The night of 20/21 November 1970 was the only night for many days before and after that date that launch would have been possible."
Vice Adm. Frederic A. Bardshar aboard USS Oriskany was sent his go-ahead planning message, which said simply, "NCA approval received." The aircrews of fifty-nine strike and support aircraft were briefed but not told why they would be flying over the major North Vietnamese port of Haiphong and dropping only flares, not bombs. They were given permission to fire their Shrike air-to-surface missiles and 20-mm ammunition against any enemy radar-controlled SAM defenses that posed a threat to US forces and to support search-and-rescue missions if anyone were shot down.
It for sure doesn't sound like they were risk averse and wanted to wrap the members of the raid force in pillows. Shudder to think that they would risk casualties or a KIA (here's my not-shocked face...okay, it's gone now).
Last edited by jcustis; 11-10-2011 at 05:02 AM.
There are none so blind as those who will not see.
I say again Ken, explain the scenario to a random 15 year old and see what an epic fail the CJCS's action was. How he wasn't summarily dismissed (forced into retirement) remains totally amazing.
Ken, you can attempt to mock me as much as you like to entertain your like minded around here. (by now you should have realised that those tactics do not work on me)You may, however, make as many standing broad jumps at possibly wrong conclusions as you wish.
... but at the critical moment he failed. So (being thankful he killed no one in this case) you thank him for his service, give him a service medal and pack him off post haste into retirement.I suspect that he did it like countless others around the world before and since -- by making more, mostly intelligent decisions involving far more persons while under stress than you or I ever had to do. Note also that we do not know that the decision was not intelligent, we only have your assumption based on limited information that it was unitelligent.
... forget the history all it took was the man to fail at a critical moment... one mistake is all it takes. He failed. Probably a good case study for the Peter Principle.Note also that you're basing your possibly fallacious assumption on one incident of which you are but partially aware and informed as opposed to possessing (or citing) more detailed knowledge of his over 40 years of service in which, among other things, he was both CinCPac and CinCLant, two major commands and something no one had ever done before (or since...).The 'how' is discussed above. You do not know that it was a simple decision, it merely suits your purposes to so assume.
I don't have anything to do with 15 year oldsBeen my observation that 15 year olds make a lot of hasty --and bad -- decisions. Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs are like ordinary mortals, some are yes men, some are not.
The question is how they managed to claw their way up the promotion ladder. Officers of that rank (one would like to think) would be a cut above us mere mortals, yes?
So did Hannibal's elephants, but did that make them any more than mere elephants?All have far more military experience than you, most good, in more areas of the world and more varied circumstances.
The simple difference Ken, is that I did not serve long enough to reach my own level of incompetence... obviously many of the guys you mention did.
Maybe most do. But then obviously some are so intellectually challenged that they allow an attack to go ahead on an empty camp 23 miles from Hanoi. The mind boggles.Most also have more sense than to leap to judgement based on limited knowledge and most are concerned with far more than minor tactical problems.
Don't worry the Brit have there problems as well. Remember Arnhem?
On D-1 an Ultra decryption revealed the movement of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to Nijmegen and Arnhem. Also airphoto-reconnaissance and intel from the Dutch underground confirmed the panzer presence. Eisenhower was concerned, Montgomery laughed it off and Eisenhower did not have the balls to overrule Montgomery. (seems to be a problem at the top levels of the US military, yes?) The rest is history. Only 8,000 casualties, what the hell, hey Ken? (can't criticise the generals can we?).
Excuses, excuses Ken. This man blew it. He should have been fired if not worse.They can be legitimately accused of being excessively cautious but it must be recalled that they are dual hatted as both the military adviser to the President (not Commanders, they command nothing) AND as guardians of the institutions that are the entire US Armed Forces with worldwide and not just current Theater (or current political administration) concerns. Those are somewhat conflicting roles and the balance is always uneasy.That too is an assumption and not necessarily correct.
Ken, with respect, you are now trying to pass the buck to Washington while there is growing evidence that after all is said and done maybe the US military does in fact need political micromanagement.However, you raise a good point. The Cabanatuan raid was ordered by the local commander using in-theater troops. There were some unheralded but deep and successful raids in Korea that met those same parameters. Son Tay, OTH was the harbinger of excessive control from Washington and of the use of out of theater forces. That raised those efforts from a military operation to a political action (please note and consider that FACT). As was / is the OBL effort. The OBL thing was a mixed bag, theater wise but was emphatically a Washington orchestration. I suspect little good will come from that trend...
But the US did once have a man of honour. Remember Operation Eagle Claw? As a result of that cock-up Beckwith resigned.
Last edited by JMA; 11-10-2011 at 04:22 PM.
Ain't that the truth...What is totally amazing is that a mature South African with considerable and successful military experience is making judgements like a 15 year old.I say again Ken, explain the scenario to a random 15 year old and see what an epic fail the CJCS's action was. How he wasn't summarily dismissed (forced into retirement) remains totally amazing.Understand one thing -- I am not mocking you. I am stating that you espouse some bizarre theories. Nor am I attempting to entertain anyone -- I am trying to suggest to you that you, as the saying goes, should "engage brain before putting mouth in gear." You are smarter than some of the odd comments you make for whatever reason.Ken, you can attempt to mock me as much as you like to entertain your like minded around here. (by now you should have realised that those tactics do not work on me)That's just asinine. You apparently totally misunderstand the role of the CJCS. None of that was his call.... but at the critical moment he failed. So (being thankful he killed no one in this case) you thank him for his service, give him a service medal and pack him off post haste into retirement.Nor do I so stop suggesting we call on one for answers to questions about which most will know little. An attribute apparently widely shared.I don't have anything to do with 15 year olds.Not at all. Pontificating, sycophantic, overly aggressive, less than thoughtful and other less than stellar types exist in all ranks, Private to General. If one thought as you say one should like to, then one would make some terribly flawed judgements about people. Obviously.The question is how they managed to claw their way up the promotion ladder. Officers of that rank (one would like to think) would be a cut above us mere mortals, yes?Yep, they were combat experienced Elephants.So did Hannibal's elephants, but did that make them any more than mere elephants?Still groping, I see...The simple difference Ken, is that I did not serve long enough to reach my own level of incompetence... obviously many of the guys you mention did.
Yep, many of them did -- many of them also did not. Same applies in all fields of human endeavor. As you know...Yes, the boggle is quite noticeable.Maybe most do. But then obviously some are so intellectually challenged that they allow an attack to go ahead on an empty camp 23 miles from Hanoi. The mind boggles.I was criticizing Generals before you were born. Generally, though, I tried to have some factual basis rather than my perceptions on which to base that criticism. It might be helpful if you tried that.Don't worry the Brit have there problems as well. Remember Arnhem?
On D-1 an Ultra decryption revealed the movement of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to Nijmegen and Arnhem. Also airphoto-reconnaissance and intel from the Dutch underground confirmed the panzer presence. Eisenhower was concerned, Montgomery laughed it off and Eisenhower did not have the balls to overrule Montgomery. (seems to be a problem at the top levels of the US military, yes?) The rest is history. Only 8,000 casualties, what the hell, hey Ken? (can't criticise the generals can we?).
Re: the Arnhem effort -- and Son Tay for that matter --you forget or elide the political aspects and the stultifying effect of a large bureaucracy. You apparently never had to deal with that or have forgotten how perncious it can be. Some of us have dealt with it and know better than to discount it -- think of our conversation re: Libya when I suggested those factors would cause exactly what did happen...
Not all bad, I guess -- gave you something to rail about for a few weeks.We can disagree on that. You're speaking through your hat...Excuses, excuses Ken. This man blew it. He should have been fired if not worse.
That's no excuse, it's simply reality with which you have never had to work so you can be dismissive. Those who have to live with it do not have your luxury.Heh. I wouldn't deign to comment on that little gem...Ken, with respect, you are now trying to pass the buck to Washington while there is growing evidence that after all is said and done maybe the US military does in fact need political micromanagement.No. he did not. I knew Beckwith and while he was indeed generally honorable, he did not resign over the foul-ups (plural) that led to the failure of Eagle Claw -- which were many, multi-service and both bureaucracy and Washington jinxed from the start and a few of which he also contributed. Charlie didn't resign, he retired with credit for 30 years service and full Retired pay -- the norm for Colonels, then and now. He did that over a year after Eagle Claw. So, once again you make a fallacious comment based on poor knowledge and a lot of false presumption.But the US did once have a man of honour. Remember Operation Eagle Claw? As a result of that cock-up Beckwith resigned.
You really ought to work on that -- and that, BTW is not mockery or meant to entertain anyone, it is a suggestion for you to consider if you wish to be taken seriously.
1. Lowered NV morale because it showed we could hit within 25 miles of Hanoi, with minimal losses to us.
2. Enhanced US PW morale because an effort had been made to free them.
One might also suggest that putting US boots on the ground that close to Hanoi opened up the US psyche to more aggressive actions within North Vietnam itself, culminating in the 1972 Operation Linebacker I and Operation Linebacker II.
One might also consider the effect in 1964 had Linebacker-type actions, as well as US raids, been employed against North Vietnam - rather than the "graduated response" employed by the Johnson Admin.
I will not continue the ###-for-tat response but rather restate my position.
The decision to proceed with the Son Tay raid despite confirmation that the camp was empty was gross incompetence. The fact that the CJCS failed to act sadly indicates that a person incapable of decision making at a critical moment had somehow managed to reach the pinnacle of the US military. If the decision to proceed was taken by or strongly recommended by the military the CJCS should have been dismissed (or worse). If, however, the decision to proceed was driven by the politicians then it exposed a lack of moral courage in the CJCS which again raises questions as to how he managed to reach that position. I say again any which way you try to spin it the man was worthy as a subject of a case study into the Peter Principle.
Fast forward to Operation Eagle Claw. Here we see more of the Keystone Cops incompetence at the highest level of the US military. I quote from Beckwith's book: - in conversation with Task Force Commander Major General James B. Vaught during the preliminary planning stage:
Staggering isn't it?"What's the risk, Colonel Beckwith?"
"Oh, about 99.9 percent."
"What's the probability of success?"
"Zero."
"Well, we can't do it."
"You're right, Boss."
"I've got to buy time from the JCS."
A major-general and a colonel can't tell the JCS that the operation has a zero chance of success??????????????????????????????????
So what were the JCS thinking???????????????????????
Then from here:
It is simple.The contradiction between the optimism of the flag-rank staff officers and the pessimism of field commanders like Beckwith indicates that the feedback of ground commanders had not been taken seriously by a civilian administration which was determined to execute what it perceived as a last resort.
Nobody (in their right mind) with question the physical courage of the US forces... but it is becoming increasingly clear that moral courage is in short supply in the upper echelons of the US military.
Sticks and stones and all that stuff Ken
I see no good reason for spelling "US" here.
Moral courage in armed services is the exception, not the norm. Anecdotes.
That's the downside of the power that command authority bestows on superiors and the downside of having an organisation that demands obedience to the degree of overpowering survival instincts.
Military moral courage needs to be replaced by a careful selection of civilian leaders (and by civilian authority over the military). The civilians on top need to make sure that unpleasant news reach them by rewarding good reporting and punishing bad reporting (and non-reporting of important facts) whenever they can reveal it.
I don't think there's a reliable way how to make amilitary effective AND foster its moral courage at the same time.
It’s not limited to the military, that’s for sure.
The civilians on top need to make sure that unpleasant news reach them by rewarding good reporting and punishing bad reporting (and non-reporting of important facts) whenever they can reveal it.
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
You contiinue to post in this thread, over and over, that there was confirmation the prisoners were moved.The decision to proceed with the Son Tay raid despite confirmation that the camp was empty was gross incompetence.
A single source report from a HUMINT asset is not confirmation of anything, yet you continue to toss your hand in with the conspiracy theorist lot who believe that report sealed the deal.
Do you understand that your argument hinges on that weakness right now?
He said as he again laid out a ###.
As for this:That certainly applies to some, fortunately, not to all even though such blanket condemnation may be perceptively merited in your view. Fortunately, you are not the arbiter. Also fortunately, reality -- and most others -- differ.It is simple.
Nobody (in their right mind) with question the physical courage of the US forces... but it is becoming increasingly clear that moral courage is in short supply in the upper echelons of the US military.No sticks or stones, just another response to your apparent once a month or so relatively pointless excessive negativity cycle. It's yet another plea for you to think about what you're posting rather than occasionally dashing off ill considered and quite uninformed vituperation for no apparent reason other than that you can...Sticks and stones and all that stuff Ken
It's too early for the Grinch...
You are probably correct in that one hears of very few commanders who are willing to make that final and irrevocable protest and resign rather than follow insane orders or risk soldiers lives unnecessarily.
Of course in a situation (like that Beckwith found himself) where the operational commander who himself will be in harms way to refuse would invite the response "well if you are not up for the task then we will find someone who is," (incorporating the innuendo of cowardice).That's the downside of the power that command authority bestows on superiors and the downside of having an organisation that demands obedience to the degree of overpowering survival instincts.
When it is a situation where it is someone who will not be at risk like the cocooned JCS it is all about their pensions - in that how many lives can be gambled with (not risked mind you) before he/they are prepared to risk their pensions.
In the case of Son Tay you may be correct but in the case of Eagle Claw (where a desperate unpopular President was prepared to risk the lives of military men to save his own political ass) it was up to the CJCS and the JCS to tell the politicians to go take a hike. They didn't have the balls (moral courage in this case) to do it.Military moral courage needs to be replaced by a careful selection of civilian leaders (and by civilian authority over the military). The civilians on top need to make sure that unpleasant news reach them by rewarding good reporting and punishing bad reporting (and non-reporting of important facts) whenever they can reveal it.
You may be correct... but a step in the right direction will be to court-marshall those who it is proven have failed in their duty of care to the men under their command.I don't think there's a reliable way how to make a military effective AND foster its moral courage at the same time.
In the case of Son Tay and Moorer if he had known that either way he was going to end his career and lose his pension he may just have done the right thing especially if that was the honourable course of action.
My initial reaction was to address this post to JMA; but upon reflection, I am simply going to followup Jon Custis' posts. So, we should address the material facts regarding, and who was involved in, the so-called "intelligence failure" (no POWs); and, more importantly, at what level, should we analyze the end goal of the mission.
In considering those questions, two online sources stand out for factual validation and reasoned policy analysis (fn 1):
Amidon, Mark. "Groupthink, Politics, and the Decision to Attempt the Son Tay Rescue". Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College 2005 (Winter) [cited as Amidon].
Mitchell, Major John, USMC (1997). "The Son Tay Raid: A Study in Presidential Policy". e-History: Vietnam War. The Ohio State University [cited as Mitchell]
1. Events of 19-20 November (the Material Facts)
Amidon's summary (pp.5-6 pdf) is the shorter of the two:
Mitchell's section on "Intelligence and the Decision: (page 6 & page 7) goes beyond Amidon (snips from 19-20 Nov):On 19 November, after the President approved the mission and one day before actual launch, word reached General Blackburn of the North Vietnamese HUMINT source who reported “no prisoners at Son Tay.” This HUMINT report triggered a massive reanalysis of available information and demands for an updated intelligence estimate.
For the next 12 hours, General Blackburn, DIA Director Lieutenant General Donald Bennett, Admiral Moorer, and Secretary Laird struggled with the significance of this news and what impact it should have on the mission. General Blackburn was certain that the mission should proceed; yet his confidence wavered as he expressed great frustration with the quality of the intelligence analysis. “One minute they were ‘sure’ the prisoners were gone, the next they were ‘suspicious’ that POWs had been moved back into Son Tay.”[31] General Bennett appeared before Admiral Moorer on the morning of 20 November with two stacks of “evidence,” one saying “they’ve moved,” and an equally large one saying “they’re still there.”[32] Despite this muddled intelligence picture, General Bennett eventually recommended that the mission proceed, primarily on the basis of the “95 percent assurance” that the raiders could safely complete their mission.[33] Armed with the concurrence of his three subordinates, Secretary of Defense Laird routinely notified the President that the mission would proceed as planned. The White House concurred with the Pentagon’s intentions. With the raid due to launch in hours, the Administration was not interested in doubts. As Admiral Harry D. Train, at that time the Executive Assistant to Admiral Moorer, later put it, “They didn’t want to know.”[34]
31. Schemmer, p. 180.
32. Vandenbroucke, p. 65.
33. Schemmer, p. 180.
34. Vandenbroucke, p. 66.
Why was the presence or absence of the POWs "irrelevant" to the decisions made at the National Command Authority level ?....
[the meeting of Blackburn, Bennett and Moorer on 19 Nov] Having heard the opinions of both men, Moorer decided to brief Laird the following morning. Hopefully, the additional time would allow for reconsideration and/or confirmation regarding to the new information. If confirmed to be accurate, enough time would be available on the morning of 20 November to brief the NCA and deliver any changes to the raid force prior to their scheduled launch time.
The following morning [20 Nov], Moorer, Bennett, and Blackburn again met to discuss the new developments. As it turned out, Bennett had a change of opinion. He had reconsidered his position based on all the information collected to date on Son Tay. Bennett arrived at the same conclusion Blackburn did on the day before. Therefore, Bennett recommended a 'Go.' That recommendation was enough for Moorer to agree that the mission should be attempted, since he also believed that the POWs were still there. It was good that all three 'confirmed' what they wanted to believe because the raid force mission commander had given the final preparation and execution order to the raid force earlier that morning. It is apparent that Moorer's decision to wait had paid off because anything less than a unified recommendation from his office probably would have led to an abort by the NCA. However, there was still enough time to do just that with another 'Red Rocket' if Nixon or Laird deemed it necessary in light of the Hanoi source information. Therefore, with Bennett at his side, Moorer went to brief Laird on the recent developments.
Laird did not hesitate in agreeing with Moorer's recommendation to proceed despite the new developments. Laird was committed and fully understood Nixon's policy and to what extent the President would go to make his point once diplomatic efforts failed or produced insufficient results on a specific issue. Laird's resolve and conviction over the POW/MIA would be reconfirmed in his eyes because, within an hour of Moorer's departure, Richard Helms arrived to discuss the information obtained from the Hanoi source and also brought additional news concerning the POW issue. The CIA had intercepted recent "traffic" and confirmed that as many as 11 more POWs had died in captivity in addition to those reported on 13 November. Laird knew he must immediately inform the President of these developments. However, exactly what and how he told the President is an issue which is still debatable.
....
Research indicates, and it is the judgment of this author, that the President would not have aborted the mission in light of this information. Whether or not the President was briefed about the Hanoi source information is irrelevant. After all, the final decision to carry out the raid had been made. In other words, there was no political "smoking gun" (any Presidential "wrong doing" associated with the decision to execute or continue) to be found on this specific issue. However, if the Hanoi source information proved to be true, Laird would take all the blame if the mission turned out to be a total failure. Apparently Laird's decision not to brief Nixon would provide Presidential "plausible deniability" in case the mission met with tragic results. Having established Nixon's policy towards ending the war in Vietnam and what part the raid would play in that policy, let us review the leadership, execution, and reaction to the mission in order to understand the complexity and significance of the Son Tay Raid.
cont. in part 2
2. Strategic Analysis vs Tactical Analysis
Amidon succinctly sums up the "worm's eye" tactical view vs. the "big picture" strategic view (pp.10-11):
Mitchell (page 16) comes to the same conclusion:Same Mission, Different Goals
The most stunning aspect of the Son Tay raid is the wide and subtle goal divergence that existed between the Pentagon and the White House. In the minds of the Pentagon military planners, the Son Tay raid was a high-risk tactical mission undertaken to rescue American POWs being held captive under harsh conditions in North Vietnam. Colonel Simons summed this viewpoint in his pre-mission speech to the raiders: “We are going to rescue 70 American prisoners of war, maybe more, at a camp called Son Tay. This is something that American prisoners have a right to expect from their fellow soldiers.”[53] To the Pentagon planners, conflicting intelligence in the eleventh hour threatened the sole objective of the raid. No POWs, no raid.
President Nixon’s motives were far more complex and closely guarded. Although Nixon also sought to rescue POWs, the Son Tay raid provided an ideal vehicle to forward his emerging strategy of imposing pressure on the North Vietnamese and convincing them that the Administration was not to be trifled with. According to historian Jeffrey Kimball:
Unlike those at the Pentagon who viewed the Son Tay raid as a POW rescue, President Nixon saw it as a combination of a rescue, a threat to the North Vietnamese, and a salvo against his domestic critics. At least one modern scholar has gone so far as to ask the question: “Was Son Tay a rescue mission or an attack on North Vietnam disguised as a rescue mission?”[55]In his memoirs, Kissinger revealed the broader diplomatic and strategic reasons behind the November 1970 [Son Tay] air raids. Besides diverting North Vietnamese defenses from Son Tay, they were designed to retaliate for the abrupt rejection of our peace proposal; and to slow down the North Vietnamese dry-season supply effort in the South. Thus, besides its humanitarian and political purposes, the combined operation of rescue and bombing had military and psychological purposes - an adjective Nixon used in his memoirs. [Nixon] commented that “it revealed [to the North Vietnamese] their vulnerability to a kind of attack they had not experienced before. The rescue mission demonstrated that the US could get past North Vietnamese air defenses and operate in [their] rear. It was a true [rescue] activity but also designed to show” that Nixon’s threats should be taken seriously.[54]
Numerous Pentagon officials expressed surprise at the White House’s indifference to the reports of decreased camp activity. Their concerns might have been far more muted had they understood the fundamentally different objectives of the White House and the Pentagon. Whereas the military’s launch decision hinged solely on rescuing POWs, the White House saw great opportunity in safely executing a raid into North Vietnam, even if no POWs were rescued. Those in the Pentagon believed they were recommending “go” on a tactical mission. The White House had long since approved a strategic mission.
53. Schemme, p. 198.
54. Kimball, p. 238.
55. eHistory, “The Son Tay Raid: A Study in Presidential Policy,” p. 6.
As Mitchell points out, there are some interesting tactical issues that remain open - the full story of the Secondary School being one of them !IN CONCLUSION: A QUESTION TO CONSIDER
Having explored both the humanitarian and political origins of the raid, perhaps a final thought provoking question remains, was the Son Tay Raid a rescue mission or an attack? In the opinion of this researcher, it was both! A noble and honorable attempt had been made by a gallant force to relieve the suffering of their brothers-in-arms, but the raid also possessed the elements of a deliberate attack to carry out Presidential policy. Undoubtedly, had POWs been rescued at Son Tay, immediate success would have been acknowledged by all, perhaps even resulting in uniting a divided America. Yet, at the same time, but unfortunately out of public view, the raid was an immediate success because Hanoi quickly began direct negotiations and took rapid action to correct their past transgressions regarding the treatment of POWs. By linking military actions to strategic goals, as was demonstrated by the raid on Son Tay, it is evident that President Nixon emerged from the latest round of 'negotiations' as a winner, although not immediately recognized as such.
Perhaps there will always be speculation concerning the raid. For example: Prior to the mission, did the NCA or any other planner/decision maker know that there were 'in fact' no POWs at Son Tay? Perhaps some did, but for unknown reasons elected to remain silent on the issue. Additionally, did Colonel Simons' raid group land at the secondary school on purpose and if so, who ordered it and why? Furthermore, when were the POWs actually moved from Son Tay? And finally, why were the POWs moved? All of these questions call for additional research.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue with positive results like those which occurred after the raid. Hanoi's response was to break off official peace negotiations in Paris and publicly denounce the U.S. for escalating the war. Unofficially, Hanoi, China, and the Soviet Union were shaken by the raid. All tightened security at their military compounds and other sensitive locations. Additionally, previously classified White House documents revealed that Hanoi began responding to official requests concerning POW issues as early as 26 November 1970, something they had rarely done before. Hanoi was also concerned that American public opinion was now focused on the POW/MIA issue, especially since confirming that many POWs had died in captivity. Hanoi finally got the message and began to fear a change in international and American public support for the war since the raid had highlighted such a sensitive issue. In light of these and other developments, the raid was an overwhelming success as both a rescue mission and an extension of policy. The President's decision to support his policy through military activity directly resulted in forcing Hanoi to treat POWs more humanely and forced Hanoi back to Paris in a more humble negotiating position.
Without a doubt, Hanoi now knew it was dealing with a new Administration determined to see an end to the war, but only in an honorable manner. On two occasions the President had shown Hanoi his resolve and to what lengths he would go to ensure that his style of diplomacy should not be misinterpreted. Hanoi knew it had better pay attention lest it risk waking a lethargic giant with a new attitude.
Frying Adm. Moorer is NOT justified by the facts. He acted in accord with the NCA policy setting the strategic basis for the mission. That NCA policy happened in this instance to be sound.
Regards
Mike
fn 1. The Wiki for Operation Ivory Coast provides a framework for discussion, including the two sources linked above. Consider also 1972 Linebacker I and II linked in my last post.
As always your research skills, speed and thoroughness are amazing and laudable.
Thus I laud...
I agree with your conclusion re: Moorer with the added note that Moorer, like every other CJCS was NOT in the chain of command. The CJCS is an adviser, of course his recommendations have weight but in the end the Chain was and is President - SecDef - overseas commander. In this case, as your research shows, the decision was in essence political and was by the President. Counter recommendations by the CJCS may or may not have affected that -- with Nixon, my bet would be no. Every former Lieutenant Commander relishes a chance to overrule a four star...
Bookmarks