JMA: Train is the only point I'll respond to.

You (and everyone else) know what facts I'm relying on, what inferences I draw from those facts, and the ultimate conclusions I reach from those inferences.

I did do an online search last nite re: then (1970) Capt. Harry Train - retired an O-10 - and found little online about his tour with Moorer; and nothing to show that he was in or out of the decision-making loops in 1970. Mitchell does not mention him at all; nor does Blackburn.

Train's 1993 comment is phrased in terms of "we". Who was the "we" ? Moorer and Train ? Train and his code clerk ? The salient factual question is what did Train know, what did he communicate to Moorer, and vice versa (and exactly when in 1970 did all that occur). That question is particularly important if Train in Nov 1970 firmly believed that the raid should be aborted.

Amidon's Train quote (p.8 pdf; below separating the quote from Amidon's comments) is from Vanderbrache's book (based on an interview with Train, which I couldn't find online):

Self-Censorship: Individuals with dissenting views remain silent, driven by a desire to remain a “team player” or a fear of losing influence.

In a 1993 book, Admiral Train admitted: “Twelve hours before the raid we had fairly high confidence that [Son Tay] was empty. The photography showed the grass had not been walked on in ten days. On the basis of the photographic evidence alone we knew that it was empty.”[42]

42. Vandenbroucke, pp. 65-66.

Despite being personally confident that the camp was empty, a four-star flag officer [JMM: Train was an O-6 then] remained either silent or chose not to forcefully argue his case.
If someone has more information on Train's actual role in the Son Tay mission, I'm more than willing to look at it.

The same goes for more information re: the Laird-Helms discussion (just before Laird saw Nixon) re: the Hanoi source.

Regards

Mike