Major, this is the second time you have come out shooting from the hip in response to my postings and embarrassed yourself.Originally Posted by jcustis
So now you attempt to redeem yourself by attempting to discredit me. If you had read the sources listed by Mike and maybe done a little research for yourself (call it rummaging through the internet if you will) you will have (or should have) realised that the INT was so thin as to the presence of POWs in Son Tay that no responsible commander would have allowed any of his soldiers and airmen to have taken part in such an ill advised and risky operation (possibly the most audacious and potentially risky operation ever undertaken by US forces).
Now how come you failed to identify the critical fact in all this and that being that it was later confirmed that the camp had been vacated on 14 July?
That would have informed you that it was impossible for Moorer to have received confirmation of the actual presence of POWs in the camp prior to seeking final mission approval from the president.
Why too, do you think Moorer elected not to inform the President of the ‘lack of activity’ in the camp?
Do you think Moorer’s actions were those one should be reasonably expect from a CJCS? Clearly not.
Finally your comment about reading Perilous Options (Vandenbroucke’s book) is plain ridiculous. Mike was unable to find it online yet I am supposed to have a copy on my bookshelf??? I thought we had got past the ‘activity’ issue to the point where actual confirmation of POW occupation was needed (as was possible back in May 1970 when there were POWs in the camp).
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