Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

[jcustis]

Finally your comment about reading Perilous Options (Vandenbroucke’s book) is plain ridiculous. Mike was unable to find it online yet I am supposed to have a copy on my bookshelf??? I thought we had got past the ‘activity’ issue to the point where actual confirmation of POW occupation was needed (as was possible back in May 1970 when there were POWs in the camp).

Uhhh, you could have found the relevant part here: http://books.google.com/books?id=RWn...page&q&f=false.

I believe Mike was referring to the actual interview.

So now you attempt to redeem yourself by attempting to discredit me. If you had read the sources listed by Mike and maybe done a little research for yourself (call it rummaging through the internet if you will) you will have (or should have) realised that the INT was so thin as to the presence of POWs in Son Tay that no responsible commander would have allowed any of his soldiers and airmen to have taken part in such an ill advised and risky operation (possibly the most audacious and potentially risky operation ever undertaken by US forces).

I don't have a desire to discredit you. You do a fine job of that all by yourself.

Your presumption that I would conclude the intelligence to be too thin is pretty sweeping. I think you are overly risk-averse, so I understand how that could frame your views and your opinion of what a responsible commander looks like, but you really shouldn't let your values, opinions, and judgment speak for what posters should or shouldn't be inclined to think.

It would be better to simply say, "I wouldn't have done that," and call it a day. Instead you are just incredulous that others might disagree with you. It's okay, really. it happens often here.

Where at that link do I find the piece about "... there were indications that activity had picked up between 3 and 13 November... "?

C'mon, read the darn thing.

Do you think Moorer’s actions were those one should be reasonably expect from a CJCS? Clearly not.

Which actions? Again, you've been all over the map, so clarify what you are talking about.

Now how come you failed to identify the critical fact in all this and that being that it was later confirmed that the camp had been vacated on 14 July?

That would have informed you that it was impossible for Moorer to have received confirmation of the actual presence of POWs in the camp prior to seeking final mission approval from the president.

What is your definition of confirmation? A POW waving into the night as an SR-71 flew overhead? I for sure am not talking about that level of intel, and I surmise that the planners did not believe they needed that standard to be able to advocate a go for the mission. You may be prescribing that standard here, and that's okay, but the whole point to this discussion is what the planners knew, when they knew it, and what other information impacted in the decision-making process (there was a lot).

I think it's fair to say that there were a significant number of details, decisions and factors impacting on the process at the time, and there is a wide range of potentially contradictory information that exist. I still believe that the planners tried to make conscientious decisions in the process. You don't seem to think so, and again, that's fine, but don't be surprised that you're expected to bring your A-game when making weighty posts like you have, and to defend your point of view with information.

At the end of the day, I don't believe Moorer to be a moral coward, imbecile, or unintelligent, and the contrasting viewpoints in this thread simply demonstrate the beauty of how people can come to different conclusions over the same bit of information.