This report provides an overview of both how the Iraqi insurgency has moved towards civil conflict from its inception in the spring of 2003 through 2007, of the ways in which insurgent tactics and methods have changed over time, and the current level of civil conflict and risk of overall civil war. It is divided into five general sections:
• The first section examines Iraq under the rule of Saddam, the immediate post-war aftermath and the development of a violent insurgency in the spring and summer of 2003. It chronicles the insurgency’s inception and how it has evolved from 2003 until 2007 and examines Coalition operations to counter it.
• The second evaluates insurgent patterns of attacks, and Coalition and Iraqi casualties. It also examines insurgent tactics, methods of attack, and the political, psychological and informational warfare lessons from 2003-2006.
• The third section assesses the composition of the insurgency including Iraqi Sunni Arabs (both “Islamists and “Nationalists”), foreign jihadists, and the uncertain status of the Shi’ites. It also addresses the degree to which these factions cooperate or conflict and the role of Iraqi’s neighbors in the insurgency.
• The fourth considers Iraqi views of the threat.
• The fifth and final section offers an assessment of probable outcomes of the conflict and lessons of the war.
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