Methinks you edited and lengthened this post after my first response, no matter...

Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
I don't have a desire to discredit you. You do a fine job of that all by yourself.
Can you hear the one hand clapping?

Your presumption that I would conclude the intelligence to be too thin is pretty sweeping.
I was merely assuming that you had the smarts to know that but... go on prove me wrong then.

I think you are overly risk-averse, ...
Me, risk averse? Got the wrong guy in mind. I can think of a couple of hundred people who would find that pretty funny. Been called a lot of things in my time (both good and bad) but never risk averse.

... so I understand how that could frame your views and your opinion of what a responsible commander looks like, but you really shouldn't let your values, opinions, and judgment speak for what posters should or shouldn't be inclined to think.
You need help again. This time read your own manual FM 6.0 about the difference between taking a calculated risk and a gamble:

2-94. A calculated risk is not the same as a military gamble. A calculated risk is an exposure to chance of injury or loss when the commander can visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. Taking a calculated risk is acceptable. A military gamble is a decision in which a commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome. In the case of a military gamble, the commander decides based on hope rather than reason. The situations that justify a military gamble occur when defeat or destruction of the friendly force is only a matter of time and the only chance for mission accomplishment or preservation of the force lies in the gamble.
Got the picture now?

It would be better to simply say, "I wouldn't have done that," and call it a day. Instead you are just incredulous that others might disagree with you. It's okay, really. it happens often here.
Incredulous that you and others seem to be so imperceptive so as to fail to pick up on the key aspects of this issue and continue to blindly argue in favour of a man who when his moment came failed to make the most simple decision. (This is why I referred to the book; The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions)

Officers are (or should be) judged on their ability to apply good judgement and display a keen ability to quickly and accurately grasp the critical elements of a given situation. Not too much of that around here sadly.

Which actions? Again, you've been all over the map, so clarify what you are talking about.
If you have been reading this thread you will know what actions I have commented on.

What is your definition of confirmation? A POW waving into the night as an SR-71 flew overhead?
Silly.

I for sure am not talking about that level of intel, and I surmise that the planners did not believe they needed that standard to be able to advocate a go for the mission.
Here you surmise in favour of three people (Moorer/Blackburn/Bennett) who got it badly wrong. What was the standard they applied in May 1970 when the reached the decision that 61 POWs were in Son Tay?

You seem unable to grasp that after the operational planning got under way and picked up momentum (like with Market Garden) the boot moved to the wrong foot in that the INTEL people had to prove the camp was empty rather than merely cast reasonable doubt as to a POW presence (which given the location of Son Tay and all the related risks) which would have led to an abort.

You may be prescribing that standard here, and that's okay, but the whole point to this discussion is what the planners knew, when they knew it, and what other information impacted in the decision-making process (there was a lot).
And the bad news is that Adm Train (the man whose testimony you all want to just go away) indicates what they knew and when they knew it.

I think it's fair to say that there were a significant number of details, decisions and factors impacting on the process at the time, and there is a wide range of potentially contradictory information that exist.
I'm sure you think that but I'm not sure you could support that with any concrete facts, could you?

I still believe that the planners tried to make conscientious decisions in the process. You don't seem to think so, and again, that's fine, but don't be surprised that you're expected to bring your A-game when making weighty posts like you have, and to defend your point of view with information.
I seldom enter the fray if I don't have the ammunition to support my case. I stated that Moorer made an imbecilic decision (along the lines of The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions) which could be explained by his being newly appointed, the Peter Principle kicking in or a range of other reasons.

At the end of the day, I don't believe Moorer to be a moral coward, imbecile, or unintelligent, and the contrasting viewpoints in this thread simply demonstrate the beauty of how people can come to different conclusions over the same bit of information.
You don't believe or you don't want to believe? Now your problem would come if you were asked to substantiate that.