AFRICOM and the perception mess

[Dayuhan]

This issue has popped up on a number of threads, and I think it deserves its own discussion.

Moderator's Note

Thread closed on 3rd November 2012 as the main AFRICOM thread also has posts on perceptions.The main AFRICOM thread is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6167

A post by KingJaja on a Nigeria thread is a good place to start...

That's not the point, perception is reality. All the "Als" - Al Qaeda, Al Jazeera and Al Sharpton realise that. That this simple fact is lost on the USG is tragic and difficult to understand.

A textbook case of "how not to do it" was the clumsy announcement of Africom's formation in 2008 and the equally more clumsy search for basing rights in Africa. These two events created a buzz in the local media and generated a lot of negative publicity. Today, the Africom brand is toxic.

An example of this brand toxicity....

http://concernedafricascholars.org/b.../78/abegunrin/

AFRICOM is an example of U.S. military expansion in the name of the war on terrorism, when it is in fact designed to secure Africa’s resources and ensure American interests on the continent. AFRICOM represents a policy of U.S. military-driven expansionism that will only enhance political instability, conflict, and the deterioration of state security in Africa.

Again KingJaja raises a legitimate point:

This is why the USG's misreading of the complex factors that shape public opinion here and its failure to sell its Africa policy to the African public is baffling. There are so many crazy stories flying up and down about America's intentions in SS Africa. If they are not countered, they could do real damage.

It is the job of the US State Department and Africom to contribute to informed opinion on Africom. If you cannot "encourage" prominent columnists / bloggers to write favourable stories, then you shouldn't be in the business of public diplomacy.

The problem here, again, is not reality, it's perception. Most people here realize that AFRICOM is little more than an administrative repackaging of programs that were already existing. Anyone who looks at the resources actually committed to AFRICOM can see that it can't even dream of trying to "secure Africa’s resources and ensure American interests". If anything the actual structure, location and resources of AFRICOM are a compelling testimony to American disinterest. That reality, though, is not the issue: the issue is the perception.

The question is how we managed to turn a minor administrative reshuffle into a public relations debacle, and how we can avoid doing it again.

Thoughts?