You can find the last ICG report on LRA there: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/region...-end-game.aspx

After the UN security council congratulating himself for all the good job they did not do, this is kind of fresh air.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For mustering and maintaining political will
To the African Union:
1. Appoint urgently a special envoy with a robust mandate to coordinate African and other international efforts against the LRA, including by persuading:
a) President Museveni to commit more troops and equipment to the military operation while increasing efforts to protect civilians and rendering it more accountable; and
b) Presidents Kabila (DRC), Boziz (the CAR) and Kiir (South Sudan) to grant the Ugandan army access to all areas where the LRA is active for six months, reviewable after five months, and to instruct their armies to increase civilian protection.
2. Set up the special envoys office with sufficient staff, equipment and resources to operate for at least one year.
To the Government of Uganda:
3. Demonstrate full commitment to anti-LRA efforts by accepting a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated AU special envoy; committing more troops and equipment to the military operation while rendering it more accountable; and increasing efforts to protect civilians.
To the Governments of the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan:
4. Demonstrate full commitment to anti-LRA efforts by accepting a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated special envoy; granting the Ugandan army access to all LRA-affected areas; and ensuring national armies increase efforts to protect civilians.
To the U.S. Government:
5. Support fully the launch of a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated special envoy.
6. Maintain pressure on Uganda, the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan to commit fully to a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated special envoy.
7. Be prepared, along with other donors, to scale down military and development assistance if the four presidents fail to demonstrate appropriate commitment.
8. Appoint a special envoy for the Great Lakes region to work with the AU special envoy in mustering political commitment for anti-LRA efforts.
To the EU:
9. Provide funds to the AU enabling it to set up an office for the special envoy with sufficient resources to lead anti-LRA efforts for at least one year and to establish a Regional Intervention Force (RIF).
For launching an urgent military push prioritising civilian protection
To the Governments of Uganda and the U.S.:
10. Intensify promptly military operations against the LRA, prioritising:
a) increased efforts to protect civilians;
b) enhanced civil-military relations, including by setting up two-way channels of communication with state authorities and other local leaders, such as church leaders and customary chiefs, and, in the CAR and South Sudan, by working closely with self-defence groups;
c) enhanced information management and coordination, including by setting up joint intelligence and operations centres with national armies in the CAR and South Sudan; and
d) strict accountability measures, including by implementing a code of conduct, rules of engagement and investigations of alleged human rights abuses and accusations of illegal exploitation of natural resources.
To the African Union:
11. Finalise the operational and legal framework for a Regional Intervention Force (RIF) that includes the priorities set out in Recommendation 10 above, as well as the standard operating procedures used by the Ugandan army stipulating the quick transfer of women and children LRA escapees to international protection agencies.
For intensifying complementary civilian efforts
To the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA):
12. Coordinate a region-wide Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) program, including by:
a) expanding the communication campaign that encourages LRA fighters to surrender so it covers the whole tri-border region and continue it until LRA groups no longer pose a threat to civilians; and
b) coordinating efforts of international and national NGOs and church groups in the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan to help former LRA members return home safely and reintegrate into civilian life including through job creation programs and psycho-social care.
To the U.S. Government, the EU, the UN and other donors:
13. Support development and implementation of a region-wide DDRRR program and the repair and improvement of communications and transport infrastructure in the LRA-affected area.
For planning ahead
To the AU and its international partners:
14. Draw up a clear exit strategy that foresees the RIF in operation for one year and review after eight months whether a half-year extension is needed.
15. Plan to maintain and support the RIF and DDRRR operations after Kony and his top commanders are caught or killed, until residual LRA groups no longer pose a threat to civilians.
16. Request RIF participating countries to transfer the LRA leaders against whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants (Kony, Odhiambo and Ongwen) to the ICC if they are captured and to hand over other LRA commanders not subject to such arrest warrants to the authorities of their country for prosecution or other appropriate accountability processes.
Nairobi/Brussels, 17 November 2011