Now that I'm not restricted by my Iphone (no keyboard and I'm not a master texter), I can give a more substantive reply.

Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
So now the intel communtiy says this isn't working?
If by "now" you mean "at least since 2007-2008 and more like 2005" then you'd be right! The Intel community (IC) completed an NIE on Afghanistan in 2008 that used words like "grim," "gloomy" and "downward spiral." There was another assessment done a year ago and now this latest one. Unfortunately, the 2008 NIE is still classified because the Bush administration decided not to issue an unclassified executive summary or unclassified key judgments (Some said the administration tried to suppress it - I'm sure that had nothing to do with it coming right before a Presidential election ). However, Washington is a leaky sieve, and thanks to a host of "anonymous senior officials" who can leak without retribution, we basically know the NIE's broad conclusions. You can read two summaries and analysis for yourself here and here although there are many more if you spend a minute on Google. Additionally, there are more details available in Wikileaks if you want to go that route -for obvious reasons, I can't and won't link to them here.

I hope everyone can appreciate the tragic irony of us allowing the intel community to lead us into a threat-centric "strategy" of clear-hold-build; night raids; and outrageous development programs against the resistance aspect of the insurgency internal to Afghanistan (while totally protecting and ignoring the causation of the insanely illegitimate Karzai regime and the Northern Alliance monopoly that is codified by the constitution we helped develop) and doing nothing to address the revolutionary aspect of the insurgency with the Taliban government in exile in Pakistan.
There's a saying that goes something like, "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." In this case, I'd settle for any evidence for the assertion you make here. Maybe I'm wrong, but I seem to recall that "clear, hold and build" was not the brainchild of the IC, but came from a certain coterie of active and retired senior flag officers, advisers like Kilcullen, think-tankers, etc. The strategy was transferred to Afghanistan after the apparent "success" in Iraq. I also seem to recall that many people who knew a thing or two about Afghanistan at that time warned that the TTP's as well as the strategy used in Iraq were not likely to work in Afghanistan, but all these COIN "experts" assured us they'd take Afghanistan's unique circumstances into account.

Now the same intel F-tards say "golly, this isn't working." No kidding. I have yet to meet a single person in the intel business who knows anything about insurgency. Not a one. They do threats. That's all they know.
Just "venting" here, but it kind of pisses me off when someone doesn't do 10 minutes worth of research and fact-checking before impugning an entire profession. People can draw their own conclusions about this statement, I don't feel it necessary to comment on it further.

Insurgency is not about threats, it is about governments that are out of synch and out of touch with the people they deem to govern. God save us from the intel community, and the politicians who listen to them.
Yes, God save us please!

Please tell us who politicians should listen to instead? CNAS? Retired General Officers? The defense industry? Whichever bureaucracy (or foreign power) has the best lobbyists? Serious question.

Of course, I might point out that "threats" are part of intel's raison d'erte and are its most important function whether you choose to accept that fact or not. The primary purpose of intelligence is to provide warning for "threats" be they strategic or tactical. Enemy and potential enemy capabilities and intentions (ie. "threats") are always going to be at the top of the intel priority list. This isn't exactly new. I think I've pointed out to you before that intelligence requirements, which are defined by military Commanders and our civilian leadership, are what drives intelligence and, guess what? Those requirements are largely threat-based. If that bothers you, then you need to take it up with those Commanders and civilian leaders.

Entropy, I actually am one who does not believe that it was a "failure of intel" that led to 9-11; (that was a failure of foreign policy, not intelligence) but we have been over compensating ever since in a dogged pursuit of "threats" to defeat to ensure that it does not happen again. We have build a massive machine to stare at the symptoms, yet have done little to assess that true failure of policy. We could use some of that great talent in the intel community focused on the real problems, that are internal, rather than all staring outward looking for "threats."
Well, you are wrong - 9/11 was an intel failure. As I said previously, intel's primary purpose is to provide strategic warning for such events. As it happens, the IC did know an attack was coming, just not the details. Unfortunately, details matter and the IC messed that up. That's not to say the IC was wholly to blame for 9/11 of course.

Why it refuses to shift focus from the analysis of the symptoms of the problems we face (detailed analysis of various "terrorist" organizations [most of which are actually nationalist insurgent organizations - but why quibble over a person's purpose for action?], the individuals in these organizations, who they talk to, where they sleep, who they call, etc, etc) while completely ignoring analysis of the root causes of this "threat" that lie primarily within the political, policy, operational and tactical approaches of the governments that are being challenged?
Frankly it amazes me that you, as a retired senior officer, do not know the answer to this question. Intel is a support element which helps to guide policy, not dictate it. You seem to think Intel is not only capable of putting policymakers into a box, but should put them into a box. I'm sorry but that is wishful thinking and even dangerous. Intelligence must inform policy, not determine it.

And, if you read some more US-Afghan history, the IC did evolve in exactly the manner you describe. During the post-invasion period (roughly 2002-2004) the intel community assessed that the Taliban was essentially destroyed and was no longer a threat. The IC's focus in Afghanistan therefore shifted to concern about the return of warlordism and chaos in Afghanistan. At the time, the concern was that the Taliban's defeat would create a power vacuum and return Afghanistan to the very conditions that gave rise to the Taliban in the first place. It was in this context that efforts were made to demobilize the "Northern Alliance" factions and begin the process that lead to the 2003 Loya Jirga and 2005 elections. In that context, there's this article which discusses policymaker views at that time as well as a bit of what was going on. Does that sound like an intel-driven threat-based policy discussion to you? The answer is "no" because intel was primarily supporting the various "non-kinetic" initiatives (reconstruction, DDR, demining, etc.) because the intel community believed the Taliban was no longer a threat.

Now, one can say the intel folks got it wrong and focused too much worry on the dangers of a return to warlordism, but I think it's pretty hard to argue what you seem to be arguing, which is that the intel community has been static for 10 years and focused on "threats" to the exclusion of all else.

At the same time, the IC has long been cognizant of corruption in Afghanistan in general and with Karzai in particular. My memory is a bit foggy at this point, but I seem to recall a lot of skepticism regarding Karzai's grandiose plans to reign in corruption and the drug economy after his 2005 election. Whatever skepticism did exist was overwhelmed by a bevy of useful idiots inside the beltway. We've known about the issue of overcentralization of Afghanistan's government for years as well. Questions about that came up immediately after the 2003 Loya Jirga and especially during the 2005 elections. It was ignored because it was decided (not by intel) that Karzai was going to be our guy.

Additionally, the IC has been telling policymakers for years about Pakistan's duplicity - why have policymakers not responded in an effective way? Is that something you can blame on bad intel? It's not like the facts of any of this are new or even controversial and it's not as if policymakers have not been exposed to all of this - they have been, but have ignored it for various reasons. Maybe this will come as a shock to you, but policymakers tend to ignore intel when it conflicts with the policies they'd prefer to implement.

Frankly, the rest of your comments suffer from the basic misunderstanding I just described. In short, while in principal I agree with your signature on Einstein and simplicity, one shouldn't run with it and go from simplicity to simplistic.