In the old days, If Karzai was unsatisfactory we'd just find a momentarily compliant general who was willing to tell us what we want to hear and have him stage a coup, after which he'd stop telling us what we want to hear and do whatever he pleased. Didn't work especially well in the old days, no reason to expect that it would work much better now.
Yes, Karzai is dependent. That doesn't give the US infinite options in dealing with him, because the US is constrained by its own prior efforts to convince the US populace that the Karzai government is "legitimate" and "democratic". To reverse that and take the position that we installed the wrong sort of government and we have to go back and do it all again would be politically unfeasible, not least because it would raise the prospect of another decade-long effort to keep yet another new government in power.
In theory, the US can ditch Karzai, and if they do he will fall. In theory, that provides leverage, and the US should be able to tell Karzai that they'll ditch him if he doesn't do what he's told to do. In practice, we won't do that and he knows it, so the bluff is pointless.
Even if Karzai would do what RCJ wants him to do, there's not a snowball's chance in hell that the Taliban would settle for shared patronage and a piece of the action. They want the whole thing and all they have to do to get it is hold on until we leave. Why should they compromise, except as a tactical step aimed at eventual victory?
I don't think this is compatible with what you wrote earlier:
If the problem is "the cultural reality of Afghan patronage", how can you say that "the single essential task is to change the government to a form that leverages the patronage culture toward stability"? If your earlier post is accurate, the essential task is not to change the government, but to change the cultural reality, because that cultural reality will dictate the actual pattern of governance no matter what formal structure you put in place. Culture trumps structure, every time.The cultural reality of Afghan patronage. This is an all or nothing society. If you are on the in team, you have full chance at power, land, influence, wealth. If you are on the out team you get scraps. When there are major swings of political power it drives an equally major swing of patronage.
Do you really think the US should be committing itself to an effort to alter Afghan cultural reality?
It may well be true that Afghan stability depends on a change in this culture... but do we really need stability in Afghanistan? I submit that we do not need it and are not in a position to achieve it with the time and resources we are prepared to commit. All we need is to assure that all of the contending parties understand that the cost of attacking us or sheltering those who do exceed any possible benefits.
Bookmarks