The USN was enlarged to face the RN after 1895.
Pres. Cleveland was fed up with a cool and relaxed UK reply in a Venezuelan-British Guyana border conflict. The British knew that the U.S. had no power in the region for want of a powerful fleet.
About a decade later, the USN was still clearly inferior, but a relevant force as long as the British had to patrol many other waters (especially the North Sea with a battle fleet + Atlantic and Indian Ocean with cruisers).
Americans and their belief in demand as driver of an economy are really funny at times. It makes no sense from a macroeconomic point of view (the U.S middle class rather has to thank the Chinese for working in part for mere promises of physical returns), but it's really amusing.
The same goes for the American belief in the importance of the USN for world-wide secured shipping on the Oceans. Pirates arise as first real threat to shipping in decades, the USN plays a tiny role in an inefficient multinational countermeasure (basically comparable to Indian efforts) and the Americans still think that it's their and only their navy that keeps global trade possible.
Many people would be surprised if they learned how much % value (not volume or mass) of global trade happens with air freight services, not maritime shipping.
Bookmarks