I think the Suez is very much the wrong analogy. Historical analogies are only a little bit useful and sometimes less than that if people get wrapped around the axle debating if the analogy is the right one or not; but I think the rise of the rise of the German navy before WWI is more appropriate one as far as real threats are concerned.
If Taiwan were lost it would be a serious naval defeat. Preventing Red China from taking the island means keeping control of the Taiwan Strait and that is a naval task. If we could not help the Taiwanese do it, it would be because our Navy was weak relative to a hostile navy. We would then build it up so it was strong again. Since the start of the 20th century that is what we have always done. I judge we would do it again.
It would be expensive. Navies always are. But it may not be as expensive as feared. We could afford all the contracting fol-der-al in the past. A serious naval defeat tends to concentrate the mind of nations and things tend to get done more better.
But the best way to avoid that expense is to keep the Navy strong enough, and our alliances strong enough so that the Red Chinese aren't tempted to try it. That would be expensive too, but only a tiny fraction of my above listed alternative. Taking, holding, crossing and continued holding of the straits is a pretty tall order and the force needed to frustrate that isn't nearly so big as the alternative listed above.
We wouldn't have to spend anything if we just told the Taiwanese too-da-loo of course; but the long term consequences of abandoning a free nation with whom we are formally allied to an expansionist police state may be rather bad.
The reason for concern here is the nature of Red China. India is a large country and it is strengthening its' navy. We don't mind that a bit. If the Australians decided to build some aircraft carriers and 20 nuke boats we would stand up and cheer. The French could decide they needed a balanced 200 ship fleet and we would be sighing with relief. But Red China is a concern. It won't be forever though. I am optimistic that it will eventually turn into something considerably less scary. So our task, in cooperation with allies, is to keep them from yielding to the temptation to embark upon a glorious naval adventure until they get to that less scary state and they don't want to anymore. We can do this best, in my view, by maintaining a strong Navy and system of alliances; not yielding to angst, throwing up our hands and deciding we are doomed and we'd better get used to it.
That may be viewed as trying to control rather than trying to influence, but I think that is a distinction without a difference in this case. If you want to influence a potentially aggressive nation with a strong navy, you had better have a strong navy too.
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