SWJ Small Wars Survey 2012

[AmericanPride]

To me that just highlights the inadequacies of the foreign policy establishment. We've repeatedly committed forces and resources to tasks we have no appropriate tools to accomplish, with wildly contradictory goals (such as wanting to install independent democratic governments that support US objectives). Favorable political outcomes in these conditions are so improbable that they approach impossibility.

We are ineffective because the task is absurd. It was recognized from the start that full defeat of the Taliban required the development of a fully functioning Afghan government, broadly recognized as legitimate and capable of governing. The military task was to suppress the Taliban long enough for this to occur. The problem is that we can't make it occur, so we're stuck with eternal suppression. This is a fool's errand, and a mission that should never have been assigned. The political leadership is absolutely responsible for the "nation building" mission. That mission is implicit in the entire concept of "installing democracy", and that was the centerpiece of the goal the political establishment adopted.

Certainly the military side of the picture has been flawed, and there were many things that could have been done differently or better. At root, though, the critical flaw in the entire effort is on the policy side: the lack of goals that are practical, realistic, and achievable with the time and resources we are willing to commit.

Once committed to conflict, the role of the "foreign policy establishment" is very minimal, and reduced mostly to capitalizing on the gains of the military effort. But this effort has not produced any measurable or suitable gains to be used to forward America's political interests abroad. Occupation is a military function in the absence of a capable political authority in the defeated country. By most measures, the military failed in this regard in both Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitating the emergence of a durable resistance and the blunting of American goals.

When Bush addressed the country on 07 October 2001, he stated the goals of military operations in Afghanistan were to: "disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime." He made no mention of nation-building. The ultimatum to the Taliban government prior to the invasion made no demand of conversion to democracy, but insisted that the Taliban "close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals." On the same day, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that the aim in Afghanistan "is to create conditions for sustained anti-terrorist and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan..." to "make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations." CENTCOM's website lists the goals in Afghanistan as "clear", to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries like the ones al-Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 9/11." If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.

The responsibility to "define GWOT" lies with those who declared it. Of course they can't define it, because nobody can; it's an absurd concept to begin with. Terrorism may be called a tactic or a strategy, but it isn't an actor, and you can't declare war on a strategy or a tactic.

Senior military leadership has never requested for clarification on their role and mission. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have made public their intentions in the GWOT, and more specifically, in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's a convenient lie to claim ignorance in defense of the military's failure to produce favorable conditions in either country. This is awfully similar to another country's "stab-in-the-back" theory and is just as laughable.

Since when has the military been responsible for the decision to go to war? The first step in achieving desirable outcomes is the selection of reasonable and achievable goals and the application of suitable tools. This is not the job of the military. If the military is assigned to pursue an unachievable goal that is totally inappropriate to pursuit by military means, is it their fault if the effort is unsuccessful.

I never claimed the military was "responsible for the decision to go to war". Labeling the task as "unachievable" is another convenient ruse to excuse the failure of the military to accomplish its mission. I frequently hear how the US military is the best in the world. It is certainly the best equipped, best funded, and best trained; so how exactly are the objectives stated by Bush, Rumsfeld, and CENTCOM, "unachievable"? The military was admittedly unprepared for the initial requirements in Afghanistan, and to some extent Iraq, but that was ten years ago. Ignorance of the goals and an inability to meet them are not excuses that last ten years.

I don't see how either of those wars is a "pressing national security requirement".

President Bush saw differently, as did the entirety of the national security establishment through numerous public statements, publications, and actions. Only in 2008 with the change in administration and the virtual collapse of the economy did priorities shift. The GWOT consumed twice as much treasure as WW2 when adjusted for inflation. Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?