Colombia, FARC & insurgency (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

An IISS Strategic Comment

The death of FARC rebel leader Alfonso Cano during a Colombian special forces raid on 4 November 2011 was the latest in a series of government successes against the country's largest left-wing insurgent group. A fascinating article republished here from local magazine Semana shows in rare detail how his death resulted from a well-planned and adventurous intelligence operation – involving officers infiltrating communities deep inside FARC territory, masquerading as shopkeepers, drivers and more.

The Semana article, which is based largely on interviews with some of the intelligence operatives involved in Operation Odyssey against Cano, may not tell the whole story. However, it shows in detail how intelligence, mostly human intelligence, built up over time and combined with well-planned military operations can transform counter-insurgency operations.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...-alfonso-cano/

[Strickland]

If Plan Colombia is not an operational model of successfully COIN that can be replicated, then it is a strategic policy model of success that should be replicated. If one reviews the process that was followed by the Clinton administration between Pastrana's initial call for a Marshall Plan for Colombia, and Clinton's appeal for Congressional support during the 2000 State of the Union Address, then one will discover a process that should be emulated by all future administrations working within divided government. The genius of Plan Colombia is not to be found in its operational successes or failures, but rather in the simple fact that it satisfied everyone in some manner - human rights advocates, tough on drugs folks, interventionists, non-interventionists, environmentalists (yes - they were pissed about spraying), SOUTHCOM, Congress, and most importantly - the Colombians. It was the policy that become something to everyone. It is the essence of good policy via compromise.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to AbuM for raising this issue and citing Colombia as an example:

The argument essentially goes that, as weapon power has increased exponentially in past millennia, so too has the density of combatants in the field appeared to decrease substantially. The relationship here is obvious, but also obviously not one-sided. The increased lethality of weapons raises the risk of concentrated formations, but additionally, technological advances in logistics, battlefield mobility and communications enable more dispersed formations as well.

Link:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...dispersal.html

AbuM cites a Colombian paper, which is in Spanish and defeats Google Translator.