Initial Officer Selection

[JMA]

I had read the following quote before but not read that it had activiely been used in the lead up to WW2:

I divide officers into four classes -- the clever, the lazy, the stupid and the industrious. Each officer possesses at least two of these qualities. Those who are clever and industrious are fitted for the high staff appointments. Use can be made of those who are stupid and lazy. The man who is clever and lazy is fit for the very highest commands. He has the temperament and the requisite nerves to deal with all situations. But whoever is stupid and industrious must be removed immediately."

Attributed, circa 1933
General Baron Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord (1878-1943)
German Chief of Army Command (1930-33)

Then we have the following explanation which does not seem to have the proper attributes but nevertheless makes interesting reading:

German Army officer selection

If there is more detail on this out there it would be appreciated...

[ganulv]

Also when the physical and the academic are weighted it tends to diminish the importance of leadership qualities that are required and need to be selected for. The leadership qualities requirement should be absolute and not part of a balancing act with weighted scores from SATS/ACT results and a physical rating.

Sadly the US seems to have bought into the 'whole person' stuff when selecting potential officers. […] What seems bizarre is that the most crucial aspect being the leadership potential is relegated to a mere 30% and based on a school teachers assessment. Can't be right can it?

I have an acquaintance who taught at West Point immediately prior to her retirement from the Army a couple of years ago and the next time I have a chance I will try and remember to ask her about the logic of the application process. But at first blush I wonder if the criteria may be geared toward selecting those individuals most likely to see the West Point experience through to its conclusion rather than toward selecting those individuals most likely to be good officers. From afar my impression is that the right to wear a class ring from a U.S. Service academy is a first rate achievement. But I also have the impression that a lot of the tasks mastered (or at least borne) do not necessarily have anything to do with the training of a good officer. I am sure some reading the above will say, “What the hell does this guy know?” while others will say, “That’s putting it politely.”

For what it is worth, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy is the most difficult of the Service academies to gain admittance to, as well as one of the most difficult of all undergraduate institutions in the United States for the same.

[Ulenspiegel]

Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord also made the following statement:

"Vorschriften sind für die Dummen"

Rules are for the fools. :-)

[JMA]

I have an acquaintance who taught at West Point immediately prior to her retirement from the Army a couple of years ago and the next time I have a chance I will try and remember to ask her about the logic of the application process. But at first blush I wonder if the criteria may be geared toward selecting those individuals most likely to see the West Point experience through to its conclusion rather than toward selecting those individuals most likely to be good officers. From afar my impression is that the right to wear a class ring from a U.S. Service academy is a first rate achievement. But I also have the impression that a lot of the tasks mastered (or at least borne) do not necessarily have anything to do with the training of a good officer. I am sure some reading the above will say, “What the hell does this guy know?” while others will say, “That’s putting it politely.”

For what it is worth, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy is the most difficult of the Service academies to gain admittance to, as well as one of the most difficult of all undergraduate institutions in the United States for the same.

I am sure that every aspect of human endeavor can be improved upon and at least refined.

My first question is whether the aim of the officer training is to produce future generals or to produce thousands of officers who then make their way in the military on an 'up or out' basis. In just about every case it is the latter... but the question needs to be asked, is this the right way?

Then based on the above and other considerations how important is it to throughly test and screen potential officers before they are taken into service and start training? We have variations from the five day British (and other) AOSB (Army Officer Selection Board) to a paper assessment with an interview (and then use the training course itself as the main selection mechanism).

The next aspect is the weighting of the selection criteria for admission to the training. Is the 60:30:10 (academic:leadership: physical) weighting correct or should a specific SAT/ACT score be a pass without weighting. The same with the physical should an assessment be made as to the physical health and potential of an individual be made on a pass or fail basis (and as the kid will be between 18-22 one would take into account how much the individual will 'fill out' over the training period). Next, should the military rely on the leadership assessments of high school teachers? I suggest not. So here we have a major issue which (will not be changed anytime soon but) deserves some thought.

Then there is the issue of the timing and composition of the degree course which officers (undoubtedly) require. Sandhurst nowadays takes in cadets 80%+ of which have degrees (of their own choosing). The US seems to have different models but effectively demand a degree before promotion to the rank of captain. Or is the trick to get them bright eyed and bushy tailed between 18-22 and select and filter carefully (with an eye on identifying those with general staff potential) then taking them through company level command before assessing whether there is a long career ahead. If yes then you sit individually with each officer and plan his future (subject of course to his achieving certain laid down milestones along the way) and send him off to university (on full pay) for a few years to prepare him for the future. Attendance on the Command and Staff Course and the degree wiuld be required before promotion to Lt Col. (which would be after 15-20 years of commissioned service).

Now rather than the rather brutal 'up or out' policy those who are not considered to have general staff potential are offered a 'low road' career option or an exit from the service. The exit process would involve attendance at a university on full pay to enable the person to obtain a degree to prepare him for a second career after the military. It is important that young men who have given the best years of their lives to the service are not discarded but treated with dignity and respect.

There is another side to this and it is that if the selection process was more focussed on the long term potential of potential officers it would mean that a greater reliance would fall on creating platoon and other company level officers from the ranks. This would lead to marked reduction in the quality of company level NCOs if the 'best' were commissioned (or made platoon commanders) unless a serious leadership and NCO development programme was developed concurrently.

It is really all about thinking. The current systems 'work' for most countries but outsider logic and clarity often helps with the process of improvement. If you can ask people in the service the 'why' question and they can't answer the problem lies with them and not you.

Remember too: The Mind Is Like A Parachute, It Only Works When It's Open

[JMA]

Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord also made the following statement:

"Vorschriften sind fr die Dummen"

Rules are for the fools. :-)

Yes, I wonder what a world with no rules would be like?

Clearly he had a clear thinking mind like another of that era being von Lettow-Vorbeck.

Have you read his My reminiscences of East Africa? He certainly gave the Brits and South Africans the run around in East Africa 1914-18. A guerilla war genius. I wonder why he is not studied more widely?

[davidbfpo]

JMA you asked:

...von Lettow-Vorbeck....Have you read his My reminiscences of East Africa? He certainly gave the Brits and South Africans the run around in East Africa 1914-18. A guerilla war genius. I wonder why he is not studied more widely?

The WW1 German General von Lettow-Vorbeck has appeared before on SWC IIRC, although not sure whether in any depth. Added:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=651

My response to why is he not studied more widely: the campaign however skilled was a faraway sideshow and he was a mere nuisance to the Allied effort (mainly British Empire) on the main front. Secondly he lost and in the inter-war years any information gathering and writing outside Germany was focussed on the main front(s). I also wonder if his reliance on African soldiers (Askari's) had an impact, especially in South Africa. Perhaps his prowess as a guerilla has outweighed his skill as a leader?

[Ulenspiegel]

Yes, I wonder what a world with no rules would be like?

Clearly he had a clear thinking mind like another of that era being von Lettow-Vorbeck.

Have you read his My reminiscences of East Africa? He certainly gave the Brits and South Africans the run around in East Africa 1914-18. A guerilla war genius. I wonder why he is not studied more widely?

In German it is more regulations, SOPs, not laws. He referred to the obvious problem that known regulations produce a high degree of predictability, something not very healthy in war.

[The Cuyahoga Kid]

From afar my impression is that the right to wear a class ring from a U.S. Service academy is a first rate achievement. But I also have the impression that a lot of the tasks mastered (or at least borne) do not necessarily have anything to do with the training of a good officer. I am sure some reading the above will say, “What the hell does this guy know?” while others will say, “That’s putting it politely.”

I'm biased, but from my limited experience, I'm highly inclined to agree. Service Academies may have higher performing alumni than other commissioning sources (I assume this is the case, don't actually know), but I think that's because of selection bias more than anything else, and despite the type of training provided there.

[Boondoggle]

I've had that quote on the wall behind me in my office for years. First remember hearing it (of all places) when I was a 2ndLt at The Basic School.

[JMA]

Moving right along to officer development...

The paper Officer Development : A Contemporary Roadmap by Maj William D Linn, II is an intelligent contribution to this matter. In the paper Maj Linn provides a comparison with the systems used by US allies.

FWIW I agree with much of what he writes... but obviously not all.

One example of an area of agreement is:

Officers should select degrees that have applicability to their profession, but not all will lie within the traditional confines of military-related fields. The Army should recognize that both the degree and the environment in which the officer earns his degree are of equal importance.

[ganulv]

Apropos from The Paper of Record earlier this week. LINK

[JMA]

Apropos from The Paper of Record earlier this week. LINK

Good find of a good article.

I suggest IMHO the key to his thought pattern is the following:

To know whether you can trust a particular intuitive judgment, there are two questions you should ask: Is the environment in which the judgment is made sufficiently regular to enable predictions from the available evidence? The answer is yes for diagnosticians, no for stock pickers. Do the professionals have an adequate opportunity to learn the cues and the regularities? The answer here depends on the professionals’ experience and on the quality and speed with which they discover their mistakes. Anesthesiologists have a better chance to develop intuitions than radiologists do.

This is of course why the Brits have a brigadier, a full colonel and a half colonel for each three day Main Board AOSB of 40 candidates with a major or senior captain per group of eight.

Of course in the Brit army they now have now 60 years of experience with the 'modern' selection process whereby they can access the records back to the AOSB for all of the current general staff and note how accurate their predictions and findings back then were (as well as on the various promotional courses along the way).

I wonder what the author would find if he were to revisit the existing AOSB today?

[Stan]

Indeed a good article and find !

Just one more reason that the selection process is carried out by those who have actually "been there, done that".

The story was always the same: our ability to predict performance at the school was negligible. Our forecasts were better than blind guesses, but not by much.

And this quote sounds like the politicians running the Army

The statistical evidence of our failure should have shaken our confidence in our judgments of particular candidates, but it did not. It should also have caused us to moderate our predictions, but it did not. We knew as a general fact that our predictions were little better than random guesses, but we continued to feel and act as if each particular prediction was valid.

[JMA]

Indeed a good article and find !

Just one more reason that the selection process is carried out by those who have actually "been there, done that".

And this quote sounds like the politicians running the Army

Your point is good in that this is a story from a (then) young psychologist who was involved in the process of selecting people for a duty beyond his understanding or comprehension (being in this case infantry officers for combat duty) little wonder he got it wrong.

This officer selection (AOSB) should not be staffed by those officers who are available but by the best who may need to be pulled off operations and leave for the purpose (not joking). Only the best should be tasked with this selection process.

[Stan]

This officer selection (AOSB) should not be staffed by those officers who are available but by the best who may need to be pulled off operations and leave for the purpose (not joking). Only the best should be tasked with this selection process.

JMA,
Completely agree. My selection for senior NCO included a bunch of admin weenies looking for shined boots and nice uniforms

My education and experience had no part in this process. How ironic that a decade later they would invite me back to active service on the dark continent.

What a shame and a real waste of time !

[JMA]

Finally I got round to finding the recent BBC Sandhurst series on Youtube:

Sandhurst : Episode 1

Sandhurst : Episode 2

Sandhurst : Episode 3

Enjoy

[JMA]

This thread seems to have died a natural death.

Thought I would add this:

Unobtrusive indicators of the "good [combat] officer":

* Distrust any officer with a perfect or near perfect record of efficiency reports. he is conforming to the existing value system and will have no interest in changing it.

* Look carefully at a man who gets low marks on "tact" and who "deviates from accepted doctrine." He may be creative.

* An officer who gets low marks on loyalty is especially valuable, for he is unwilling to acquiesce to his superior's policies without debate. He is likely to have an independent mind.

* Be suspicious of any officer who has accumulated awards for valour without having sustained physical injury. Trust a Purple Heart wearer.

* Distrust any officer who has had "all his tickets punched" and who sports an array of staff awards on his chest. He is likely to be a manager playing the system.

* Distrust all officers who use "buzz words" and have a poor vocabulary. they tend to be managers of the most obsequious type. True leadership is likely to be foreign to them.

* Trust a man who heads for the sound of the guns and has repeated tours of combat and command duty at all unit levels; it is preferable that he have only minimal exposure to staff work.

* Trust an officer who was seen by his men in combat and whose command performed well and showed low rates of drug use, fragging, body counting, etc.

* Search for the officer whose readiness reports indicate a high percentage of equipment which is deficient. He is a man addicted to the truth.

- Gabriel/Savage, Crisis in Command, 1978

[Fuchs]

Eike Middeldorf et al, "Taktik im Russlandfeldzug" (Tactics in the Russian Campaign), 1956, p. 228

[About how to hunt guerrilla groups]Die geeignete Form hierzu sind Jagdkommandos in Strke von hchstens 40 bis 60 Mann. Sie verlangen aber eine andere Art von Fhrern und Kmpfern als die Kampftruppe sie fordert. Die besten Kmpfer gegen Banden waren meist sogenannte "Auenseiter", d.h. Soldaten, in deren Beurteilungen oft die Bemerkung "schwieriger Untergebener" zu finden war.

The suitable form for this are Jagdkommandos [literally: hunting commands] in strength of at most 40 to 60 men. They demand a different kind of leaders and fighters than the combat troops demand. The best fighters against gangs were mostly so-called "outsiders", means soldiers in whose personnel reviews often had remarks such as "difficult subordinate".

[davidbfpo]

On another thread, not on this theme, Ken W. posted this valuable observation:

The need for immediate, unthinking obedience served a valid military purpose for many centuries but it has become a harmful anachronism in the last 100 or so years.

Link in Post 15:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15109

I have assumed this is a valid point. Has this been recognised in contemporary officer selection? Or should it?

[Fuchs]

It depends.
Sometimes very urgent action is required. In this case the superior needs to have enough trust of his subordinates that they execute asap without much 'thinking'.

Those who need bureaucracy-given authority to enforce such a rapid reaction are likely the same who are not competent enough to convince their subordinates in less urgent situations and demand 'unthinking obedience' on such occasions, too.