Could the CAP concept work in Afghanistan?

[COMMAR]

I understand all sides of Vietnam being a no-win & there were many reasons for that; Political, Cultural, Tactical, & Strategic. I also understand that many of those issues migrate to A'stan. However the CAPs had many successes in their areas of influence w/little serious support. A lot of the Major short comings came fr/things beyond their control.

Here's the rub.
In 2yrs all Combat Forces will.. be.. out. I hear the Negatives: The Gov't of A'stan is CORRUPT, correct. Small Units operating at Distance are vulnerable, also correct, etc. All reasons would be just as valid for leaving no US troops, But thats not an option. Left behind will be MTT, ETT, some CS, & SOF.

There are many USMC Rifle Squads already acting in a CAP role w/relative independence; owning their own Battle-space, developing their own networks, & training their own local militia. All of this is coordinated at the top but it is the Squads & Sqd Ldrs running the show.

Thanks to Programs like Combat Hunter (teaching Profiling, Networking, Man-Tracking, & Advanced Patrolling & Observation Techniques), Squad Fires (bringing the squad the ability to call up to Level II CAS) & DO/ECO the Rifle Squad has many more tools in his Kit than ever before.

EMPLOYMENT

I wouldn't employ them in major or densely populated areas, those are Main Missions, I'd keep those for the ETTs & the ANSF. The CAPs would operate on the Margins.

I would start in the remote areas, in the villages that would most welcome that type of presence. I'd insert them in rural territory the taliban would need to retake to operate comfortably. The Goal wouldn't be to actively hunt the taliban, leave that for SOF, just disrupt & deny. Deny, Deny, Deny.

We can play the long game on the cheap. Let the ETT continue to build & develop ANSF. Let SOF go Kinetic, picking them off 1 raid at a time. Let the SF coordinate & build. And let the CAP Deny on the margins, denying the ability to set up his remote safe havens.

W/a CAP Platoon in many of these remote areas the SF can disperse in much smaller numbers, spread influence, & coordinate across a larger AO. Let SF MSGTs handle the Strategic nature of these relationships. Let the CAP run the day-to-day Local/Tactical end.

They don't need to be nor do I think they should be in the same chain of command. SF's mission is Strategic, the CAPs is Local/Tactical. However operating together (having 2-3man SF tm in the same village) will allow SF to remain fluid & centered on their Strat Goals, leaving village security to CAP, also allowing CAP Ldrs access to Sr. guidance.

Deployment

In 2008 2nd BN, &th Marines deployed to Farah Prov. as a Training BN, under basically the same "Non-Combat" authority as units will have in 2014. It eventually became a Combat/Training BN b/c for the most part(except for SOF) they were alone. They were successful but took a lot of casualties TF-2/7 was stretched over 10,000sq miles & at 1 pt over 16,000sqmi.

In 2014 the USMC can Deploy a 2-3 BN CAP based Special Purpose MAGTF.

Rough Draft: TF-2/7 deployed 70man Reinforced Rifle Platoons most at 70-100mi of dispersion. Each Squad separated to train, advise, & lead its own Police Station in the IDR FDD Programs.

Take 2-3 Infantry BNs & develop a 5-6mth CAP based PTP, similar to the ETT (culture, language, isolation) training-cycle, fr/the squad up start with:

• A 18-20man CAP Plt, pulling fr/Weapons Plt to fill SDM, RTO, CLIC, & Sapper slots

• Similar to TF 2/7 reinforce the Rifle Plt HQ (Plt Cmdr, Plt Sgt, Plt Guide, RTO, Corpsman) w/support Marines & a PSD fr/Weapons Plt & or Company. Rifle Plt HQ operates freely across 3 CAPs & coordinates objectives

• Company HQ operating on the Tenets of Distributed Ops & the BN as well. Weapons Coy is BN QRF. SPMAGTF HQ coordinates w/HHQ

[carl]

There are many USMC Rifle Squads already acting in a CAP role w/relative independence; owning their own Battle-space, developing their own networks, & training their own local militia. All of this is coordinated at the top but it is the Squads & Sqd Ldrs running the show.

...The Goal wouldn't be to actively hunt the taliban, leave that for SOF, just disrupt & deny. Deny, Deny, Deny.

...Let SOF go Kinetic, picking them off 1 raid at a time.

Do the squads now operating as de-facto CAPs and would your notional CAPs have real power to shape or even veto SOF raids in their areas? I can think of little worse for a CAP at a critical point in building their relationship with their community than to have a raid come in without prior coordination one night, kill several of the wrong people, then be gone in the morning leaving just the bodies behind.

I ask because I've read that at least in the past, SOF tends to swan about on their own without much regard for local forces.

Also, I think who is in the CAP is critical. Would you just use the people who happen to be in a unit you picked for this or specially select them?

[jmm99]

COMMAR:

Carl asked a similar question, but re: SOF. Mine is directed to control of the local police and local militia.

Lt.Col. McBreen's Notes (pt. 7, p.3 pdf; my emphasis):

Each Marine was a combined leader. Marine riflemen were team leaders, Marine fire team leaders were squad leaders. The Marine squad leader commanded the CAP in combat. Westmoreland's order prohibiting US leaders from commanding Vietnamese troops was ignored.

How do you address the command structure re: the local security forces ?

Regards

Mike

[COMMAR]

Do the squads now operating as de-facto CAPs and would your notional CAPs have real power to shape or even veto SOF raids in their areas? I can think of little worse for a CAP at a critical point in building their relationship with their community than to have a raid come in without prior coordination one night, kill several of the wrong people, then be gone in the morning leaving just the bodies behind. I ask because I've read that at least in the past, SOF tends to swan about on their own without much regard for local forces.

I got out before Marines redeployed to A'stan but in Iraq several SOF missions occurred in areas we were developing and as far as I understood it the de-conflicting of missions happened much farther up the chain than the Plt or Coy level. Plt Cmdr would get word fr/the CO & it was usually, "accommodate these Gentlemen"; I doubt much is any different now.

CAP authority should fall along the same lines as other ISAF Training teams like the ETT. Not clear on ETT's exact chain, x-many teams fall in y-training command's AO. Not being in the same chain means SOF & ISAF-Training AO's overlap, conflicting interests occur & CAP would follow the same guidelines as the ETT. To me thats a good thing b/c they have different missions (the Tactical& the Strategic) working towards the same goal.

No team's an Island. As I said, I would deploy CAP w/in an existing INF-BN w/out gutting it. With TF-2/7 each Squad led its own Police District the P-Cmdr &/or Plt-Sgt traveled between them every few days Coordinating, Facilitating, & given Cmd Guidance. The Coys had Plts operating 70-100mi fr/the Coy HQ. A CAP enabled BN would be no different than BN-2/7, the SPMAGTF-HQ would report to ISAF Training Cmd.

Also, I think who is in the CAP is critical. Would you just use the people who happen to be in a unit you picked for this or specially select them?

When you look at the Al Anbar Sons of Iraq militias, the neighborhood security forces, Police Districts in Ramadi who were lived, trained, fought for by single squads for whole deployments w/out being specifically trained for that type of mission. Many present day Marine RS spend months in 1 Squad-level outpost attached to ANSF patrolling the same neighborhood, building relationships in virtual isolation.

For the CAP, w/the influx of Marines fr/Weapons I would shift the 1st-timers &potential hard-cases to the Rifle Plt HQ, but that hasn't shown as a problem w/current RS.

COMMAR: Carl asked a similar question, but re: SOF. Mine is directed to control of the local police and local militia. How do you address the command structure re: the local security forces?

I really don't think you need to look further than what Marine RS are already doing w/local Police/Militia, but to say 'Command' would be tricky better to say Lead. In remote Squad Outposts Every Marine is a Leader to the ANSF, but Mentoring is usually done along the lines that McBreen wrote.

What I've understood about CAP is their Main Objective was to Deny the use of x-villages to the enemy. By building & developing local Defense to the point of self-sufficiency then turn them over.

To that end they controlled the area around their village like a tiny AO, they:

• Developed their own Intel Networks
• Lead "Advised" their own Combat Patrols
• Destroyed enemy Infrastructure
• Lead community enhancement, build projects
• Arranged Medical & Humanitarian Aid

This doesn't replace SOF. Marine Inf-Coys are doing these very things right now & SOF teams are working in conjunction in the same communities. Having CAP focus on building & protecting the immediate area of remote villages allows SOF to work within the same villages with freedom to pursue their broader objective, this has/is already being done in Population-Centers at the Coy-level.

A new CAP would continue these Micro-AO missions feeding Intel up the chain executing Ops down the Chain. Missions involving SOF w/local CAP would happen no different then they do now w/Coys, they're usually handed down fr/the top w/Missions of Opportunity discussed locally.

[davidbfpo]

If the CAP concept is suitable today or after 2013-2014 for Afghanistan, surely the areas for deployment are the non-Pashtun areas, where at least there maybe more of a welcome? Notably in the north, centre and west.

In the Pashtun-majority areas the time for CAP has evaporated. It is easy to speculate that a CAP in a "platoon house" will become a target for the Taliban and allies. The first "house" and CAP that is overwhelmed will lead to a political re-appraisal, since the CAP is only likely to American, I simply cannot see it being sustainable politically at home.